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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
and
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LC. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO
UPS'S 10.17.12 MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Claimant, Michael Vawter, by and through his attorney of record, Rick D. Kallas, of the law firm,
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718 and JRP 3 (F) hereby files
the Claimant's Response to UPS's 10.17.12 Motion For Reconsideration.

Vawter I Claimant's Briefln Response to UPS' s 10.17 .12. Motion For Reconsideration

Page 1

(I)

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON RECONSIDERATION

When ruling on a Motion For Reconsideration, the Industrial Commission applies the following
standards to determine whether any of its findings of fact and conclusions of law need to be changed:
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive
as to all matters adjudicated, provided that within twenty days from the date of filing
the decision, any party may move for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. A
motion for reconsideration must "present to the Commission new reasons factually
and legally to support [reconsideration] rather than rehashing evidence previously
presented." Curtis v. MH King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005). The
Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments simply because the
case was not resolved in the party's favor.
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual
findings or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. On
reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions in the
decision. However, the Commission is not compelled to make findings of fact during
reconsideration. Davidson v. HH Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986).
Mccrorey v. Boise Paving and Asphalt Co. and Explorer Insurance Co. and State of
Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, pp. 1-2, LC. 2000-025583, Order Denying
Reconsideration (Filed: 6.23 .11 ).
UPS has alleged that the Industrial Commission committed the following three (3) general errors
in its Motion For Reconsideration:
1.

The Industrial Commission allegedly erred by applying the doctrine of quasi estoppel to eliminate
ISIF liability;

2.

The Industrial Commission allegedly erred by refusing to apply the doctrine of res judicata to bar
the Claimant from collecting additional past denied medical benefits from UPS; and,

3.

The Industrial Commission allegedly erred by awarding attorney's fees for UPS's unreasonable
denial of benefits after the Supreme Court dismissed UPS's 2nd failed interlocutory appeal on
1.30.12.
The three (3) general errors that UPS complains of can be identified with relative certainty

because UPS gave them sub-headings in its Brief. However, within each sub-heading it is difficult to
identify those specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that UPS takes umbrage with because UPS
failed to specifically identify the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that it challenges on
reconsideration by reciting specific paragraphs within the Commission's 9.28.12 decision. With that in
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mind, the Claimant will attempt to explain why the Industrial Commission should reject each of UPS' s
arguments and deny its Motion For Reconsideration.

(II)

1.

ARGUMENT

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE QUASI
ESTOPPEL ISSUE
UPS first argued that it was error for the Industrial Commission to apply the doctrine of quasi

estoppel to assist the Commission in its determination of ISIF liability because that doctrine was not
specifically listed as a noticed issue in the Industrial Commission's 3.1 7 .12 Notice of Hearing and was
not pied as an affirmative defense by ISIF.
The Industrial Commission should reject UPS's argument because the question of ISIF liability
was clearly before the Industrial Commission as Issue No. 4 in the Industrial Commission's 3.7.12
Notice of Hearing:
4.

Whether ISIF is liable under Idaho Code§ 72-332, and, if so, apportionment under
the Carey formula (See 3 .7.12 Notice of Hearing).

When it determined whether the ISIF should be held liable for any portion of the Claimant's
permanent and total disability, the Industrial Commission had the inherent jurisdiction to determine any
sub-issue that would be relevant to that determination. The Industrial Commission has a long history of
exercising its inherent jurisdiction to determine disputed sub-issues that are not specifically addressed by
the pleadings or listed in a notice of hearing if the determination of those sub-issues is necessary to a fair
and just determination of the primary listed issues:
Claimant argues that the Nelson defense was not a noticed issue and the defense was
waived by Defendants. The Nelson defense was not a noticed issue but whether
Claimant incurred an occupational disease was a noticed issue. (See Watson v. Joslin
Millwork and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, LC. No. 2008-017579, Order
on Reconsideration and Pending Motions, p. 6, '1" 1) (italics supplied).
Preliminarily, the Commission recognizes that neither party has specifically raised
Nelson as an issue in this occupational disease case. Indeed, reference to the rule is
altogether absent from the briefs of the parties. Nevertheless, the Commission feels
compelled to address the applicability of the Nels on rule to the facts of this case. The
second noticed issued is whether Claimant suffers from a compensable occupational
disease. Claimant must satisfy the various elements of an occupational disease in
order for the disease to be found compensable. The rule of Nelson deals with the
compensability of an occupational disease, and establishes that the aggravation of a
pre-existing condition is not compensable except where the aggravation is caused by
an accident. Koch v. Micron Technology, 136 Idaho 885, 42 P.3d 678 (2002). The
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Commission finds that consideration of the Nelson doctrine is subsumed within, and
anticipated by, afair reading of the noticed issues. (See Brennen v. Selkirk Press, Inc.
and State Insurance Fund, pp. 31-32, if 76, LC. No. 2009-025084 (Filed: 1.30.12)
(italics supplied).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that the Industrial Commission is not required to
list every single sub-issue in the notice of hearing required by Idaho Code §72-713 if the determination
of those sub-issues flows naturally from a determination of the listed issues:
This Court has said that administrative tribunals are unable to raise issues without
first serving an affected party with " fair notice" and a " full opportunity" to meet
such issues. Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 (2005)
(citing White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887572 P.2d 887,
889 (1977)). Idaho Code § 72-713 is the legislature's codification of this rule,
requiring the Commission to provide parties with a written notice of issues to be
heard at a Commission hearing. Id Idaho Code section 72-713 states that the "
commission shall give at least ten (10) days' written notice of the time and place of
hearing and of the issues to be heard .... " The issue of whether this notice required by
LC.§ 72-713 needs to specifically state each individual issue in the text of the issues
statement of the notice was answered in Hernandez. Id at 781-82, 118 P.3d at 11314. Further, the necessity of specifically listing the issue of causation in the issues
statement was answered in Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 564-65,
130 p .3d 1097' 1102-03 (2006).
In Hernandez, the claimant was given proper notice of three issues regarding
entitlement to medical benefits, temporary disability benefits, and attorney fees before
the Commission. 141 Idaho at 781, 118 P.3d at 113. Yet, the claimant argued that the
issues of impairment and maximum medical improvement (MM!), of which the
Commission referee made findings, could not be at issue because they were not
specifically listed in the notice's issues statement. Id. This Court disagreed, holding
that the issue of MMI was " necessarily at issue by virtue of his claim for additional
temporary income benefits" because whether the claimant was entitled to temporary
income benefits turned on whether claimant had reached MMI. Id. If the claimant had
reached MMI by a certain date, no additional temporary income benefits could be
awarded, but if not, the claimant was entitled to the benefits. Id. Additional temporary
income benefits could not be awarded without addressing the issue of MMI.
Similarly in Henderson, this Court found that since the claimant had made a claim for
further medical benefits, the unspecified issue of causation was put at issue " by
virtue of [the claimant's] claim." 142 Idaho at 564, 130 P.3d at 1102. Since " prior
decisions ha[d] made it clear that an employee seeking compensation for medical care
must prove that there is a causal relationship between the industrial accident and the
need for the medical care," the Commission was not required to specifically notice
the issue of causation. Id. It was necessarily at issue to address the issue of
entitlement to medical benefits sought in the case. Medical treatments could be the
most reasonable available option for a claimant's symptoms, but if there is no causal

Vawter I Claimant's Briefin Response to UPS's 10.17.12. Motion For Reconsideration

Page 4

connection, there will ultimately be no entitlement to benefits. Id at 565, 130 P.3d at
1103 (" Even though medical care is reasonable, it is still not compensable unless the
care was due to the industrial accident." ). In the present case, ifthere was no causal
connection between Gomez's industrial injury and the treatment she received, the
noticed issue of reasonableness is irrelevant. Ill Like in Hernandez, the issue
specifically listed in the notice issues statement turned on another question that was
not listed in the notice. In Hernandez, the issue before the Commission turned on
MMI, here it turns on a causal connection between Gomez's industrial injury and the
treatment she received. Therefore, we hold that LC. § 72-713 does not require
specific notice of causation. Causation is put on issue by virtue of any claim
regarding the reasonableness of medical benefits arising from an industrial accident
or disease; even if reasonableness is found- without causation, there is no
entitlement to benefits. Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601-602, 272 P.3d
569, 573-574 (2012) (italics supplied).
The listed issue of the ISIF's liability in this case turns on whether the Industrial Commission had
substantial and competent evidence to apply the doctrine of quasi estoppel which was not a listed issue.
Based on the Industrial Commission's decisions in Watson and Brennen and the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Gomez, it seems clear that the Industrial Commission has the inherent jurisdiction to
determine whether quasi estoppel should be applied to the question ofISIF liability.
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined the primary purpose of the Industrial Commission as to do
substantial justice for all of the parties in every single case:
The original notion was that the Industrial Commission would be like most any other
Commission. It would lend a ready ear and a helping hand to a citizen with a
grievance; the overriding purpose being to do justice in the given situation. Hagler v.
Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990) (italics
supplied).
To fulfill its mission of achieving substantial justice, the Industrial Commission obviously has the
inherent jurisdiction to determine every listed issue and every inherent sub-issue that comes before it:
72-707. Commission has jurisdiction of disputes. All questions arising under this law,
if not settled by agreement or stipulation of the interested parties with the approval of
the commission, except as otherwise herein provided, shall be determined by the
commission. (See Idaho Code §72-707) (italics supplied).
The question of ISIF liability was not settled by agreement or stipulation of the parties.
Therefore, that primary listed issue (and every implicit sub-issue like quasi estoppel) would be a question
arising under the Workers' Compensation Act which "shall be determined by the commission". The
Industrial Commission always has the inherent jurisdiction to make any inquiries or investigations which
are deemed necessary in order to reach a just determination of any disputed issue:
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(3) The commission, or member thereof, or a hearing officer, referee or examiner, to whom
the matter has been assigned, shall make such inquiries and investigations as may be
deemed necessary. (See Idaho Code §72-714(3)).
Even if the Claimant had not asked the Industrial Commission in his 7.27.12 Opening Brief to
apply the doctrine of quasi-estoppel when determining the listed issue of ISIF liability, the Commission
had the inherent jurisdiction to review all of the evidence in the record and determine whether quasi
estoppel should be applied to the question of ISIF liability pursuant to Idaho Code §72-707 and Idaho
Code §72-714(3).
What UPS is really asking the Industrial Commission to do is impose hyper-technical "code
pleading" standards in a "notice pleading" state before an administrative tribunal that sits in equity:
A party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive" resolution of the case. I.R.C.P. l(a); see Deaton v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho
614, 759 P.2d 905 (Ct.App.1988). With the advent of notice pleading, a party is no
longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings. Dursteler v.
Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d 1244 (Ct.App.1985), later proceeding, 112 Idaho
594, 733 P.2d 815 (Ct.App.1987) .... In addition, where issues not raised by the
pleadings are either expressly or impliedly tried, the trial court has discretion to
decide those issues and to permit the pleading party to amend its pleadings to
conform to the proof offered at trial. I.R.C.P. 15(b); Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho
773, 747 P.2d 1302 (Ct.App.1987); see also M.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101
Idaho 345, 612 P .2d 1192 (1980) .... However, the trial court is under no obligation to
compel the pleading party to amend his or her complaint. The emphasis of the rule is
to insure that a "just result" is accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to
rigid forms of pleading. See Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 439, 566 P.2d 758, 762
(1977). Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho 929, 931, 763 P.2d 302, 304 (Ct. App. 1988).
Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 35, 13 P.3d 857, 866 (2000) (italics supplied).
The Industrial Commission has a statutory duty to apply process and procedure which is as
summary and simple as possible to achieve the ends of equity and fairness:
72-708. Process and procedure. Process and procedure under this law shall be as
summary and simple as reasonably may be and as far as possible in accordance with
the rules of equity. (See Idaho Code §72-708) (italics supplied).
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72- 708 the Commission will construe these rules liberally
to secure the just, speedy and economical determination of all issues. (See JRP 1 (A)).
After the Claimant put UPS on notice that he was asking the Industrial Commission to apply the
doctrine of quasi estoppel in his 7.27.12 Opening Brief, UPS had the opportunity to respond to the
Claimant's quasi-estoppel argument and I or object to the Industrial Commission's consideration of that
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issue in its 8.15.12 Response Brief, but UPS chose to remain silent. By choosing to remain silent, UPS
clearly acquiesced to the Industrial Commission's determination of the quasi estoppel question.
In addition, where issues not raised by the pleadings are either expressly or impliedly
tried, the trial court has discretion to decide those issues and to permit the pleading
party to amend its pleadings to conform to the proof offered at trial. I.R.C.P. 15(b).
Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 35, 13 P.3d 857, 866 (2000) (italics supplied).
Even if the Claimant had not raised the quasi estoppel issue in his 7.27 .12 Opening Brief but
instead had waited to raise it for the first time on reconsideration, the Industrial Commission would still
have been able to exercise proper jurisdiction to hear and decide that issue without violating UPS' s due
process rights:
As discussed in the Curtis case, cited above, the Commission may consider "new
reasons, factually and legally" to alter a decision on a motion for reconsideration. In
[sic] [If], [i]n fact, it is a "rehash" of old arguments, already addressed, that is
discouraged on reconsideration. Therefore, we do have the authority to consider the
equitable waiver and estoppel arguments, regardless of whether they are new.
Federko v. Sun Valley Co., LC. No. 2008-017353, Order Denying Reconsideration
(Filed: 6.3.11) (italics supplied).
The Industrial Commission has the original jurisdiction to decide all issues that come before it
and the inherent jurisdiction to determine all sub-issues that are implicated by a fair reading of the listed
issues or tried with the express consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the parties. UPS's lack of
notice argument lacks merit and the Industrial Commission should deny UPS's Motion For
Reconsideration.
2.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF QUASI ESTOPPEL

Beginning in paragraph 74 on page 32 of its 9.28.12 decision and continuing through paragraph
81 on page 35, the Industrial Commission carefully analyzed each element in the PFC of the doctrine of
quasi estoppel and explained why it was applying that doctrine to the facts of this case in order to reach
the conclusion that the ISIF was not liable for any of the Claimant's permanent and total disability.
When UPS filed its 10.17.12 Motion For Reconsideration, it had a duty to specifically recite the
factual findings and legal conclusions in i!il 74-81 that UPS took issue with on reconsideration. UPS did
not recite any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law in the Commission's decision that it took
issue with. However, on page 2 of its Brief, UPS argued that the Industrial Commission erred by
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applying the doctrine of quasi estoppel to the facts of this case because the Claimant "did not discuss

how the elements were met in this case". UPS has misstated the record. On pp. 6-7 of his 7.27.12
Opening Brief, the Claimant cited the Idaho Supreme Court case of Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807,
186 P.3d 663 (2008), discussed each element in the PFC of quasi estoppel and explained how those
elements were applicable to the facts of this case.
The Claimant explained the advantage that UPS gained in 1990 by hiring Dr. Knoebel to be its
IME doctor because it did not have to pay Claimant any PPI benefits based on Dr. Knoebel's 0% PPI
rating. The Claimant also explained the advantage that UPS would gain in this 12.18.09 claim by shifting
7% of his 19% whole person PPI rating back to his 10.22.90 claim. That would be a win I win I win
triple benefit to UPS and a lose I lose I lose triple detriment to the Claimant.
UPS benefitted in the 10.22.90 claim based on Dr. Knoebel's 0% IME PPI rating because it did
not have to pay the Claimant any PPI benefits. By changing its position on the 10.22.90 PPI issue in the
2009 claim, UPS benefitted again in the 2009 claim by shifting 7% of the Claimant's 19% whole person
PPI rating back to his 10.22.90 claim. And finally, UPS benefitted a third time because it would be
impossible for the Claimant to collect the 7% PPI rating that UPS obtained for him in 2011 through his
10.22.90 claim because the 5-year statute of limitations applicable to his 7% PPI rating expired on or
about 10.22.95 (See Idaho Code §72-706(2)).
The Claimant suffered a lose I lose I lose triple detriment because he did not collect PPI benefits
from UPS in connection with his 10.22.90 claim based on Dr. Knoebel's 0% PPI rating. The Claimant
lost a second time in his 12.18.09 claim when UPS convinced Dr. Frizzell to apportion 7% of his
12.18.09 19% whole person PPI rating back to his 10.22.90 claim. And finally, the Claimant lost a third
time when the 5-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code §72-706(2) prevented him from ever
collecting the 7% PPI rating benefits that UPS just obtained for him from Dr. Frizzell 21 years after his
10.22.90 injury claim.
After considering the gains realized by UPS and the damage caused to Claimant by UPS changing
position and the unfairness of allowing UPS to avoid liability for the Claimant's disability by changing
its position on the PPI issue, the Industrial Commission correctly applied the doctrine of quasi estoppel
and concluded that it would be unconscionable for UPS to shift liability to the ISIF:
Further, we believe that it would be unconscionable to allow UPS, after having
accepted the benefit of the 0% PPI rating rendered by Dr. Knoebel, to now assert a
contrary position to the disadvantage of the ISIF. (Seep. 35, if79 of 9.28.12 Vawter
decision).
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UPS then argued on page 2 of its Brief in Support of Reconsideration that the Industrial
Commission erred by applying the doctrine of quasi estoppel because the "Claimant did not show how

Defendants have taken a different position in this matter or identify what Defendants' original position
was". Once again, the evidence in the record refutes UPS's argument. On p. 6 of his Opening Brief, the
Claimant clearly identified UPS's original position on the 10.22.90 PPI rating as follows:
Based on the opinion from its own IME physician, Richard Knoebel, M.D., UPS did
not pay the Claimant any PPI benefits in connection with his 10.22.90 low back
injury claim (CL 5.17.12 H.E. 001015) (Seep. 6 of CL 7.27.12 Opening Brief).
After identifying UPS's original position and explaining how it avoided liability for the payment
of PPI benefits in connection with the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury claim based on the UPS IME
doctor's opinions, the Claimant explained how UPS was now taking a different position by claiming that
7% of the Claimant's 12.18.09 19% PPI rating should be apportioned back to his 10.22.90 low back
llljury:
UPS is now trying to avoid paying the Claimant the full 19% PPI rating that he
deserves from his 12.18.09 injury and 2 subsequent back surgeries by arguing that 7%
of the Claimant's 19% PPI rating should be apportioned to his 10.22.90 low back
injury. This change in position gives UPS a windfall at the Claimant's expense.
The Industrial Commission should apply the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to prevent
UPS from taking an inconsistent position now on the issue of whether the Claimant
should receive a PPI rating for his 10.22.90 low back injury which is detrimental to
the Claimant. (Seep. 6 of CL 7.27.12 Opening Brief).
In spite of that clear description of the contrast between UPS' s original position and its new

position on the 10.22.90 PPI rating issue, UPS continues to assert that it has not taken inconsistent
positions in this case on the 10.22.90 PPI issue:
Despite the omission, even assuming the doctrine was applicable, there is no support
for the proposition that Defendants' current position with respect to Claimant's 1990
low back injury is inconsistent with a previously taken position. There was no
previous position. (Seep. 3 ofUPS's Brief on Reconsideration) (italics supplied).
The Commission should reject UPS's argument that "there was no previous position" when UPS
hired Richard Knoebel, M.D. to be its IME doctor to evaluate the Claimant after his 10.22.90 low back
injury, Dr. Knoebel issued the Claimant a 0% PPI rating and released him to return to full duty work on
4.2.91 without any restrictions and UPS was able to avoid having to pay the Claimant any PPI benefits
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and any PPD > PPI benefits in connection with his 10.22.90 claim based on its own IME expert's
medical opinions.
UPS clearly articulated its 0% PPI position to the Claimant and to the Industrial Commission
when it filed its "CHANGE OF BENEFIT OR STATUS NOTICE" form with the Industrial Commission
on or about 4.2.91 and stated:
"Per Dr. Knoebel's report, you were released to return to work effective 04-02-91.
You were determined to be medically stationary without any impairment" (C.5.17.12.
Ex. 006078).

After considering this substantial and competent evidence of UPS's original position on the
10.22.90 PPI issue, the Industrial Commission correctly concluded that UPS benefitted from Dr.
Knoebel's no PPI I no permanent restrictions opinions back in 1991 because it was able to avoid liability
for PPI and PPD > PPI benefits:
However, UPS assuredly benefitted from Dr. Knoebel's opinion and acquiesced in
the same, since the Commission's records reflect that the claims file was eventually
retired without the payment of any impairment rating by UPS or its then surety. In
1991, at the time Dr. Knoebel rendered his rating, it was to the advantage of UPS and
its then surety to minimize their exposure by obtaining a favorable opinion on
Claimant's impairment/limitations. This they did. (See p. 34, ~ 77 of the Industrial
Commission's 9.28.12 decision).
UPS' s self-described most important argument against application of quasi estoppel rests on the
premise that Claimant and the ISIF failed to address the fact that Defendant Liberty Insurance
Corporation was not the surety for UPS at .the time of the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury.
Most importantly, Claimant did not address the fact that Defendant Liberty Insurance
Corporation was not the surety at the time of Claimant's 1990 claim. Neither did
ISIF. As noted on page 11 of the Commission's decision, UPS had a different surety
at the time of Claimant's 1990 low back injury. Although directly acknowledging the
sureties were different, the Commission failed to explain how estoppel would apply
to Liberty Insurance Corporation when it was not involved in the prior matter (See pp.
2-3 ofUPS's Brief in Support of Reconsideration) (italics supplied).

The evidence before the Industrial Commission proves that UPS does not even know who its
surety was 22 years ago at the time of the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim:
•

•

In Claimant's Exhibit No. 006067, UPS listed Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company as the
surety responsible for the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim.
In Claimant's Exhibit No. 006068, UPS listed Liberty Northwest Insurance as the surety
responsible for the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim.
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•
•

In Claimant's Exhibit No. 006069, UPS listed Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as the surety
responsible for the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim.
In Claimant's Exhibit No. 006088, UPS listed Liberty Mutual Insurance Group as the surety
responsible for the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim.
UPS has used one word to describe all of its sureties and that word is "Liberty". Even if Liberty

were not the same surety in both the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim and his 12.18.09 claim, it does not make
any difference because under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, the employer and its surety are

both treated as the Claimant's employer:
(13) (a) "Employer" means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or
contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It
includes the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the
proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there
being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of
the workers there employed. If the employer is secured, it means his surety so far as
applicable. (See Idaho Code §72-102(13)(a)) (italics supplied) (emphasis supplied).
UPS was the Claimant's employer on the date of his 10.22.90 industrial accident. By operation of
Idaho Code §72-102(13)(a), UPS's then surety was also the Claimant's employer.

UPS was the

Claimant's employer on the date of his 12.18.09 industrial accident. By operation of Idaho Code §72102(13)(a), UPS's then surety was also the Claimant's employer. The Industrial Commission correctly
applied the doctrine of quasi estoppel against the Claimant's employer and it does not matter whether the
same surety "Liberty" added different terms to its name.
UPS next argues on pp. 3-4 of its Brief in support of Motion For Reconsideration that the
Industrial Commission was behaving in an "erroneous and prejudicial" manner when it applied the
doctrine of quasi estoppel to prevent UPS from shifting its liability for the Claimant's permanent and
total disability to the ISIP because "it is common in a litigated case for parties to argue for retroactive

restrictions and impairment ratings, and it is not unusual for the Commission to impose them
retroactively when determining the extent of disability".
The Claimant disputes that it is common practice for the Commission to allow the Employer to
obtain a PPI rating and permanent restrictions 21 years after an industrial accident and then apply both
the PPI rating and the restrictions retroactively to a 21-year-old claim (especially in cases like this where
the Claimant's original attending physicians did not issue him any PPI rating or restrictions and he was
able to return to full duty work without restrictions and perform very heavy work for 19 years before his
final industrial accident). Because the Industrial Commission's practice of giving retroactive application
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to PPI ratings and restrictions is so rare, UPS only cited a single case to support the Industrial
Commission's alleged common practice of imposing retroactive PPI ratings and retroactive restrictions;
i.e., Cuevas V. Nederend Dairy, 2010 IIC 0093 (Filed: 2.10.10).
The Cuevas decision is exactly the same case that UPS relied on at page 14 of its 8.15.12 Post
Hearing Response Brief (i.e., UPS is merely rehashing the same old legal arguments that have already
0

been considered by the Commission). While Cuevas might stand for the proposition that in the right case
it may be appropriate for the Industrial Commission to apply a PPI rating and restrictions retroactively to
a preexisting condition, the holding in Cuevas says absolutely nothing about the proper application of the
doctrine of quasi estoppel to the unique facts which are present in this case.
The facts in Cuevas are clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case. The Claimant in
Cuevas hired an IME doctor after his last industrial accident who issued the Claimant a 3% preexisting
PPI rating for his preexisting degenerative back condition and laid the foundation during his post-hearing
deposition for the imposition of preexisting work restrictions. The Claimant in Cuevas agreed with his
own IME doctor and readily conceded that 3% of his 9% PPI rating should be fairly apportioned to his
preexisting degenerative back condition.
Based on those facts, the Commission correctly concluded in Cuevas that 3% of the Claimant's
9% whole person PPI rating should be apportioned to his preexisting low back condition and that 15% of
his 70% permanent partial disability should be apportioned to his preexisting condition pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-406. However, there are clear distinctions between the facts in Cuevas and the facts in this
case.
The Claimant in Cuevas did not work for the same employer for 27 years like the Claimant in this
case. The Employer in Cuevas did not hire an IME doctor to conduct a PPI evaluation I work capacity
evaluation of the Claimant 21 years prior to his last industrial accident and then reap the benefit from
those IME opinions by avoiding liability for the payment of PPI benefits and PPD > PPI benefits. None
of the parties in Cuevas alleged that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the OddLot Doctrine. None of the parties in Cuevas filed a Complaint against the ISIP.
The Industrial Commission did not find the Cuevas Claimant to be permanently and totally
disabled under the Odd-Lot Doctrine. The Industrial Commission was not asked to address the question
ofISIF liability in Cuevas. And finally, the Industrial Commission in Cuevas was not asked to apply the
doctrine of quasi estoppel to the inconsistent positions taken by the Employer when it determined the
question ofISIF liability.
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The holding in Cuevas does not provide any support for UPS's argument that the Industrial
Commission's application of quasi estoppel to the facts of this case was "erroneous and prejudicial".
On the contrary, a review of the record confirms that the Industrial Commission's decision to apply the
doctrine of quasi estoppel was necessary to achieve substantial justice and was fully supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record:
In 1991, UPS engaged the services of Richard Knoebel, M.D., for the purpose of
performing an Idaho Code § 72-433 exam. The record does not reflect what
instructions UPS gave to Dr. Knoebel, what records it supplied, or what questions it
asked. However, the record does reflect that after completing his examination of
Claimant, Dr. Knoebel proposed that Claimant had not suffered any permanent
physical impairment as a consequence of the 1990 accident, and neither was he
entitled to any permanent limitations/restrictions. The 1990 claim was not litigated,
and there was no finding made by the Commission as to whether or not Dr. Knoebel
was correct in rendering his judgment on Claimant's impairment. However, UPS
assuredly benefitted from Dr. Knoebel's opinion and acquiesced in the same, since
the Commission's records reflect that the claims file was eventually retired without
the payment of any impairment rating by UPS or its then surety.
In 1991, at the time Dr. Knoebel rendered his rating, it was to the advantage of UPS
and its then surety to minimize their exposure by obtaining a favorable opinion on
Claimant's impairment/limitations. This they did.
Now, of course, the occurrence of the subject accident of December 18, 2009 has
made it advantageous to UPS and its current surety to argue that some portion of
Claimant's impairment must predate the subject accident. As developed above, the
Commission has found that 7% of Claimant's 19% impairment rating should be
assigned to the 1990 accident, and that because this 7% impairment rating meets the
other elements of ISIP liability, a portion of UPS's responsibility for total and
permanent disability benefits can be shifted to the ISIP.
It seems clear that UPS is now asserting a position inconsistent with one it acquiesced
in and benefitted from in 1991. Further, we believe that it would be unconscionable
to allow UPS, after having accepted the benefit of the 0% PPI rating rendered by Dr.
Knoebel, to now assert a contrary position to the disadvantage of the ISIP.

We conclude that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is applicable to the facts of this case.
Therefore, Employer/Surety is estopped from asserting that Claimant has a 7% PPI
rating referable to the 1990 accident. The Commission is aware of the irony of
applying the doctrine to these facts; the Commission has concluded that Dr. Frizzell
correctly identified a 7% PPI rating which should attach to the permanent effects of
the 1990 accident, while the application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel binds
UPS/Surety to Dr. Knoebel's 0% rating, a rating which we were not persuaded to
adopt. (See Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 decision in Vawter, supra, at pp. 34-35).
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The record in this case contains substantial and competent evidence to support the Industrial
Commission's application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel. The Industrial Commission explained the
advantage gained by UPS from taking the original position that Claimant had a 0% PPI rating and no
permanent restrictions related to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury claim.

The Industrial

Commission then explained the significant advantage that UPS would gain 21 years later by assigning
7% of the Claimant's 19% PPI rating and permanent restrictions back to his 10.22.90 low back injury
claim. And finally, the Commission explained why it would be unconscionable for UPS to be allowed to
shift significant liability to the ISIF for the Claimant's permanent and total disability based on UPS's
inconsistent positions on the 10.22.90 PPI rating issue.

The Industrial Commission should deny UPS' s Motion For Reconsideration because UPS has
failed to identify any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law on the quasi estoppel issue that were
clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

(3)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS CORRECT WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA TO ALLOW UPS TO AVOID LIABILITY FOR
THE PAYMENT OF 100°/o OF THE INVOICED AMOUNT OF ALL PAST MEDICAL
BENEFITS INCURRED BY CLAIMANT IN CONNECTION WITH ms 12.18.09
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
The Industrial Commission framed the res judicata issue in its 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing as

follows:
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether
the issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the
doctrine of res judicata (See 3 .7.12 Notice of Hearing)

UPS did not object to the manner in which the Industrial Commission framed the res judicata
issue in its 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing. The Claimant filed his post-hearing Opening Brief on 7.27.12 and
explained why it would not be appropriate for the Industrial Commission to misapply the doctrine of res
judicata and thereby allow UPS to avoid liability for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all
past denied medical benefits in direct violation of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western
Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009)

1
•

UPS filed its Response Brief on 8.15.12 and argued that the Industrial Commission should
misapply the doctrine of pure res judicata to the facts of this case in order to prevent the Claimant from

See pp. 24-27 of the Claimant's 7.27.12 Opening Brief.
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collecting 100% of the invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by Claimant in connection

with his 12.18.09 claim 2 •
The Industrial Commission considered the res judicata arguments of the parties and then entered
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law holding that res judicata could not be used by UPS to
circumvent the Court's holding in Neel; i.e., the Industrial Commission correctly held that UPS is liable
for 100% of the invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by the Claimant in connection with
this denied claim, including the $24,627.80 in new I additional medical benefits set forth in Claimant's
5.17.12 H.E. No. 14 that were not previously adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing:
The point is that every bill for medical services represents a discrete claim for
workers' compensation benefits. Accordingly, since it is clear that the bills totaling
$24,627 .80 are new bills, Claimant's entitlement to that which was not adjudicated at
the prior hearing, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar Claimant's litigation of
those bills at this time, notwithstanding that most of those bills are for services
rendered prior to the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing. Aside from the res
judicata defense, no other defenses to these bills have been raised by
Employer/Surety. Accordingly, and per Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147
Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), Claimant is entitled to 100% of the invoiced amount
of the bills set forth at Claimant's 5.17.12 Exhibit 14 (See if85 of Industrial
Commission's 9.28.12 decision).
UPS has asked the Industrial Commission to reconsider its holding on the res judicata issue
because "the precise issue is whether collateral estoppel applies"

3

•

The Industrial Commission should

reject UPS's attempt to reframe the res judicata issue as a collateral estoppel issue at this late stage of the
proceedings when UPS never objected to the way the Industrial Commission framed the res judicata
issue in its 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing. Nonetheless, even if the Commission allows UPS to reframe the
res judicata issue as a collateral estoppel issue, it does not matter because neither doctrine can be applied
to bar the Claimant from making claim for additional past denied medical benefits that were not
adjudicated as part of Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 at the 9.28.10 Hearing and have never been paid
by UPS in direct violation of Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009).
The precise issue adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing was whether the Idaho Supreme Court's
holding in Neel required UPS to pay the Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of the $149,033.68 in
past denied medical benefit claims that were presented to the Industrial Commission and adjudicated at
the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7? The Commission correctly applied Neel and
2

See pp. 24-25 ofUPS's 8.15.12 Response Brief.
See p. 7, if 2, sentence I of Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration.
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held that UPS was liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of all medical benefit claims that were
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's H.E. No. 7 and ordered UPS to pay Claimant
$149,033.68. The Industrial Commission's 5.17.12 Order did not state that by making the Exhibit No. 7
payment UPS would receive an unearned credit for the payment of all other past denied medical benefits
that were incurred by the Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 claim (even if they were not
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing).
The precise issue before the Commission at the 5.17.12 Hearing was whether the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Neel required UPS to pay 100% of the invoiced amount of the new and I or additional
medical benefit claims set forth in Claimant's 5.17.12 H.E. No. 14 that were incurred by Claimant in
connection with his 12.18.09 claim but were not adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as part of Claimant's
H.E. No. 7? The Industrial Commission correctly found that res judicata did not apply because the
medical benefit claims set forth in Cl. 5.17.12 H.E. No. 14 were new and discrete claims for medical
benefits that were not adjudicated as at the 9.28.10 Hearing as part of Claimant's H.E. No. 7.
While UPS may disagree with the Industrial Commission's conclusion that each medical bill that
the Claimant submitted to Employer for payment at the 9.28.10 Hearing and each medical bill submitted
by the Claimant at the 5.17.12 Hearing constituted a separate and discrete claim for worker's
compensation benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, that does not mean that the Industrial
Commission's legal conclusions on the application of res judicata were erroneous.
UPS has not cited any legal authority, any statute, any Supreme Court decision or any Industrial
Commission decision to support its argument that the Industrial Commission's res judicata legal
conclusions were erroneous. On the contrary, the Industrial Commission's decision to not misapply the
doctrine of res judicata to the facts of this case is perfectly consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's
holding in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009):
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements:
(1) same parties;
(2) same claim; and
(3) a valid final judgment. Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618.
Claim preclusion generally bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to
defeat the claim, but also as to matters relating to the claim which might have been litigated in
the first suit. Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620. However, Idaho Code§ 72-718 varies the doctrine
of resjudicata as applied to worker's compensation cases. See Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,
7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995). Decisions by the Commission are conclusive only as to matters
actually adjudicated, not as to all matters which could have been adjudicated. Id.; see also
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Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 720-21, 682 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 (1984).
Because we have determined that the Agreement and ensuing order were void, there is no
"valid final judgment," and res judicata does not bar the present claim." Wernecke v. St.
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 288, 207 P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009) (italics
supplied) (emphasis supplied).
The Court in Wernecke held that that the doctrine of res judicata can only be applied to matters
actually adjudicated (i.e., the specific medical benefit claims listed in Cl. 9.28.10 H.E. No. 7 and
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 hearing) and to final judgments on the merits. UPS has conceded in this case
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel likewise requires a final judgment on the merits 4 • In this case, the
Idaho Supreme Court has already issued two Orders making it perfectly clear that the Court does not
consider the Industrial Commission's 5.17 .11 Order to be a final judgment on the merits based on the
Court's prior holding in Jensen v. Pillsbury, 121Idaho127, 823 P.2d 161(1992) 5 •
Since the new I different I additional medical benefit claims listed in Cl. 5.17 .12 H.E. No. 14
were not matters actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing and since the Idaho Supreme Court has held
that the Industrial Commission's 5.1 7.11 Order was not a final judgment on the merits, the Industrial
Commission was correct when it refused to misapply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
in order to allow UPS to circumvent the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction,
147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009). The Commission should deny UPS's Motion For Reconsideration
on the res judicata issue I collateral estoppel issue because those doctrines cannot properly be applied to
the facts of this case.

4.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Beginning in paragraph 89 on page 39 and continuing to paragraph 103 on page 45 of its

9.28.12 decision, the Industrial Commission gave a detailed factual and procedural history of this claim
and carefully explained how the facts recited supported an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-804 against certain classes of benefits after the Idaho Supreme Court entered its 1.30.12
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL.
In the three (3) paragraphs that UPS devoted to the attorney's fee issue on pp. 8-9 of its Brief in
Support of Motion For Reconsideration, UPS does not cite a single finding of fact or conclusion of law
contained in paragraphs 89-103 of the Commission's 9.28.12 decision that it disputes as being
4

Seep. 7 ofUPS's Brief where UPS cites Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001).

See the Court's 7.27.11 ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL and its 8.15.11 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION.
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unsupported by substantial and competent evidence or clearly erroneous. Instead, UPS merely reverts
back to the same flawed legal reasoning that it has employed throughout this case; i.e., since UPS plans
to appeal the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 threshold compensability decision, it had no obligation
to pay any other benefits during the pendency of this claim. UPS stated this position to Claimant in its
8.6.11 letter to Claimant's counsel and repeated it in its 2.14.12 letter to Claimant's counsel:
As to the additional benefits your client seeks which are beyond what the
Commission has awarded, my client declines to pay such benefits absent a decision of
compensability that is considered final by the Idaho Supreme Court and not subject to
a stay of enforcement. (See UPS's 8.16.11 letter to Claimant's counsel@ CL 5.17.12
H.E. 0170010 and UPS's 2.14.12 letter to Claimant's counsel @ CL 5.17.12 H.E.
017021).
UPS just keeps repeating this same argument over and over in correspondence to Claimant's
counsel and throughout the pleadings that it has filed with the Industrial Commission. What UPS fails
to understand is that after the Commission entered its threshold compensability determination finding
this claim compensable on 5.17.11, UPS had a duty under Idaho Code §72-304 and Idaho Code §72804 to make the prompt payment of all worker's compensation benefits that the Claimant was entitled
to receive (not just those benefits specifically awarded in the Commission's 5.17.11 Order) so that the
Claimant would receive the sure and certain relief that he was promised by Idaho Code §72-201.
The May 17, 2011 decision addressed Claimant's entitlement to a limited class of
workers' compensation benefits because those were the only benefits that Claimant
requested at the time of the threshold determination of the issue of compensability.
However, the Commission 's finding of compensability implicitly required that
Employer/Surety pay to Claimant, or on his behalf, those additional workers'
compensation benefits to which Claimant was entitled as the result of having suffered
a compensable accident/injury. (See i!91 of 9.28.12 decision at p. 40) (italics
supplied).
v

The order denying the request for stay specified that the May 17, 2011 decision is
final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated therein pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72718. The order further directed Claimant to pay to Employer/Surety those benefits
that were awarded incidental to the Commission's finding on compensability. The
order did not specify that during the pendency of hearing on the issues addressed in
this decision Employer/Surety's only obligation was to pay the benefits awarded
incidental to the finding of compensability made in the May 17, 2011 decision. As
noted above, the Commission's final order on the issue of compensability brings with
it an obligation to pay to Claimant those workers' compensation benefits to which he
would normally be entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable
accident/injury. (See i!93of9.28.12 decision at p. 41) (italics supplied).
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From the foregoing, it is clear that the position of Employer/Surety was that since it
had paid the benefits that were specifically addressed in the Commission's order of
May 17, 2011, it had no obligation to pay benefits that were not addressed in that
order. What Employer/Surety has failed to understand, however, is that the
Commission's finding that the subject accident is compensable carries with it an
obligation on the part of Employer/Surety to pay to Claimant those workers'
compensation benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the accident. We find
nothing in the correspondence going back and forth between Claimant's counsel and
Defense counsel which suggests that Employer/Surety at any time disputed the claims
for additional benefits to which Claimant believed he was entitled. The only basis for
denial was the aforementioned belief that Employer/Surety had no obligation under
the May 17, 2011 order to pay anything except those benefits which were specifically
addressed in that order.
As explained in more detail in our December 8, 2011 order denying Employer's
motion for stay, it is the expectation of the Industrial Commission that its final order
on compensability binds the parties to act accordingly during the pendency of this
bifurcated matter. It is no defense to Claimant's manifold requests to simply say that
Claimant's entitlement to the benefits at issue will be decided in connection with the
May 17, 2012 hearing. Absent a good faith dispute over Claimant's entitlement to a
particular benefit, Employer/Surety had an obligation to timely pay the same once this
claim had been found to be compensable under the workers' compensation laws of
this state. (See Idaho Code § 72-305) [sic] [304]. (See ~~101-102 of 9.28.12 decision
at pp. 43-44) (italics supplied).
UPS argues that it did not have any duty to pay the Claimant undisputed PPI benefits based on
Dr. Frizzell's PPI rating because apportionment was clearly in dispute

6

•

The record in this case proves

that UPS's statement is factually incorrect because UPS never disputed Dr. Frizzell's 12% postapportionment PPI rating. Dr. Frizzell was the only physician involved in this case to issue a PPI rating
and to apportion that PPI rating. As soon as UPS received Dr. Frizzell's original 12.6.10 20% PPI
rating, it should have started making PPI payments within 28 days in accordance with Idaho Code §72304 and Idaho Code §72-429 (Cl. 5.17.12 H.E. 001089).
After UPS convinced Dr. Frizzell to apportion 7% of the Claimant's 19% whole person PPI
rating back to the Claimant's 10.22.90 claim on 3.10.11 (Cl. 5.17.12.H.E. 001101), there was absolutely
no dispute over the apportioned 12% whole person PPI rating that was then due and payable. UPS did
not ask Dr. Frizzell to change his undisputed 12% PPI rating and UPS did not hire an IME doctor to
challenge Dr. Frizzell's undisputed 12% whole person PPI rating.

6

UPS's statement that

Seep. 9 ofUPS's Briefln Support of Motion For Reconsideration.
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"apportionment was clearly in dispute" is directly refuted by the evidence in the record which proves

that UPS never disputed Dr. Frizzell's undisputed 12% whole person PPI rating.
UPS's argument that it did not have any obligation to pay the Claimant his undisputed 12%
whole person PPI benefits because the Industrial Commission might rule in the future that he was
totally and permanently disabled is nothing more than a rehashing of UPS's same old argument that it
has no legal obligation to pay any worker's compensation benefits until after there has been a final legal
determination of rights by the Industrial Commission and I or the Idaho Supreme Court. The Industrial
Commission should reject this same old argument because it violates the prompt payment of
compensation requirements of Idaho Code §72-304 and Idaho Code §72-804 and the sure and certain
relief policies of Idaho Code §72-201.
The undisputed 12% apportioned PPI rating that Dr. Frizzell issued on 3.10.11 is worth
12% X 500 weeks = 60 weeks X 2009 PPI rate of $349.80 =

$20,988.00 calculated as follows:

$20,988.00. If UPS had started paying the Claimant his PPI benefits within 28 days after Dr. Frizzell
issued his original 20% PPI rating on 12.6.10 at the 2009 monthly PPI rate of $1,399.20, the entire
undisputed 12% apportioned PPI rating would have been paid in full within 15 months in March of
2012 (i.e., $20,988.00 +$1,399.20

=

15 months). The Claimant and his family could have used the

money from the Claimant's undisputed PPI benefits to pay their living expenses throughout the
pendency of this claim. UPS unreasonably deprived the Claimant of these benefits. An award of
attorney's fees is clearly warranted.
UPS has not challenged any of the Industrial Commission's factual findings on the attorney's
fees issue. The only legal argument that UPS has made which challenges the Commission's legal
conclusion to award attorney's fees is nothing but a rehash of the same old argument that UPS has
made throughout this case; i.e., UPS had no obligation to pay the Claimant any worker's compensation
benefits that he was entitled to receive after the Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5.17.12
because the Idaho Supreme Court had not yet entered a final decision on appeal. This argument was
soundly rejected by the Industrial Commission in its 9.28.12 decision.
Since UPS failed to prove that the Industrial Commission's attorney's fees findings of fact were
unsupported by substantial and competent evidence and failed to prove that the conclusion to award
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 was clearly erroneous, the Industrial Commission
should deny UPS's Motion For Reconsideration and award the Claimant the following attorney's fees:
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A.

Exhibit 14 Medical Benefits Incurred After 9.28.10 Hearing
$609.92

$2,033.05 X 30% Attorney's Fee=

(See i!103 on p. 45of9.28.12 decision)
In his 10.15.12 Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees, Claimant's Counsel
inadvertently described the class of medical benefits that attorney's fees should attach to as "Medical
Benefits Incurred Subsequent to 9.28.12 Decision" when the correct terminology based on the
Commission's 9.28.12 decision should have been "Medical Benefits Incurred After 9.28.10 Hearing".
The Claimant has filed an Addendum to his 10.15.12 Affidavit to correct this inadvertent mislabelling).
(Note:

B.

Exhibit 15 Medical Benefits Incurred After 9.28.10 Hearing
$202.20

$674.00 X 30% attorney's fee=

(See i!103 on p. 45of9.28.12 decision)
In his 10.15.12 Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees, Claimant's Counsel
inadvertently described the class of medical benefits that attorney's fees should attach to as "Medical
Benefits Incurred Subsequent to 9.28.12 Decision" when the correct terminology based on the
Commission's 9.28.12 decision should have been "Medical Benefits Incurred After 9.28.10 Hearing".
The Claimant has filed an Addendum to his 10.15.12 Affidavit to correct this inadvertent mislabelling).
(Note:

C.

Exhibit 16 Mileage, Per-Diem and Lodging Expenses
$644.84

$2,149.47 X 30% attorney's fee=

(See i!103 on p. 45of9.28.12 decision)
D.

Undisputed 12% PPI Rating Benefits
12% X 500 = 60 X 2009 PPI rate of$349.80 = $20,988.00 X 30% =

Total Attorney's Fee Requested Based on 9.28.12 decision:

$6,296.40

$7,753.36

Conclusion

UPS had a duty to specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions that it was
challenging in its Motion For Reconsideration.

Although UPS launched a generic attack on the

Commission's legal conclusions on the quasi estoppel, res judicata and attorney's fees issues, UPS
failed to present any new compelling factual arguments or legal arguments that would justify the
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Industrial Commission changing any of the findings of fact and legal conclusions set forth in its 9.28.12
decision. Therefore, the Industrial Commission should deny UPS's Motion For Reconsideration in its
entirety.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2012.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

By:

-~~,+1¢l

RlCKD. KALLAS
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of October, 2012, I served the Claimant's Brief in Response
to UPS's Motion For Reconsideration on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to
the following:
Paul J. Augustine, Esq.
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
1004 W. Fort St.
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Susan Veltman, Esq.
Breen, Veltman & Wilson
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, ID 83702

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S ADDENDUM TO 10.15.12
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A WARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

COMES NOW, Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, by and through his attorney of record,
Rick D. Kallas, and pursuant to the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 Order and the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990
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(1984), hereby submits the following Addendum to his 10.15.12 Affidavit In Support of Award

of Attorney's Fees.
Rick D. Kallas, being first duly sworn on oath, hereby deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho and make the following
statements based on my own personal knowledge; and,

2.

In paragraph 2 of my 10.15.12 Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees, I
incorrectly identified the class of past medical benefits that attorney's fees should be
awarded against as "Exhibit 14 Medical Benefits Incurred Subsequent to 9.28.12
decision" and "Exhibit 15 Medical Benefits Incurred Subsequent to 9 .28.12 decision".
Based on the language set forth in ,103 of the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 decision,
the class of medical benefits that the Industrial Commission should award attorney's fees
against should have been described as "Exhibit 14 Medical Benefits Incurred After
9.28.10 Hearing" and "Exhibit 15 Medical Benefits Incurred After 9.28.10 Hearing".

This addendum is being filed with the Industrial Commission to correct this inadvertent
labeling error.
Further your affiant sayeth not.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2012.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO,

PLLC

.
,R;J2 n. @

By: _RI_C_K_D_.KAL
_ _L_A_S_____,_~_~---Attorney for Claimant

Vawter I Claimant's Addendum to 10.15.12 Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees

Page 2

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF ADA )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me this 30th day of October, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of October, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
Claimant's Addendum to 10.15.12 Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees by the method indicated
below and addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
1004 W. Fort St.
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Susan Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

(',

~~)\\\ \~\J~k

i

\

!

TiffanY ~lano
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB NO. 7850)
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, PLLC
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, ID 83702
PH (208) 387-2667
FAX (208) 387-2677
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com
Attorney for Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc. and Liberty Insurance Corp.

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer,
and

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No.: 2010-000114
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF
SEPTEMBER 28, 2012 DECISION

)

LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

;_)

---------------)

COME NOW Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc., and Liberty Insurance Corporation, and
file this Reply Brief pursuant to JRP 3(F) and Idaho Code § 72-718, respectfully showing as follows:

1. The Commission's application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 1

Contrary to Claimant's assertion, Defendants do not dispute the Commission's
jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of quasi estoppel in workers' compensation proceedings.
Defendants' contention is that the Commission's application of the doctrine in this particular
case was in error because the issue was not raised as an affirmative defense by any of the
parties prior to hearing, not set forth in the Commission's 3/7112 Notice of Hearing, not
discussed at hearing, and not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
a. Quasi estoppel is not a sub-issue of ISIF liability.
Claimant's reliance on the Watson, Brennan, and Gomez cases for the proposition that
quasi estoppel is a sub-issue of ISIF liability and thus did not need to specifically be
identified as an issue for hearing is misplaced. None of those cases involve the application of
a legal principle such as quasi estoppel. Instead, each deals with an issue that depends on the
threshold issue of compensability. In Watson, the claimant argued on reconsideration that
the Commission erred by holding his claim was barred by Nelson because it was not a
noticed issue for hearing. The Commission disagreed, stating that Nelson deals with the
threshold compensability of an occupational disease and cannot be ignored in any case where
an occupational disease is in dispute. Watson v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., 2009
IIC 0570. Similarly, in Brennan although neither party specifically raised Nelson as an issue,
the Commission found it was appropriate to consider the Nelson rule because it was
subsumed within and anticipated by the issue of whether the claimant sustained an
occupational disease. Brennan v. Selkirk Press, Inc., 2012 IIC 0009. In Gomez the Supreme
Court held that although causation was not specifically listed in the noticed issues for
hearing, the issues that were listed turned on whether there was a causal connection between
the claimant's injury and her treatment. The court emphasized that "without causation, there
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 2

is no entitlement to benefits" and therefore the issue of causation could be anticipated as a
litigated issue. Gomez v. Dura J\1ark, Inc. 152 Idaho 597, 601-02, 272 P.3d 569, 572-3
(2012). Because each of these cases involves the threshold issue of compensability rather
than the application of a legal theory like quasi estoppel, they are not applicable to our case.
Additionally, in contrast to the issue of causation, quasi estoppel is not an element of
a claimant's prima facie case. It is an affirmative defense and a legal principle. Thomas v.

Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002).

Although the

Industrial Commission is not strictly bound by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(c)
is instructive in that it requires a party asserting an affirmative defense such as estoppel to list
it in a responsive pleading. I.R.C.P. 8(c). Moreover, Idaho Code§ 72-713 requires that the
Commission give written notice of the issues to be heard at least ten days prior to the date of
hearing. LC. § 72-713. As set forth above, the Supreme Court has held that where an issue
is subsumed within and anticipated by the noticed issues, the notice requirement of Idaho
Code § 72-713 is met.

However, unlike issues which tum on the threshold issue of

causation, like a claimant's entitlement to medical benefits, time loss benefits, impairment
benefits, and disability, quasi estoppel is not subsumed within and anticipated by a larger
issue. Similarly, quasi estoppel is not an element of ISIF liability, and whether ISIF is liable
in a particular case does not automatically implicate a quasi estoppel analysis. Without quasi
estoppel there can still be ISIF liability. Claimant's characterization of the doctrine as a
"sub-issue" of ISIF liability is flawed.
Defendants are not asking for "hyper-technical code pleading" as Claimant asserts.
(Cl. Responsive Brief, p. 6). They simply contend it was in error for the Commission to
apply the doctrine of quasi estoppel without prior notice. Upon review of the pleadings, the
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Commission's March 2012 Notice of Hearing, and the discussion at the beginning of the
May hearing, there is no indication quasi estoppel was an issue. Contrast this to the issue of
res judicata/collateral estoppel, which was raised by the parties prior to hearing, set forth in
the Commission's March hearing notice, and specifically discussed at the outset of the May
hearing. (5/17112 Trans. pp. 5-7; 2/13/12 Cl's. Request to Include Supplemental Issue for
Resolution at 5/17112 Hearing, p. 3).
Had Claimant intended to litigate the issue, he could have done so at the time of
hearing rather than in his post-hearing brief, which he concedes was the first time the issue
was raised. (CL Responsive Brief, p. 6). It cannot reasonably be argued that Defendants'
"clearly acquiesced" to the Commission's quasi estoppel determination when they were not
given reasonable notice of the issue prior to hearing or afforded the opportunity to put on
evidence regarding the matter. (CL Responsive Brief, p. 7). It is for these reasons that the
Commission's application of the doctrine was in error.
b. The Commission's application of quasi estoppel assumed facts not in evidence.

There is no evidence in the record that at the time of Dr. Knoebel's opinion,
Defendants had knowledge Claimant was entitled to permanent physical impairment.
Although quasi estoppel "may arise when a party who has a duty to speak fails to do so and
thereby produces an advantage for himself or a disadvantage for someone else, which is
unconscionable," the Supreme Court has held that silence generally cannot be relied on to
support estoppeL Thomas, 137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1247, Lupis v. Peoples Mortg. Co.,
107 Idaho 489, 491, 690 P.2d 944, 946 (1984). In our case, there is no evidence in the record
that UPS and its then surety had a duty to speak following Dr. Knoebel' s 1991 opinion.
There is no evidence their reliance on his opinion was unreasonable, let alone
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unconscionable, or that Claimant disputed it. There is no evidence of any rating rendered at
the time that is contrary to Dr. Knoebel's opinion, and the Commission acknowledged that
because the 1990 claim was not litigated, it never issued a finding whether Dr. Knoebel' s
opinion was incorrect. (9/28/12 Decision, p. 34).
Given that there is no evidence in the record to discredit Dr. Knoebel's opinion at the
time it was rendered or indicate that UPS and its prior surety were umeasonable to rely on it
or had a duty to speak out against it, it was improper for the Commission to conclude UPS
"assuredly benefited" from not having to pay an impairment rating. (9/28/12 Decision, p.
34).

The Commission's conclusion assumes UPS and its then surety had knowledge

Claimant was entitled to an impairment rating and received a benefit by not paying what was
owed. If the undisputed medical evidence shows that no impairment was due at the time of
Dr. Knoebel's opinion, there was no "benefit" in Defendants not paying such benefits, and it
was improper for the Commission to assume they were due.

2.

The Commission's decision not to apply res judicata/collateral estoppel to
matters previously litigated.

Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits, including past and future, was actually
litigated at the prior hearing and should have been barred from re-litigation by res
judicata/collateral estoppel.

Although Claimant characterizes his claim as "new" and

different than what he litigated at the first hearing, there is nothing "new" about it. As in the
first hearing, Claimant argued at the second hearing about the extent of his entitlement to
medical benefits. Claimant had a fair opportunity at the first hearing to put on evidence
regarding this same matter, and it was in error for the Commission to grant him another
opportunity to litigate the same issue.
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As indicated in Defendants Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission made it clear in its December 8, 2011, Order Denying Stay that its decision on
the issue of Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits was final and would not be relitigated.

[U]nder the plain language of [Idaho Code§ 72-718], the May 17, 2011
decision is final as to the matters of whether Claimant suffered an injury
arising out of employment, whether Claimant is entitled to TTD benefits,
whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits, and whether Claimant is
entitled to attorney fees. These issues will not be revisited by the Commission
in future decisions, absent instruction by the Court following an appeal.
Though the Commission has continuing jurisdiction over the remaining issues
in this case, the May 17 decision was not intended to be, nor should it be read
as preliminary. It is final.
(12/8/2011 Order Denying Stay, p. 5).

There are only limited situations in which the

Commission is permitted to re-open an otherwise final award. LC.§ 72-719. At the second
hearing, Claimant did not argue fraud, that his condition had changed, or that the
Commission's first decision resulted in manifest injustice. His attempt to re-litigate the same
issue as before is precisely the type of situation res judicata and collateral estoppel were
meant to address.
The Supreme Court has previously stated that decisions by the Commission are
conclusive as to matters actually adjudicated, but not as to all matters which could have been
adjudicated. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995), Woodvine v.

Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 720-21, 682 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 (1984). More recently,
the court asserted that in Idaho, the doctrine of res judicata means:

[T]hat 'in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand,
the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every
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matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also every matter
which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.'
Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 152 Idaho 96, 202, 268 P.3d 464, 470 (2012) (citing
Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994)).

Moreover, while Claimant argues "the Industrial Commission should reject UPS's
attempt to reframe the res judicata issue as a collateral estoppel issue at this late stage in the
proceedings," the record clearly shows the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel were
raised prior to hearing and contemplated by the Commission when it issued its 317 /12 Notice
of Hearing. (Cl. Responsive Brief, p. 15; 3/17112 Notice of Hearing, p. 2). As Claimant
stated in his 2/13112 Request to Include Supplemental Issue for Resolution at 5/17/12
Hearing:
Defendant UPS then asked the Industrial Commission to include the following
issue to be heard and decided at the 5/17/12 final Hearing:
Whether the doctrines of Res Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel prevent the
Claimant from requesting that Defendant UPS pay additional past denied
benefits which have not yet been paid by Defendants UPS to the Claimant?
The Industrial Commission indicated that it would add the issues of Res
Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel to the list of issues to be heard and decided
at the 5/17/12 Hearing.
(Cl's. Request to Include Supplemental Issue for Resolution at 5/17/12 Hearing dated
2/13/12, p. 3). Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata was framed by the parties and the
Commission as inclusive of collateral estoppel, and Claimant's argument Defendants are
reframing the issue is without merit.
Because the extent of Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits was actually
adjudicated at the first hearing, his claim for additional medical benefits at the second
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hearing was barred by doctrine of res judicata, inclusive of collateral estoppel, and the
Commission's decision not to apply the doctrine was in error. Claimant's arguments to the
contrary are unpersuasive.
3. The Commission's award of attorney fees.

Claimant erroneously asserts UPS "never disputed Dr. Frizzell's 12% postapportionment PPI rating" and therefore were unreasonable in not initiating impairment
benefits. (Cl. Responsive Brief, p. 19). This assertion is entirely without support and ignores
the fact that the issue of causation was litigated at the first hearing and continuously disputed
following the Commission's decision in Claimant's favor. According to Referee Michael
Powers at the outset of the first hearing, the issue of whether Claimant sustained a personal
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment was "a major issue in the case."
(9/28/10 Trans., p. 4). Following the Commission's May 2011 order, Defendants attempted
to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, with the first issue listed in the Notice of Appeal
being "Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant suffered
an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment causing an injury on
December 18 2009." (6/20/11 Notice of Appeal). Though the Supreme Court declined to
address the matter, Defendants continued to dispute compensability. In a letter to Claimant's
counsel dated February 14, 2012, which is excerpted in part in the Commission's 2012
decision, counsel for Defendants stated:
Further, entitlement to additional benefits [beyond those ordered by the
Commission its May 2011 decision] is contingent on the compensability
determination made in the May 17, 2011 decision. The Commission has
indicated such decision is final as to the issues adjudicated. However, the
Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the decision is not final for purposes
of appeal. A genuine legal dispute continues to exist as to both
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compensability and payment issues. Although the Court declined to address
the issues through interlocutory appeal, it has not considered the merits of the
disputed issues.

Again, all benefits ordered in this matter by the Industrial Commission have
been paid by Defendants. Based on the facts of this complicated case,
Defendants assert no additional benefits are owed at this time.
(Cl. Ex. 17, P. 017022) (emphasis added). The Commission summarized the subsequent
procedural history of the case in its September 2012 order and it will not be repeated here,
but it is sufficient to say that Defendants disputed compensability from the outset of the
proceedings and have made their position on the matter clear, as well as their intention to
appeal their case to the Supreme Court upon a final, appealable order.
Further, Defendants' position on the issue of compensability is in good faith and
reasonable considering the facts. As stated in the May 2011 decision:
This is a close case. Because shoe tying is such a commonplace occurrence, at
first blush it would seem that such an act could not be related to employment
unless changing or selling shoes was one's occupation. There is no bright line
in Idaho case law regarding when an accident arises out of employment and
there are no cases involving boot lace tying. More importantly, the scope and
reach of the court's decision in Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., is a subject of
legitimate debate.
(5/17/2011 Decision, pp. 20-21). Because compensability remained in dispute following the
May 2011 hearing and the issue of finality has not yet been determined by the Supreme
Court, it was not unreasonable for Defendants to deny payment for impairment benefits. The
workers' compensation law provides no recourse for Defendants to recover benefits that have
been paid on a claim subsequently deemed not compensable.

Further, because the

Commission's May 2011 order was deemed final and conclusive as to the matters
adjudicated, which included Claimant's entitlement to past and future medical benefits, it
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was reasonable for Defendants to deny Claimant's subsequent claim for additional medical
benefits.
Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above and in Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, Defendants respectfully request the Commission grant its Motion for
Reconsideration.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day ofNovember, 2012.

Susan R. Veltman
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of November, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
RICK KALLAS
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, & DEFRANCO, PLLC
1031 EPARK BLVD
BOISE, ID 83712
PAUL AUGUSTINE
P.O. BOX 1521
BOISE, ID 83701
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the abovenamed, the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN

..........,
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,

IC 2010-000114

v.

ERRATA

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

On September 28, 2012, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation;
and Order were filed by the Commission in the above-entitled case. Both Employer and Claimant
have brought the Commission's attention to certain typographical and factual errors in the
Commission's original decision. These points are well taken, and the Commission makes the
following changes to correct the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of
September 28, 2012:
The following changes should be made:
1.
ERRATA-1

On Page 3, line 7, the sentence "Claimant appealed the May 17, 2011 decision to the

Idaho Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed the appeal," should read, "Employer/Surety
appealed the May 17, 2011 decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed the
appeal".
2.

On Page 5, line 17, the sentence "The ISIF acknowledges that Claimant may be totally

and permanently disabled, but contends that Dr. Frizzell's recent opinion apportioning Claimant's
low back impairment between the subject accident and Claimant's preexisting condition must be
rejected," should read "The ISIF acknowledges that Claimant~ totally and permanently disabled, but
contends that Dr. Frizzell's recent opinion apportioning Claimant's low back impairment between
the subject accident and Claimant's preexisting condition must be rejected."
3.

On Page 12, paragraph 21, line 6, the sentence" On or about September 19, 1990,

Claimant suffered a left shoulder injury when he slipped, catching himself with his left arm," should
read "On or about September 19, 2000, Claimant suffered a left shoulder injury when he slipped,
catching himself with his left arm."
4.

On Page 26, paragraph 58, box #2:

September 19, 1990

left shoulder injury

7% of the whole person

left shoulder injury

7% of the whole person

should read as follows:
September 19, 2000

I
5.

On Page 29, paragraph 63, line 7, the sentence "Here, there is neither testimony from

Claimant, evaluating physicians, or vocational rehabilitation specialists which would support the
proposition that the 1988 thumb impairment, 1990 left shoulder impairment, or 2004 right shoulder
impairment constituted an obstacle to Claimant's employment or reemployment," should read "Here,
there is no testimony from Claimant, evaluating physicians, or vocational rehabilitation specialists

ERRATA-2

which would support the proposition that the 1988 thumb impairment, 2000 left shoulder
impairment, or 2004 right shoulder impairment constituted an obstacle to Claimant's employment or
reemployment."
6.

On Page 3 8, the issue heading of "Is Claimant Entitled to Ruling on Reimbursement

in Advance of Supreme Court Review of this Decision?" should read "Is Employer/Surety Entitled to
a Ruling on Reimbursement in Advance of Supreme Court Review of this Decision?"
7.

On Page 40, paragraph 93, the sentence "The Industrial Commission considered these

and other arguments, and in an order dated December 8, 2011, denied Claimant's motion for stay,
noting, inter alia, that any decision to bifurcate a case carries with it the downside illustrated by these
facts," should read "The Industrial Commission considered these and other arguments, and in an
order dated December 8, 2011, denied Employer/Surety's motion for stay, noting, inter alia, that any
decision to bifurcate a case carries with it the downside illustrated by these facts."
8.

On Page 41, paragraph 93, line 3, the sentence "The order further directed Claimant to

pay to Employer/Surety those benefits that were awarded incidental to the Commission's finding on
compensability," should read "The order further directed Employer/Surety to pay to Claimant those
benefits that were awarded incidental to the Commission's finding on compensability."
9.

On Page 41, paragraph 94, the sentence "Claimant sought permission to appeal the

Commission's order denying the stay to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Commission supported
this request for permissive appeal," should read "Employer/Surety sought permission to appeal the
Commission's order denying the stay to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Commission supported
this request for permissive appeal."
10.

ERRATA-3

On Page 44, paragraph 102, the sentence "(See Idaho Code§ 72-305)," should read

"(See Idaho Code§ 72-304)."
11.

On Page 45, paragraph 104, the sentence "Though raised as an issue by

Employer/Surety, a challenge to the Supreme Court's decision in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc.,
147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), was not addressed by Employer/Surety in post-hearing
briefing," should read "Though raised as an issue by Claimant, a challenge to the Supreme Court's
decision in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), was not
addressed by Employer/Surety in post-hearing briefing."
Attached is a corrected version of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

dayof

QettmleC2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
I!

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

ERRATA-4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day of
a true and correct copy of
Errata was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:

f1'tt/Yllzr:2012

RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
1703 W HILL RD
BOISE ID 83702
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

ERRATA-5

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COM1'1ISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,

IC 2010-000114

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

v.

Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Originally Filed September 28, 2012
(As amended by Errata of
December 5, 2012.)

Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter came before the Industrial Commission for hearing on May 17, 2012.
Appearing for Claimant was Rick Kallas, Esq.

Appearing for Defendants United Parcel

Service/Liberty Insurance Corporation was Susan Veltman, Esq. Appearing for the State of
Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was Paul Augustine, Esq. Per the Notice of
Hearing filed March 7, 2012, the following matters are at issue:
1.

Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits:
a. Permanent partial impairment (PPI);
b. Permanent partial disability (PPD);
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c. Mileage, per diem and lodging expenses incurred in connection with medical
treatment related to Claimant's industrial injury;
2.

Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, either under the 100%

method or according to the odd-lot doctrine;
3.

Whether apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-406 is appropriate;

4.

Whether the ISIF is liable under Idaho Code § 72-332, and, if so, apportionment

under the Carey formula;
5.

Whether Employer and Surety are entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid

pursuant to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, should that decision be reversed on
appeal;
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the

issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata;
7.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804, or

whether the issue of Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees is precluded under the doctrine ofres
judicata;
8.

Whether Employer and Surety are liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of all

past-denied medical care expenses incurred by Claimant in connection with his industrial injury;
9.

Whether the Commission, in order to prevent a manifest injustice, should amend

its May 17, 2011 decision to reflect that Employer and Surety are liable for 100% of the invoiced
amount of all past-denied medical care expenses incurred by Claimant in connection with his
industrial injury.
At hearing, the testimony of Claimant, Shaun Byrne, Greg Herzog, Barbara Nelson, and
Nancy Collins was adduced. The testimony of Preston Wilkinson was taken by way of pre-
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hearing deposition on May 8, 2012. The testimony of R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., was taken by way
of post-hearing deposition on June 4, 2012.
This matter has been the subject of prior proceedings before the Commission. At the
request of Defendants, hearing on this case was bifurcated. Following a September 28, 2010
hearing, the Commission issued its May 17, 2011 decision finding that Claimant suffered a
compensable work-related accident and was entitled to an award of TTD benefits, as well as
certain medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68. Employer/Surety appealed the May 17,
2011 decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed the appeal.
Employer/Surety requested that the Commission stay the award pending resolution of the
remaining issues in the case. By Order filed December 8, 2011, the Commission denied the
request for stay and ordered the payment of the award made in the Commission's May 17, 2011
decision.

Employer/Surety attempted to perfect a permissive appeal of the May 17, 2011

decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. That appeal was rejected as premature.
At the May 17, 2012 hearing, the Commission considered all testimony and exhibits
offered in the connection with the earlier hearing. In addition, the Commission admitted into
evidence Claimant's additional exhibits 1 - 24, Employer/Surety's additional exhibits 9

22, and

ISIF's additional exhibits A- K.
Being fully advised in the law and the premises, the Commission issues this decision on
the issues remaining in this bifurcated proceeding.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Claimant contends that on or about December 18, 2009, he suffered an accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment, and as a consequence of which he is totally and
permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. Specifically, Claimant contends that his total
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and permanent disability is solely the result of the compensable accident, and that responsibility
for his total and permanent disability lies exclusively with Employer/Surety.

Although

Employer/Surety has filed a complaint against the ISIF, seeking to hold the ISIF responsible for
a portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability, Claimant does not join with
Employer/Surety in asserting that some portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability is
the responsibility of the ISIF.

Claimant acknowledges that although he has a number of

preexisting physical impairments, none of these impairments are of the type that implicate ISIF
liability.

Specifically, Claimant denies that any of his preexisting physical impairments

constituted a subjective hindrance to him on a pre-injury basis. Further, Claimant contends that
none of these impairments combine with the work accident to cause permanent and total
disability. Claimant acknowledges that he suffered a work related low back injury in 1990 for
which he required medical treatment, and which resulted in time loss from work. Claimant
contends that at the time of his closing evaluation for this injury, he was given neither an
impairment rating, nor any physician imposed limitations/restrictions.

Though Claimant

acknowledges that he has suffered low back aches and pains over the years since 1990, he denies
that he suffers from any preexisting low back condition which would have warranted the award
of an impairment rating prior to the subject accident. Claimant contends that Employer/Surety,
having benefitted from the finding of their evaluating physician in 1991 that Claimant suffered
no impairment as a consequence of the 1990 accident, should not now be heard to assert that
Claimant does have an impairment rating of 7% of the whole person referable to the 1990
accident.
Finally, Claimant asserts that the doctrine of res judicata does not operate as a bar to his
demand for payment of additional medical bills, recently discovered, but incurred prior to the
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date of the first hearing on this matter. Instead, Claimant contends that he is entitled to an award
of attorney fees for Employer/Surety's failure to pay medical and other benefits related to
Claimant's compensable injury.
Though acknowledging that Claimant is profoundly disabled, Employer/Surety contends
that Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled under either of the routes to total and
permanent disability recognized by Idaho law.

Employer/Surety contends that in the event

Claimant is found to be totally and permanently disabled, not all of the responsibility for
Claimant's

total

and

permanent

disability

should

be

borne

by

Employer/Surety.

Employer/Surety contends that Claimant has preexisting permanent physical impairments
involving several body parts, and that his preexisting permanent physical impairment for his low
back condition meets all of the elements of ISIF liability.

According to Employer/Surety,

Claimant's current low back impairment is 19% of the whole person, with 7% assignable to
Claimant's preexisting condition and 12% assignable to the subject accident. Employer/Surety
contends that the doctrine of res judicata bars Claimant from adjudicating entitlement to
additional medical bills incurred prior to the date of the first hearing, but only recently
discovered.
The ISIF acknowledges that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, but contends
that Dr. Frizzell's recent opinion apportioning Claimant's low back impairment between the
subject accident and Claimant's preexisting condition must be rejected.

ISIF argues that

Claimant's total and permanent disability, if extant, is wholly the product of the subject accident,
and that none of Claimant's preexisting impairments constituted a subjective hindrance to
Claimant, nor did they combine with the subject accident to cause total and permanent disability.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Claimant was born on

, and was 52 years old as of the date of

hearing. He and his family moved to Donnelly, Idaho when Claimant was 11 years old. With
the exception of a brief stint in the Marine Corps, Claimant has resided in Donnelly ever since.
2.

Claimant graduated at the bottom of his class from Donnelly High School. He got

mostly Cs and Ds, with some Fs and Bs, during his tenure as a student. He did poorly at studies
requiring reading and writing, but excelled at math.
3.

Barbara Nelson confirmed that Claimant's academic performance in high school

was poor. Ms. Nelson administered various academic tests, including the WRAT 4. This testing
confirmed Claimant's testimony that he has severe deficiencies in reading, writing, and spelling,
but tests at a high school graduate level in math. (Tr. 218/21 - 220116). Nancy Collins, the
vocational expert retained by Employer/Surety, expressed no disagreement with Ms. Nelson's
observations concerning Claimant's academic performance and deficiencies.
4.

Notwithstanding his deficits in reading, writing, and spelling, it is noted that

Claimant is a cogent and articulate speaker. He had no difficulty understanding or responding to
the questions that were put to him at hearing. In particular, he seems to be blessed with good
recall.
5.

Claimant has no other post-high school education, other than the training he

received in the Marine Corps. He testified that he received training as a mechanic on vehicles
peculiar to the Marine Corps, and which have no counterpart in the civilian world.
6.

Though Claimant testified that he has taught himself to read, he still has difficulty

with comprehension. He does not read the daily paper. He has attempted to read novels for
enjoyment, but is frequently frustrated when encountering words that he does not understand.
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He is capable of using a web browser to access websites that he likes to follow, mostly those
providing fishing news or information on BSU football. He denied having any other computer
skills whatsoever.
7.

From approximately 1983 to 2004 Claimant worked as a volunteer EMT. He

testified that he completed initial EMT training, then became ambulance certified and later
obtained an EMT-A rating. When he finally resigned in 2003, he was serving as President of the
local EMT board. (Tr. 166/21 - 167/8). Claimant resigned from his position as an EMT because
of new rules that created potential liability for any EMT who inaccurately recorded medical
information about a patient. Claimant testified that in view of his difficulties with reading,
writing, and spelling, he had no desire to subject himself to this type of liability.
8.

Claimant was discharged from the Marines in 1980 because of what he described

as a "defective attitude." Nevertheless, Claimant received an honorable discharge. He returned
to the Donnelly area, and was first employed by Petrolane. There, he worked as a driver for
about a year before landing another job at Roland Brothers. He worked there for approximately
2Yz years, first as a mechanic's apprentice, and then as a snow plow operator and cement truck
driver. He left Roland Brothers in order to take a job with UPS in 1983. He was employed as a
package driver, and worked in this position for the duration of his employment by UPS.
However, until 1990 he evidently drove a "feeder route" in which position he transported
packages from Boise to McCall and back. In approximately 1990, he bid on a package driver job
in Cascade so that he would be able to spend more time following his school age children's
sporting and school activities. Against the suggestion that the Cascade job was physically less
demanding than the feeder route job, Claimant testified that it was, in fact, a more demanding
position. Claimant described his job duties as follows:
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A.
Well, there is in the big city like Boise they have - they have pre-loaders
and unloaders and all of that stuff. In a rural area, McCall, they have - I think
there is four guys that work in the building in McCall that unload the feeder truck
and load their package cars. It's the drivers that do it. But where I was at do\VTI
in Cascade I was the only one. So, I unloaded the trailer into the truck and loaded
the truck and placed the boxes - we put anything from a pound to - I think the
heaviest one I ever carried was 232 pounds. You know, I have had 24 7 on the
box. But we weighed it when I got to the mill, but so, you know, I did all that
and, then, at the end of the you go out and make your deliveries and you have a
predetermined time that you have to do your pickups and you do your pickups
during the afternoon and, then, finish your deliveries and get done at the end of
the day, you unload your truck of the packages you didn't get delivered and also
all your pickup stuff into the trailer and, then, you do your end of day stuff where
you just - your DIAD, you have already done your signature for your COD count
and all that stuff and you punch out.
Tr. 33/2-22.
9.

Following the subject accident and related low back surgeries, Claimant was

declared medically stable by Dr. Frizzell in November 2010. Thereafter, he was given certain
permanent limitations/restrictions by Dr. Frizzell. He attempted to identify a means by which he
could return to work for UPS, and continue with his Employer until he could retire. He worked
closely with UPS to identify a suitable position, and even offered to take a job outside of Valley
County if the company could identify a position consistent with his limitations/restrictions. UPS
was unable to identify work for Claimant consistent with his limitations/restrictions, and in the
end, he resigned so that he could access his 401K to have something to live on.
10.

Claimant applied for Social Security disability benefits, and was eventually found

eligible for Social Security disability benefits retroactive to December 24, 2009. He did not,
however, begin receiving Social Security disability until December 2011. As of the date of
hearing, Claimant receives $2,260.00 or $2,290.00 per month in Social Security disability
benefits.

In addition, Claimant receives a monthly payment from the Western Conference

Pension Plan in the amount of $2, 108.00.
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11.

Claimant testified to his understanding that he can earn monthly income of either

$920.00 or $970.00 per month without endangering his right to monthly Social Security
disability income. His union pension imposes some restrictions on the type of work he can do
without jeopardizing those monthly benefits.
12.

In a letter dated June 27, 2011, Dr. Frizzell addressed Claimant's permanent

limitations/restrictions following a functional capacities evaluation administered by Peggy
Wilson:
My permanent physical restrictions are in line with the ones that I had made based
on the recommendations of Ms. Connie Crogh on December 6, 2010. Ms. Wilson
has come to similar restrictions. Mr. Vawter had a valid Key Functional Capacity
Assessment on June 20, 2011. He is able to work at a light work level.
Specifically, he may stand for 2 hours a day, 20 minutes duration. He may walk 4
hours a day with frequent, moderate distances. He may lift 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 lbs. frequently. He may carry 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs.
frequently. He may torque 10 lbs. occasionally and 5 lbs. frequently. He may
push 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs frequently. He may pull 20 lbs occasionally
and 10 lbs. frequently. He may sit 2 hours a day; 15 minutes duration. He may
bend minimally, occasionally. He may stoop minimally and occasionally. He
may crouch minimally, occasionally. He may kneel occasionally. He may crawl
occasionally. He may climb stairs frequently. He should not work from
unprotected heights. He should avoid constant, low frequency vibration.
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 1, pp. 001108-001109.

13.

In a follow-up letter of March 15, 2012, Dr. Frizzell amended these restrictions

with the following correction:
I have the reviewed the corrected copy provided by Ms. Wilson. She notes work
day of four hours with sitting to standing one to two hours, standing one to two
hours, and walking one to three hours.
Ms. Wilson also notes that Mr. Vawters' key functional capacity assessment is
valid.
Therefore, I agree with her conclusions ...
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 1, p. 001122.
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14.

Claimant expressed a good understanding of his physician imposed permanent

limitations/restrictions. See Tr. 52123

5419. As a lifelong resident of the Donnelly area, and as

a UPS driver, Claimant testified that he had a peculiar, and possibly unique, understanding of his
local labor market. His work as a UPS driver took him to almost every area business at one time
or another, and afforded him a glimpse of how local businesses were fairing in the down
economy:
By Mr. Kallas
Q. And you delivered packages as a package car driver for UPS in Valley county
for approximately 26 years?
A.

Yeah. Real close to 27 years. Yeah.

Q.
So, how familiar are you with the businesses that exist in Valley county
right now?
A.
I would say especially on the south and, because that's where I spent my
last 13 years, 14 years. On the south end I know every person, every dog, every
car that everybody drives. You could tell - UPS was a great barometer for how a
business is doing. You know when a business starts getting their stuff COD it's
not long before the door is going to be closing. So, yeah, I got a real good feeling.
Like I say, most of them I have known since I was a little kid. I ran around in
Cascade when I was a kid.

Tr. 79/8-22.
15.

With assistance from Shaun Byrne and Greg Herzog of the Industrial Commission

Rehabilitation Division, Claimant applied for work at a number of Valley County businesses
including Long Valley Farm Service, V-1, the Trading Post, Donnelly Country Store, Harpo's,
Howdy' s, Cascade Auto, Jug Mountain, W orldMart, Rite-Aid, Quick Lube, and an area fitness
center. Tr. 70/1-16. Claimant testified that though he applied for these jobs, and in many cases,
knew the owners of the businesses, he was unsuccessful in obtaining employment, either because
he was not possessed of the skills to perform the job or the job was beyond the
limitations/restrictions imposed by Dr. Frizzell.
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16.

As a consequence of the subject accident, Claimant underwent two low back

surgeries, both performed by Dr. Frizzell. After reaching medical stability in November 2010,
Dr. Frizzell eventually awarded Claimant a 19% PPI rating, along with the aforementioned
limitations/restrictions. As developed infra, the parties dispute whether, or to what extent, this
19% PPI rating, and the attendant limitations/restrictions, should be apportioned between the
subject accident and a preexisting condition.
17.

Claimant's workers' compensation history is significant for a number of reported

accidents predating the subject December 18, 2009 accident. All of these accidents occurred
during Claimant's long employment with UPS.
18.

On or about March 24, 1988, Claimant suffered a right thumb injury for which he

was eventually given a 9% whole person PPI rating.
19.

On or about October 22, 1990, Claimant suffered an injury to his low back at the

L4-5 level. Patrick Cindrich, M.D., considered Claimant to be a candidate for a percutaneous
discectomy at L4-5 to treat the left-sided paracentral disc protrusion demonstrated by the
radiological studies. However, Claimant did not undergo surgery, and was eventually declared
medically stable on or about April 2, 1991, following evaluation by Richard Knoebel, M.D., an
evaluating physician retained by UPS and its then surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance.
Following his examination of Claimant, Dr. Knoebel opined that Claimant was capable of
returning to work without restriction, and without any permanent physical impairment. (See D.
5.17.12 Ex. 10, p. 27). The summary of payments reflects that Claimant missed approximately
22 weeks of work as a result of the 1990 accident for which he received TTD benefits.
20.

On or about September 16, 1999, Claimant suffered another low back injury when

he slipped while carrying a package. Claimant complained of low back pain and bilateral lower
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extremity radicular symptoms following this accident. An MRI scan performed on September
27, 1999 was read as showing mild canal stenosis at L4-5 due to a broad diffuse disk bulge and
very mild bilateral facet osteoarthritis. (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 21, p. 236).

Claimant missed four

weeks from work as a result of this accident, for which he received time loss benefits. Neither
impairment nor restrictions were awarded to Claimant as a consequence of the 1999 accident.
21.

On or about September 19, 2000, Claimant suffered a left shoulder injury when he

slipped, catching himself with his left arm. MRI evaluation of Claimant's left shoulder showed a
severely degenerative AC joint with probable accident caused injury superimposed on chronic
deterioration of the joint. He underwent arthroscopic decompression of the left shoulder and was
pronounced stable by Dr. Rudd on or about January 23, 2002. At that time, he was also given an
impairment rating equal to 7% of the whole person. (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 12, p. 56). In terms of
Claimant's return to work, Dr. Rudd stated: "We will release him to do his normal duties for
UPS, although overhead lifting will be awkward for him."
22.

On or about July 6, 2004, Claimant suffered a right shoulder injury while loading

packages on to the top shelf of his vehicle. He was evaluated by Robert Walker, M.D., and
diagnosed as suffering from a partial thickness right rotator cuff tear and a right AC joint injury.
Claimant underwent arthroscopic subacromial decompression of the right shoulder and excision
of the right AC joint. On or about December 1, 2004, Claimant was declared medically stable
and was given a 10% whole person rating by Dr. Walker. On December 1, 2004, Dr. Walker
offered the following comments concerning Claimant's ability to return to work:
I would expect that he will continue to strengthen over time but it may take
several months before he has maximal improvement. At this point, he will
continue with activities as tolerated and may continue to work, progressing to an
unrestricted basis.
D. 5.17.12 Ex. 19, p. 218.
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23.

With respect to the prior claims referenced above, Claimant testified that none of

the injuries he suffered permanently impacted his ability to engage in gainful activity. Without
exception, Claimant testified that he recovered from these injuries, and returned to his usual
occupation as a UPS driver. He required no accommodation, and none was offered to him by
UPS. He testified that prior to the subject December 18, 2009 accident, he felt that he could
perform any type of manual labor available in Valley County; he felt himself "invincible." (Tr.
141/12-25).
24.

The record supports Claimant's assertions in this regard, at least with respect to

the 1988 thumb injury, 2000 left shoulder injury, and 2004 right shoulder injury. As noted,
Claimant was released without physician imposed restriction following each of these accidents
and there is neither medical, nor other evidence, which would suggest that these prognostications
concerning Claimant's functional ability were inaccurate. Claimant made the same averments
with respect to his 1990 low back injury, but in this case, the record does contain significant
evidence contradicting Claimant's testimony.
25.

First, as noted above, Dr. Knoebel did not feel that Claimant was entitled to an

impairment rating for his low back condition following the 1990 accident. Absent the issuance
of an impairment rating, the 1990 accident would be insignificant for purposes of Idaho Code §
72-406 apportionment in a less than total case, and Idaho Code § 72-332 apportionment between
the employer and the ISIF in a total and permanent disability case. However, Dr. Knoebel's is
not the only opinion of record concerning whether Claimant is entitled to an impairment rating
for the 1990 accident. A review of the records and testimony of Dr. Frizzell reveals that after a
good deal of back and forth between he, Claimant's counsel and counsel for Employer/Surety,
Dr. Frizzell committed himself to the proposition that Claimant's 19% PPI rating should be

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 13

apportioned 7% to the 1990 accident, and 12% to the subject December 18, 2009 accident.
Dr. Frizzell also testified that limitations/restrictions against lifting more than 75 pounds would
accompany the 7% PPI rating awarded to Claimant for the 1990 accident.
26.

Explaining his original disinclination to assign either impairment or limitations to

the 1990 accident, Dr. Frizzell stated that because Dr. Knoebel had issued neither impairment
nor limitations for that accident, Dr. Frizzell had labored under the belief that this somehow
precluded revisiting the issue. (Frizzell Depo., 39110-21 ). When asked to simply ignore the fact
that Dr. Knoebel had previously opined on these issues, Dr. Frizzell expressed his opinion that
apportionment of both impairment and restrictions was appropriate.
27.

This did not end Claimant's criticism of Dr. Frizzell's new opinion. In arriving at

his decision to apportion Claimant's PPI rating between the 1990 accident and the 2009 accident,
Dr. Frizzell relied upon the AMA Medical Association Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent

Impairment (5th Edition).

He believed that it was appropriate to assign some portion of

Claimant's impairment to the 1990 accident because the three criteria for apportioning
impairment identified in the Guides had been met:
1)

There is documentation of a prior factor.

2)

The current permanent impairment is greater as a result of the prior factor
(ie, prior impairment, prior injury, or illness).

3)

There is evidence that the prior factor caused or contributed to the
impairment, based on a reasonable probability (>50% likelihood).

AMA Medical Association Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th
Edition), p. 11.
28.

Dr. Frizzell testified that the L4-5 injury documented in connection with the 1990

accident satisfied all three criteria, thus making apportionment appropriate. (Frizzell Depo.,
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15/4-16/5).

However, on cross-examination by Claimant's counsel, Dr. Frizzell offered the

following cryptic response concerning criteria number 2:
By Mr. Kallas
Q.
Okay. And on step 2, it asks whether the current permanent impairment is
greater as a result of the prior factor. And in this case, I assume the prior factor
that we're talking about is the 7 percent PPI rating that you issued for Mr.
Vawter' s preexisting L4-5 disk protrusion, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Can you explain to me how this current impairment rating would be
greater as a result of the prior factor?

A.

No, I can't confirm that.

Frizzell Depo., 22/18-23/4.
Even so, at the end of the day, Dr. Frizzell concluded the discussion by expressing his
view that based on the medical and other records he reviewed in connection with Claimant's
preexisting condition, it was still appropriate to assign 7% of the 19% PPI rating to the 1990
accident, and to restrict Claimant from lifting over 7 5 pounds as a consequence of that accident.
29.

Independent evidence in the record tends to support Dr. Frizzell's ultimate

conclusion that apportionment of both impairment and limitations is appropriate in this case.
30.

On August 5, 2009, Claimant was seen for a DOT physical by Jim Dardis, M.D.,

of the Payette Lakes Medical Center. In connection with that physical, Dr. Dardis recorded the
following history and findings:
REVIEW OF SYMPTOMS: The patient has complaints ofright thumb pain from
where he lost the tip of his thumb in a conveyor belt, severe upper back pain, very
sore with spasms, chronic low back pain from lifting boxes and carrying which
he's been doing for almost 28 years with UPS He has complaints in both knees
with heat and swelling which, by the end of the day, just stepping out of this truck
gives shooting pains with his left knee and causes a hot, swollen, painful, aching
like a toothache in his right knee by the end of each day of work.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Normal DOT physical, cleared for two years.
Diabetes mellitus.
Dyslipidemia.
Bilateral knee pain.
Chronic low back pain.
Current upper back pain.

D. 9.28.10 Ex. 5, pp. 75-76.
31.

From time to time, Claimant was evaluated by his supervisors, who rode along

with him on his route to assess his performance and compliance with UPS policy. Among other
things, UPS required its employees to avoid "excessive backing" when accessing the driveways
or parking lots of its customers. Evidently, this policy was intended to avoid damage to persons
or property for which the company might be held liable. On a ride along evaluation of July 29,
2008, the individual who was evaluating Claimant recorded the following: "Excessive backing
due to protectiveness of sore back." (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 15, p. 124).
32.

Claimant attempted to explain these entries and square them with his testimony

that he was altogether unimpaired prior to the December 18, 2009 accident. The Commission
finds these explanations unconvincing, and concludes that the record provides substantial and
competent evidence supporting the conclusion that Claimant suffered from symptomatic low
back complaints prior to December 18, 2009, complaints which were severe enough to cause
Claimant to modify the manner in which he performed his work.
33.

As noted above, after being declared medically stable, Claimant unsuccessfully

looked for work in Valley County. In this he was aided by both Shaun Byrne and Greg Herzog,
however, per Claimant, only Greg Herzog offered specific leads to Claimant for follow-up.
None of the jobs suggested by Mr. Herzog proved appropriate for Claimant. In addition to the
work they did on Claimant's case, both Mr. Byrne and Mr. Herzog also offered their views on
Claimant's residual employability following the December 18, 2009 accident. Mr. Byrne noted
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that Claimant's transferable job skills include good customer service skills, but little else. He
proposed that lacking significant transferable job skills, Claimant's employability could be
improved with retraining. However, Claimant's deficiencies in reading, writing, and spelling
make successful retraining doubtful.
34.

Mr. Byrne testified that Claimant was diligent and highly motivated to either

return to UPS or other employment in Valley County. Based on Claimant's relevant nonrnedical
factors and the limitations/restrictions imposed by Dr. Frizzell, Mr. Byrne ultimately concluded
that Claimant is unemployable in Valley County absent the assistance of a sympathetic
employer. (Tr. 193/22
35.

194/12; 197/5

16).

Concerning the job leads that he provided to Claimant, Mr. Herzog acknowledged

that although these jobs might be consistent with Claimant's physical limitations, Claimant was
otherwise tmequipped with the skills necessary to perform the work in question. (Tr. 209/8 211/3).
36.

Delyn Porter, a private vocation rehabilitation expert was retained by Aetna

Disability and Benefits Management, Claimant's non-occupational disability insurance provider,
to perform an assessment of Claimant's employability in Valley County. This assessment was
requested by Aetna in order to assist it in making its own determination as to whether Claimant
was entitled to the disability benefits available under that policy and/or whether Claimant \Vas a
candidate for Social Security disability benefits, a status which would reduce Atena' s exposure
for the payment of private disability benefits. Mr. Porter reached conclusions very similar to
those reached by Shaun Byrne:
Given his age a formal training program to prepare to return to work would be an
option, but he would likely have to travel outside of his labor market area in order
to participate in a training program. He also struggled with high school and notes
that he was not a good student. When considering his residual functional capacity
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41/

and permanent work restrictions with the need to travel to participate and past
struggles in school this may not be a viable option. Career exploration services
could assist him in identifying training goals and options that he may choose to
consider.
The most likely route for Mr. Vawter to return to work would be to work for a
friend, relative, or sympathetic employer that is willing to overlook and work
around the multiple factors indentified in this report. He was born and raised in
the Donnelly area and is well known and respected in the community.
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 7, p. 007011.
37.

Claimant retained the services of Barbara Nelson to provide an op1mon on

Claimant's residual employability following the subject accident. In performing her evaluation,
Ms. Nelson assumed that the final limitations/restrictions identified by Dr. Frizzell accurately
identify Claimant's current exertional limitations. Conversely, she chose to reject Dr. Frizzell's
opinion that Claimant should have observed a 75 pound maximum lifting restricting even before
the December

I 8, 2009 accident.

Ms.

Nelson assumed that all of Claimant's

limitations/restrictions are referable to the December 18, 2009 accident. These limitations, in
conjunction with Claimant's lack of transferable job skills and his severe academic limitations,
led Ms. Nelson to conclude that Claimant has suffered a profound disability and is, in fact,
unemployable in Valley County. (Tr. 222/8
38.

224/21).

On examination by the Commission, Ms. Nelson conceded that if Dr. Frizzell is

correct in his conclusion that Claimant should have observed a 75 pound lifting restriction as a
consequence of the 1990 low back injury, then he has suffered a 10-15% loss of access to the
labor market as a consequence of the 1990 accident.
39.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D., was retained by Employer/Surety to perform a forensic

analysis of Claimant's residual employability and to consider whether the 1990 accident
contributed to Claimant's current disability.
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40.

Dr. Collins did not denigrate Claimant's diligence in attempting to obtain

employment following his date of medical stability. However, she noted that at the present time,
Claimant does not have a great deal of financial incentive to pursue employment consistent with
his limitations.

Claimant is receiving monthly payments from both the Social Security

Administration and his union pension plan.

Additionally, Social Security offset provisions

would apply were Claimant's monthly income from employment to exceed $890.00.
41.

In her report, Dr. Collins proposed that Claimant's disability from all causes is in

the range of 70-80%. However, this opinion was reached without the benefit of Dr. Frizzell's
complete opinion on Claimant's current limitations/restrictions. In view of Dr. Frizzell' s belief
that Claimant should be restricted from working more than four hours per day, Dr. Collins
opined that Claimant's current disability from all causes is in the range of 80%. Although she
testified that it is not pointless for Claimant to search for part-time work as a cashier or hotel
clerk, she concedes that Claimant may be an odd-lot worker, and that Claimant's reading,
writing, and spelling deficiencies would make it difficult for Claimant to succeed in any job that
requires reading and writing.
42.

Dr. Collins did not dismiss Dr. Frizzell's opm10ns on the apportionment of

impairment and restrictions to the 1990 low back injury.

Per Dr. Collins, the 75 pound

restriction imposed by Dr. Frizzell for the 1990 injury would result in loss of labor market access
in the range of 10-15% and wage loss in the range of 50-60%. Considering these factors, she
proposed that Claimant suffered disability in the range of 35% as a consequence of the 1990
accident.
43.

The Commission finds Claimant to be intelligent, articulate, loquacious, and

generally credible in his testimony-the only exception being Claimant's unconvincing
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insistence that prior to December 18, 2009, he had no symptomatic low back complaints, and
that he did not self-limit his activities in order to protect his back.
44.

At the time of the September 28, 2010 hearing, Claimant put on proof that as of

the date of that hearing, he was aware of medical bills totaling $149,033.68. In briefing, he
cautioned that he had presented only those bills of which he was aware, and that further research
might reveal the existence of additional medical bills for treatment rendered prior to the date of
the September 2010 hearing. He asked the Commission to order Employer/Surety to pay those
bills of which he was aware as of the date of hearing.
45.

Since the September 28, 2010 hearing, Claimant has discovered additional

medical bills for services rendered prior to the date of the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision
on compensability.

Those bills total $24,627.80.

Employer/Surety does not challenge the

compensability of that care. Rather, Employer/Surety contends that Claimant's entitlement to
recover these additional expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing is barred by
the doctrine of res judicata.
DICUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS
Total and Permanent Disability

46.

Under Idaho Code §§ 72-423, 72-425, and 72-430, permanent disability is a

measure of claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as that
ability is affected by the claimant's permanent physical impairment, and the relevant nonmedical
factors identified at Idaho Code § 72-430. The date upon which this disability evaluation must
be made is the date of hearing. Brown v. The Home Depot, WL 718795 (March 7, 2012). Here,
Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled, and the ISIF concedes this point.
Only Employer/Surety contends that Claimant's disability is less than total.
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47.

A claimant may establish that he or she is totally and permanently disabled by

using either of the two methodologies available to establish total permanent disability:
First, a claimant may prove total and permanent disability if his or her medical
impairment together with the nonrnedical factors total 100%. If the Commission
finds that a claimant has met his or her burden of proving 100% disability via the
claimant's medical impairment and pertinent nonrnedical factors, there is no need
for the Commission to continue. The total and permanent disability has been
established at that stage. See, Hegel v. Kuhlman Bros., Inc., 115 Idaho 855, 857,
771 P.2d 519, 521 (1989) (Bakes, J., specially concurring) ("Once 100%
disability is found by the Commission on the merits of a claimant's case, claimant
has proved his entitlement to 100% disability benefits, and there is no need to
employ the burden-shifting odd-lot doctrine").

Boley v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho, at 281, 939 P.2d at 857.
When a claimant cannot make the showing required for 100% disability, then a second
methodology is available: the odd-lot category is for those workers who are so injured that they
can perform no services other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity
that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136
Idaho 579, 584 38 P.3d 617, 622 (2001), citing Lyons v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98
Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977). The worker need not be physically unable to perform any
work; they are simply not regularly employable in any well-known branch of the labor market
absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck,
or a superhuman effort on their part. Id., 136 Idaho at 584, 38 P.3d at 622.
48.

An employee may prove total disability under the odd-lot doctrine in one of three

(1)

by showing that [he or she] has attempted other types of employment
without success;

(2)

by showing that [he or she] or vocational counselors or employment
agencies on his or her behalf have searched for other work and other work
is not available; or;

ways:
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(3)

by showing that any efforts to find suitable employment would be futile.

Boley v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, supra.

49.

Here, Claimant's impairments total 45% (9% thumb, 7% left shoulder, 10% right

shoulder, 19% low back).

No vocational expert has proposed that Claimant is totally and

permanently disabled by virtue of having 100% disability, and on the record before the
Commission, the Commission is unable to conclude that Claimant was 100% disabled as a
matter of law as of the date of hearing. There remains for consideration the question of whether
Claimant is, nevertheless, totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine.
50.

Claimant's permanent limitations/restrictions were established by Dr. Frizzell,

and are not in dispute. These limitations would profoundly limit anyone's ability to engage in
gainful activity, but have an even greater impact on a worker whose lack of transferable job
skills leave him suited to manual labor only.

Such is Claimant's situation. His academic

performance in high school was poor, which may be explained by the existence of a learning
disability, as suggested by the testing performed at Ms. Nelson's instance. Claimant has a great
deal of difficulty with reading, writing, and spelling. Although his math skills are good, it is
difficult to imagine what type of part-time sedentary job exists in Valley County that does not
require the ability to read, write, or operate a computer. Although Claimant presents as articulate
and personable, these qualities alone do not significantly expand the labor market of someone
who is as academically challenged as Claimant. Although it was suggested that Claimant might
improve his employability with unspecified retraining of some type, it was also pointed out that
retraining would be problematic in view of Claimant's reading and writing deficiencies.
Moreover, retraining has not been offered, and Claimant's entitlement to retraining benefits
under Idaho Code § 72-450 is not among the issues noticed for hearing.
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51.

Valley County has one of the highest unemployment rates in the state, but because

he has lived in Valley County since 1971, and has a peculiar knowledge of the Valley County
labor market by virtue of his long employment with UPS, Claimant is particularly well suited to
ferret out employment opportunities in his labor market.

Although it is probably true that

Claimant is less motivated now to look for suitable employment since qualifying for Social
Security Disability and his private pension, the record establishes that Claimant was diligent in
his work search after being declared medically stable by Dr. Frizzell. He was exhaustive in his
efforts to return to work for his time of injury employer. When that effort failed to produce a job
opportunity for him with UPS, he made a reasonably diligent effort to identify suitable
employment in the Valley County labor market.

Shaun Byrne of the ICRD confirmed that

Claimant made a good effort to find work consistent with his limitations. Although Mr. Byrne
recognized that Claimant had better access to job leads than the ICRD, Greg Herzog actually did
provide Claimant with two or three job leads. Although Claimant did contact these employers,
Mr. Herzog acknowledged that the positions required skills which Claimant did not possess. (Tr.
209/8-210/15). In fact, Mr. Herzog was unable to identify any job openings in the Valley
County labor market which were consistent with Claimant's physical limitations and skills. (Tr.
21114-11).
52.

Similarly, Shaun Byrne was unable to identify suitable employment for Claimant

in Valley County. Mr. Byrne testified that the only employment that might be reasonable for
Claimant was part-time employment in some type of service job such as a retail sales
clerk/cashier.
employer."

He believed that Claimant could perform this type of work for the "right
Explaining this comment, Mr. Byrne testified that Claimant is probably only

employable by a sympathetic employer.

Mr. Byrne's gestalt is that an individual with
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Claimant's limitations and lack of transferrable job skills is essentially unemployable in the
Valley County labor market. (Tr. 197/5-16).
53.

As noted above, Barbara Nelson testified that she chose not to consider

Dr. Frizzell's opinion on apportionment of impairment and limitations to Claimant's preexisting
low back condition because she did not find his assessment to be "credible." (Tr. 222/10224/21). Although she could be criticized for accepting only those opinions of Dr. Frizzell
favorable to Claimant's claim, this potential shortcoming does nothing to denigrate her
conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Taking into account the permanent
limitations/restrictions given to Claimant following his November 2010 date of medical stability,
as well as the Claimant's relevant nonmedical factors, including, most importantly, his reading
and writing deficiencies, Ms. Nelson has credibly explained that Claimant is essentially
unemployable in the Valley County labor market.
54.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D., originally concluded that Claimant's disability is in the

range of 70-80%. However, her opinion in this regard assumed that Claimant is capable of
working an eight hour day. She candidly agreed that if Claimant is not capable of working more
than four hours per day, his disability is more likely to be at the high end of that range, i.e. 80%.
Dr. Collins still felt that Claimant might be able to find employment as a part-time cashier or
hotel clerk. She did not feel it pointless for Claimant to attempt retraining, because he was
evidently good enough at classroom work to advance in his EMT training over the years.
However, she conceded that Claimant's reading, writing, and spelling deficiencies would make it
difficult for Claimant to succeed in any job requiring reading or writing. Most telling, though
arguing that Claimant's disability is in the range of 80%, she candidly acknowledged that
Claimant may, nevertheless, be an odd-lot worker.
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55.

Based on the testimony of Mr. Byrne, Mr. Herzog and Ms. Nelson, the

Commission believes that Dr. Collins has underestimated the significance of Claimant's
restriction against working more than four hours per day, but that she has, nevertheless, correctly
observed that in the Valley County labor market, an individual with Claimant's profound
limitations and lack of skills is likely to be an odd-lot worker.
56.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Claimant has satisfied his

burden of proving that he is an odd-lot worker by at least two of the recognized methods of
proving odd-lot status.

We find that Claimant has been diligent in his attempts to obtain

employment, but that even with his intuitive grasp of the Valley County labor market, he has
been unsuccessful in finding work. As well, the vocational rehabilitation experts who have
provided testimony in this case are almost uniform in their agreement that Claimant is
unemployable in Valley County. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Claimant is totally
and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine.
ISIF Liability
57.

Idaho Code § 72-332 provides:

PAYMENT FOR SECOND INJURIES FROM INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY ACCOUNT. (1) If an employee who has a permanent physical
impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an injury
or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by
reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the
subsequent injury or occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation and
acceleration of the pre-existing impairment suffers total and permanent disability,
the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits only
for the disability caused by the injury or occupational disease, including
scheduled and unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee shall
be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial
special indemnity account.
(2) "Permanent physical impairment" is as defined in section 72-422, Idaho
Code, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a
permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such
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seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to
obtaining re-employment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be
interpreted subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere
fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent injury shall not
create a presumption that the pre-existing permanent physical impairment was not
of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
employment.
Accordingly, once an injured worker has been judged to be permanently and totally
disabled under either of the methods discussed above, the ISIF may be held responsible for some
portion of that total and permanent disability if the following elements of ISIF liability are
satisfied:
1)

It must be demonstrated that claimant suffered from a preexisting physical

impairment;
2)

It must be shown that the impairment was manifest;

3)

It must be shown that the impairment constituted a subjective hindrance to

employment; and
4)

It must be shown that the impairment combined with the industrial accident to

cause total and permanent disability.
See Dumaw v. JL. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990).
Preexisting Physical Impairment

58.

With one exception, there is agreement between the parties concerning the nature

and extent of Claimant's preexisting physical impairments. The parties are in agreement that
Claimant suffered the following preexisting physical impairments:
March 24, 1988

right thumb injury

9% of the whole person

September 19, 2000

left shoulder injury

7% of the whole person

July 6, 2004

right shoulder injury

10% of the whole person
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59.

The parties do dispute the extent and degree to which Claimant suffered a

permanent physical impairment as a consequence of the October 22, 1990 low back injury. As
developed above, Dr. Knoebel saw Claimant at the instance of Employer in April 1991, at which
time he pronounced Claimant medically stable, but not entitled to an impairment rating. The
record contains only fragments of Dr. Knoebel's report; the record does not reveal anything
about the history upon which he relied, or Claimant's physical findings on exam.

The

foundation for Dr. Knoebel' s ultimate opinion on the extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement
to an impairment rating in 1991 is unclear.
60.

However, though it is difficult to test the underpinnings of Dr. Knoebel' s opinion

at this remove, there are also things in the musings of Dr. Frizzell that are troublesome.
Dr. Frizzell vacillated a good deal in his opinion on whether Claimant was entitled to an
impairment rating for the 1990 low back injury before finally settling on a 7% PPI rating for the
1990 accident. Even though Dr. Frizzell adopted this as his final opinion, it is still somewhat
problematic that he was unable to explain to Claimant's counsel how the "prior factor," i.e. the
1990 accident, caused Claimant's current impairment to be greater.

However, balancing

Dr. Frizzell's testimony and reports against the conclusions of Dr. Knoebel, nevertheless, leads
the Commission to conclude that Dr. Frizzell credibly established that Claimant's 1990 low back
injury entitled him to a 7% PPI rating. In reaching this conclusion, we are also guided by our
finding that Claimant did not credibly testify that his low back was symptom free in the years
prior to the December 18, 2009 accident. The record establishes that Claimant suffered from
symptomatic low back complaints prior to the subject accident, and that these complaints were of
such significance to cause him to self-modify the manner in which he performed his work.
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These findings lend credence to the testimony of Dr. Frizzell that Claimant's preinjury low back
condition was of such significance as to warrant the award of a permanent physical impairment
rating.
Manifestation

61.

All of Claimant's preexisting impairments were manifest. "Manifest" means that

either the employer or the employee is aware of the condition so that the condition can be
established as existing prior the injury. Royce v. Southwest Pipe of Idaho, 103 Idaho 290, 64 7
P.2d 746 (1982).

Here, all of the impairments referenced above, including Claimant's

preexisting low back condition, were known to Claimant prior to the date of the subject accident.
Subjective Hinderance

62.

The subjective hindrance component of the test is found at Idaho Code § 72-

332(2). That section provides:
(2) "Permanent physical impairment" is as defined in section 72-422, Idaho
Code, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a
permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such
seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to
obtaining re-employment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be
interpreted subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere
fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent injury shall not
create a presumption that the pre-existing permanent physical impairment was not
of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
employment.
63.

Therefore, m order to qualify for ISIF liability, a preexisting permanent

impairment must be of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
employment, or to obtaining reemployment should a claimant become unemployed. Further, this
assessment must be made subjectively as to the particular employee involved. That an injured
worker may be employed at the time of a subsequent work injury does not create a presumption
that a preexisting physical impairment did not constitute an obstacle to obtaining employment.
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The case of Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 786 P.2d 557 (1990) makes it clear
that an injured worker's attitude toward a preexisting condition is but one factor to be considered
by the Commission in determining whether the preexisting physical impairment constituted a
subjective hindrance. After Archer, the Commission is required to weigh a wide variety of
medical and non-medical factors, and expert and lay testimony in making the determination as to
whether or not a preexisting condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the
particular claimant.

Here, there is no testimony from Claimant, evaluating physicians, or

vocational rehabilitation specialists which would support the proposition that the 1988 thumb
impairment, 2000 left shoulder impairment, or 2004 right shoulder impairment constituted an
obstacle to Claimant's employment or reemployment. The fact that no physician gave Claimant
permanent limitations/restrictions for these injuries is a significant factor informing the
Commission's decision that these preexisting physical impairments did not constitute a
subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to the subject accident.
64.

With respect to the 1990 low back injury, in addition to determining that Claimant

is entitled to a 7% PPI rating for that injury, Dr. Frizzell felt it appropriate that following that
injury Claimant should have observed certain limitations/restrictions in order to protect his back
from further injury.

He proposed that Claimant should avoid maximum lifting of over 75

pounds. The sensibility of this recommendation is well borne out by Claimant's subsequent
history. Although Claimant returned to unrestricted work following the 1990 low back injury, he
did not stay symptom free. Another low back injury in 1999 took him off work for a period of
weeks.

In the years immediately preceding the subject accident, medical and employment

records reflect that Claimant continued to be troubled with symptomatic low back complaints.
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65.

Finally,

Dr.

Collins

persuasively

testified

that

the

pre-mjury

limitations/restrictions given by Dr. Frizzell would reasonably have limited Claimant's access to
the labor market in Valley County had he lost his job at UPS.
66.

For these reasons, the Commission concludes that Claimant's 7% preexisting

physical impairment resulting from his 1990 low back injury reasonably constituted a subjective
hindrance to Claimant prior to the subject accident.
Combining With

67.

There remains for consideration the question of whether or not the Claimant's

preexisting physical impairment for his low back condition combined with the effects of the
subject accident to cause total and permanent disability. For the reasons set for below, we
believe that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
68.

Following the 1990 low back injury, Claimant underwent MRI and CT studies.

Per Dr. Cindrich, the MRI was thought to reveal a small focal left paracentral disc herniation at
L4-5. (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 10, p. 34). A December 10, 1990 CT scan of the lumbar spine was
read as follows: "There is a left sided disc herination at L4-5 with effacement of the anterior and
left side of the thecal sac." (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 10, p. 36).
69.

Following the 1999 low back injury, Claimant's low back was again studied. A

September 27, 1999 MRI was read as follows concerning findings at the L4-5 level:
At L4-5, there is a diffuse anular (sic) bulge and mild osteophyte formation
evident. Facets are slightly hypertrophic, but the ligamentum flavum is not
thickened. There is mild canal stenosis at this level. Neural foramina are
adequate. Exiting nerve roots are surrounded by adequate perineural fat.
D. 5.17.12 Ex. 21, p. 236.
70.

Following the subject 2009 accident, Claimant underwent MRI study on January

11, 2010. That study was read as follows concerning the L4-5 level:
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Loss of hydration signal in the disc consistent with degenerative disc disease.
Moderate-sized posterior focal disk protrusion causing moderate central spinal
stenosis, severe left lateral recess stenosis and a moderate right lateral recess
stenosis. No significant foraminal stenosis.
See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 21, p. 247.

71.

The most significant findings in Claimant's low back since the original injury of

1990 are at the L4-5 level. However, the findings at that level have progressively worsened with
the passage of time, and with the occurrence of subsequent industrial accidents.

The

Commission has found that Claimant is entitled to an impairment rating following his original
industrial accident, and that he should have observed certain limitations on his activities
following that accident in order to protect his back from further injury. That he continued to
experience low back discomfort and objective worsening of his condition may be explained by
the fact that he did not, by his testimony, moderate his activities subsequent to the 1990 injury.
However, evidence which the Commission has found persuasive establishes that Claimant was
not symptom free in the years immediately preceding the subject accident. Indeed, he attempted
to find ways to do his job which would ease the demands placed on his back. Finally, Claimant
suffered a severe worsening of his condition while engaged in the trivial exercise of bending
over to tie his shoes, tending to corroborate the radiological studies referenced above, which
demonstrate that Claimant had significant and progressive problems at L4-5 in the years
preceding the subject accident. Absent Claimant's significant preexisting condition at L4-5, it
seems likely that the activities of December 18, 2009 would not have resulted in damage to
Claimant's lumbar spine.

At any rate, the medical evidence establishes that Claimant's

preexisting condition was significantly worsened as a result of the subject accident, and that it is
impossible to ignore Claimant's preexisting low back condition at L4-5 in describing Claimant's
current impairment and limitations. Claimant's preexisting low back condition clearly set the
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stage for Claimant's accident of December 18, 2009, and in that sense combines with the
accident of December 18, 2009 to cause Claimant's total and permanent disability.
Carey Apportionment

72.

Having found that the elements of ISIP liability have been met with respect to

Claimant's preexisting physical impairment of 7% following the 1990 low back injury, it is next
necessary to apply the rule of Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d
54 (1984) to the facts of this case.

For purposes of Carey apportionment, Claimant's

impairments total 19%, 7% of which is attributable to the preexisting condition and 12% of
which is attributable to the subject accident. The remaining disability to be apportioned between
Employer and the ISIF equals 81 % (100% - 19%). Employer's liability for Claimant's total and
permanent disability is calculated as follows: 12/19 x 81% = 51.19 + 12

=

63.19%. The ISIF's

responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability is calculated as follows: 7/19 x 81 %

= 29.8 + 7 = 36.8%.
73.

A 63% disability equals $110,187.00 at 2009 rates.

Ordinarily, this would

represent the exposure of Employer/Surety after Carey apportionment. A 63% disability equates
to 315 weeks. Therefore, ISIF liability would commence 315 weeks subsequent to Claimant's
date of medical stability in November 2010.
Application of Quasi-Estoppel

74.

In briefing, Claimant argued that Employer/Surety should be estopped to assert an

impairment rating for the 1990 low back injury different than the 0% impairment originally
given by Dr. Knoebel in 1991. This argument would only be relevant to Claimant's prosecution
of his claim were Claimant found to be profoundly, but not totally and permanently, disabled.
However, since Claimant has been found to be totally and permanently disabled, Claimant will
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receive total and permanent disability benefits regardless of whether or not Employer/Surety is
estopped from asserting that Claimant has a 7% PPI rating from the 1990 injury; Claimant will
receive total and permanent disability benefits from either Employer alone, or from Employer
and the ISIP. Since the Commission has found Claimant to be totally and permanently disabled,
whether Employer/Surety should be estopped as requested is no longer relevant to Claimant's
receipt of benefits.
75.

However, the ISIP, which was brought into this case by Employer/Surety, has

also alleged that Employer/Surety should not now be heard to assert a position on Claimant's
1990 low back impairment different than the position it advocated back in 1991.·
76.

The doctrine of "quasi-estoppel" has received considerable treatment in Idaho

case law. In Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101Idaho1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980), the doctrine was
described as follows:
To constitute quasi-estoppel, the person against whom the estoppel is sought must
have gained some advantage for himself, produced some disadvantage to the
person seeking the estoppel, or induced such party to change his position; in
addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel
is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with the one in which he
accepted a benefit.

See also City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind. Hwy Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1994);
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (2002). Of the doctrine it has
also been said:
The doctrine classified as quasi-estoppel has its basis in election, ratification,
affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the principle precludes a
party from asserting to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position
previously taken by him. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable
to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he
acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit.

KTVB v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 486 P.2d 992 (1971).
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Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel does not require misrepresentation by one party or
actual reliance by the other. It is often described as a broadly remedial doctrine, applied on an ad
hoc basis to specific fact patterns.

77.

It \\<ill be recalled that following the 1990 accident, Claimant was diagnosed as

suffering an L4-5 disc injury of such significance that one of his physicians considered Claimant
to be a possible candidate for surgical intervention. In 1991, UPS engaged the services of
Richard Knoebel, M.D., for the purpose of performing an Idaho Code § 72-433 exam. The
record does not reflect what instructions UPS gave to Dr. Knoebel, what records it supplied, or
what questions it asked. However, the record does reflect that after completing his examination
of Claimant, Dr. Knoebel proposed that Claimant had not suffered any permanent physical
impairment as a consequence of the 1990 accident, and neither was he entitled to any permanent
limitations/restrictions. The 1990 claim was not litigated, and there was no finding made by the
Commission as to whether or not Dr. Knoebel was correct in rendering his judgment on
Claimant's impairment. However, UPS assuredly benefitted from Dr. Knoebel's opinion and
acquiesced in the same, since the Commission's records reflect that the claims file was
eventually retired without the payment of any impairment rating by UPS or its then surety. In
1991, at the time Dr. Knoebel rendered his rating, it was to the advantage of UPS and its then
surety to minimize their exposure by obtaining a favorable opinion on Claimant's
impairment/limitations. This they did.
78.

Now, of course, the occurrence of the subject accident of December 18, 2009 has

made it advantageous to UPS and its current surety to argue that some portion of Claimant's
impairment must predate the subject accident. As developed above, the Commission has found
that 7% of Claimant's 19% impairment rating should be assigned to the 1990 accident, and that
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because this 7% impairment rating meets the other elements of ISIF liability, a portion of UPS's
responsibility for total and permanent disability benefits can be shifted to the ISIF.
79.

It seems clear that UPS is now asserting a position inconsistent with one it

acquiesced in and benefitted from in 1991. Further, we believe that it would be unconscionable
to allow UPS, after having accepted the benefit of the 0% PPI rating rendered by Dr. Knoebel, to
now assert a contrary position to the disadvantage of the ISIF.
80.

We conclude that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is applicable to the facts of this

case. Therefore, Employer/Surety is estopped from asserting that Claimant has a 7% PPI rating
referable to the 1990 accident. The Commission is aware of the irony of applying the doctrine to
these facts; the Commission has concluded that Dr. Frizzell correctly identified a 7% PPI rating
which should attach to the permanent effects of the 1990 accident, while the application of the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel binds UPS/Surety to Dr. Knoebel's 0% rating, a rating which we were
not persuaded to adopt.
81.

Since Employer/Surety is estopped to deny the 0% rating, this leaves no other

preexisting impairments which satisfy the other requirements of ISIF liability.

Therefore,

Employer/Surety cannot meet its prima facie case against the ISIF and Employer/Surety bears
responsibility for 100% of Claimant's total and permanent disability commencing with
Claimant's date of medical stability in November 2010.
Medical expenses and the Doctrine of Res Judicata

82.

In connection with the initial hearing of September 28, 2010, Claimant put on

proof of medical bills incurred by him to the date of hearing. These bills totaled $149,033.68.
Claimant asked the Commission for an award in this amount, though he cautioned that this sum
might not represent the totality of bills incurred to the date of hearing. The bills at issue at the
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time of the initial hearing were not contested by Employer/Surety, and the Commission
eventually entered an order awarding Claimant the sum of $149,033.68, representing 100% of
the invoiced amount of bills presented at the original hearing.
83.

Since that time, Claimant has identified additional bills incurred between the date

of injury and May 17, 2011, the date of the Commission's decision on the compensability of the
claim. Some of these bills were incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing, and some
were incurred between the date of that hearing and the date of the Commission's May 17, 2011
decision. These additional bills, at 100% of the invoiced amount, total $24,627.80. Again,
Employer/Surety does not dispute the compensability of these bills pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72432. Rather, Employer/Surety alleges that the doctrine of res judicata bars Claimant from
making a claim for these additional bills. Employer/Surety argues that Claimant asked for a sum
certain representing medical bills incurred in connection with his treatment, and that the
Commission's award of that sum certain is res judicata of any claim for additional medical bills
for services rendered prior to the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing. Employer/Surety does
not assert that any of the bills contained at Claimant's 5.17.12 Exhibit 14 were among those for
which claim was made at the time of the original hearing. In other words, the parties seem to be
in agreement that the additional bills claimed by Claimant are actually bills for different services
than those covered in the bills which were the subject of the previous award.
84.

Although the doctrine of res judicata applies to decisions of the Industrial

Commission, it is res judicata of a peculiar sort. In workers' compensation cases, res judicata
only bars re-litigation of claims that were actually adjudicated:
However, Idaho Code§ 72-718 varies the doctrine of res judicata as applied to
workers' compensation cases. See Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329
(1995). Decisions by the Commission are conclusive only to matters actually
adjudicated, not as to all matters which could have been adjudicated.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 36

Wernecke v. St. lvfarie's Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008
(2009).
85.

Here, every medical bill that was submitted by Claimant to Surety for payment

represents a distinct claim for a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws.

Every

bill that was submitted could have been the subject of any number of defenses to payment raised
by Employer/Surety. Employer/Surety could have argued that one or more of the bills were
incurred outside the chain of referral. Employer/Surety could have argued that the care was not
required by Claimant's physician. Employer/Surety could have argued to the Commission that it
should have found the care represented by a particular bill to be unreasonable. The point is that
every bill for medical services represents a discrete claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Accordingly, since it is clear that the bills totaling $24,627.80 are new bills, Claimant's
entitlement to that which was not adjudicated at the prior hearing, the doctrine of res judicata
does not bar Claimant's litigation of those bills at this time, notwithstanding that most of those
bills are for services rendered prior to the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing. Aside from
the res judicata defense, no other defenses to these bills have been raised by Employer/Surety.
Accordingly, and per Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009),
Claimant is entitled to 100% of the invoiced amount of the bills set forth at Claimant's 5.17.12
Exhibit 14.
86.

In addition to the bills referenced above, Claimant has identified additional

medical bills totaling $674.00, as set forth at Claimant's 5.17.12 Exhibit 15. These bills appear
to represent charges for for services rendered subsequent to the Commission's May 17, 2011
order finding the claim compensable. These bills have not been paid, but do not appear to be
disputed by Employer/Surety. Per Neel, supra, Claimant is entitled to payment of these bills
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under the applicable Industrial Commission fee schedule, since they were incurred subsequent to
the finding of compensability.
87.

Finally, Claimant has claimed entitlement to the sum of $1,684.71, representing

travel expenses incurred in connection with the medical care, $264.75 representing per diem
expenses associated -vvith medical care, and $200.01 representing lodging expenses incurred in
connection with medical treatment. (See C. 5.17.12 Ex. 16). Some of these expenses were
incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing, and some were incurred subsequent thereto.
Claimant contends, and Employer/Surety does not dispute, that these expenses are otherwise
compensable as medical and related expenses under Idaho Code § 72-432.

However,

Employer/Surety asserts that those expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As with the claim for additional medical bills, the claims
for travel, lodging, and per diem expenses were not adjudicated at the time of the initial hearing.
Therefore, these claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and since they are not
otherwise contested by Employer/Surety, Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for these
expenses as well.
Is Employer/Surety Entitled to a Ruling on Reimbursement in Advance of Supreme Court
Review of this Decision?

88.

Employer/Surety has signaled that the Commission's original decision on the

compensability of the subject accident will be appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court once the
Commission has decided all of the issues in the case. Indeed, Employer/Surety attempted an
appeal of the threshold compensability issue after that decision was issued by the Commission on
May 17, 2011. Against the chance that the Court's review might result in a reversal of the
Commission's threshold finding of compensability, Employer/Surety urges the Commission to
enter an order advising Claimant that if the Supreme Court does reverse the threshold
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compensability finding, the Commission will order Claimant to reimburse all monies paid to
Claimant subsequent to the May 17, 2011 decision on compensability.

The Commission

appreciates this dilemma, but would note, as it did in connection with the order denying stay, that
the decision to bifurcate a case comes with a set of possible consequences that bear close
scrutiny before electing to proceed. One might well suppose that the Commission would be
strongly inclined to entertain a request for a reimbursement should the Supreme Court rule that
the Commission erred in finding the claim compensable. However, that matter is not before us at
this juncture, and Claimant is correct that there is no actual controversy before us that we can
address. Accordingly, the request of Employer/Surety to order reimbursement contingent upon
something that may or may not happen is denied.
Attorney Fees

89.

As noted above, this matter was bifurcated at the request of Employer/Surety to

obtain the Commission's ruling on the threshold issue of the compensability of the subject
accident. At the request of Employer/Surety, other issues, including those addressed in this
decision, were reserved for subsequent determination.

Employer/Surety hoped to obtain a

favorable ruling on the issue of compensability, and thus resolve the case without the necessity
of visiting the remaining issues. Presumably, Employer/Surety was also aware that the issue of
compensability might be decided in Claimant's favor, thus necessitating hearing on the
remammg issues.
90.

In its decision of May 17, 2011, the Industrial Commission found the subject

accident to be compensable under the workers' compensation laws of this state. In addition, the
Commission found that Claimant was entitled to certain medical and TTD benefits, entitlement
to which was litigated at the September 28, 2010 hearing.
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91.

The May 17, 2011 decision addressed Claimant's entitlement to a limited class of

workers' compensation benefits because those were the only benefits that Claimant requested at
the time of the threshold determination of the issue of compensability.

However, the

Commission's finding of compensability implicitly required that Employer/Surety pay to
Claimant, or on his behalf, those additional workers' compensation benefits to which Claimant
was entitled as the result of having suffered a compensable accident/injury.
92.

Employer/Surety appealed the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision to the Idaho

Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the appeal without comment, but later referred the parties
to the Court's opinion in Jensen v. Pillsbury Company, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). In
that case, the Court held that a decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all
the Claimant's claims is not a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to I.AR. ll(d).
Following the Court's dismissal of the appeal, Employer/Surety petitioned the Industrial
Commission for its order staying execution of the May 17, 2011 order pending resolution of the
issues remaining before the Industrial Commission and the perfection of an appeal of the
Commission's final decision to the Supreme Court. Employer's concern was that it should not
be required to pay an award to Claimant when the Supreme Court might overturn the Industrial
Commission's decision and rule that the subject accident is not a compensable accident/injury
under the Idaho workers' compensation laws. In this scenario, Employer/Surety could find itself
unable to recoup the monies that it had been erroneously directed to pay to Claimant.
93.

The Industrial Commission considered these and other arguments, and in an order

dated December 8, 2011, denied Employer/Surety's motion for stay, noting, inter alia, that any
decision to bifurcate a case carries with it the downside illustrated by these facts. However, if
parties were not expected to abide by a Commission order on a bifurcated case, there would be
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no reason to bifurcate. The order denying the request for stay specified that the May 17, 2011
decision is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated therein pursuant to Idaho Code § 72718. The order further directed Employer/Surety to pay to Claimant those benefits that were
awarded incidental to the Commission's finding on compensability. The order did not specify
that during the pendency of hearing on the issues addressed in this decision Employer/Surety's
only obligation was to pay the benefits awarded incidental to the finding of compensability made
in the May 17, 2011 decision. As noted above, the Commission's final order on the issue of
compensability brings with it an obligation to pay to Claimant those workers' compensation
benefits to which he would normally be entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable
accident/injury.
94.

Employer/Surety sought permission to appeal the Commission's order denying

the stay to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Commission supported this request for permissive
appeal. In an order dated January 30, 2012, the Court denied the motion for permissive appeal
and directed that the remaining issues in this case be litigated without further delay.
95.

Contemporaneous with the legal maneuvering that took place between the date of

the May 17, 2011 decision and the Idaho Supreme Court's January 30, 2012 denial of the motion
for appeal by permission, Claimant peppered Employer/Surety with letters demanding payment
of various workers' compensation benefits, including benefits that were the subject of the May
17, 2011 order, as well as additional workers' compensation benefits to which Claimant felt he
was entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable·accident.
96.

It is the conclusion of the Commission that the efforts of Employer/Surety to

perfect an appeal of the Commission decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, and, failing that, a
permissive appeal to the Court of the Commission's order denying the motion for stay, were
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made in good faith, and in com1ection with complex legal issues on which reasonable minds may
disagree. Specifically, we conclude that Employer's refusal to pay the award made in the May
17, 2011 order, or any other benefits to which Claimant might be entitled, was not unreasonable
to January 30, 2012, the date of the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of the motion for appeal by
perm1ss10n.
97.

By letter dated January 31, 2012, counsel for Claimant reiterated his demand for

payment of the benefits awarded in the May 17, 2011 order, plus interest thereon, totaling
$184,458.38. (See C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017015). As reflected in defense counsel's letter of
February 14, 2012, following the Court's dismissal of the motion for permissive appeal,
Employer/Surety issued its check to Claimant in the amount of $184, 172.3 8, the difference from
Claimant's demand to be found in the interest calculation.
98.

By letter dated February 10, 2012, counsel for Claimant made demand upon

Employer/Surety for additional workers' compensation benefits, i.e. not benefits which were the
subject of the May 17, 2011 Industrial Commission order, but other benefits to which Claimant
was entitled as the result of his compensable accident. These benefits included PPI benefits as
awarded by Dr. Frizzell, additional medical expenses and travel, lodging, and per diem
reimbursements for expenses incurred in the course of obtaining medical case. In response to
these requests, counsel for Employer/Surety provided the following response:
Your most recent correspondence demands payment for additional
medical expenses, travel expenses, per diem/lodging expenses and PPI benefits.
Entitlement to such benefits has not been determined by the Industrial
Commission and remains in dispute. As discussed during the most recent
telephone conference \Vith the Commission, these issues will be litigated at the
hearing scheduled for May 17, 2012. Further, entitlement to additional benefits is
contingent on the compensability determination made in the May 17, 2011
decision. The Commission has indicated such decision is final as to the issues
adjudicated. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the decision
is not final for purposes of appeal. A genuine legal dispute continues to exist as
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to both compensability and payment issues. Although the Court declined to
address the issues through interlocutory appeal, it has not considered the merits of
the disputed issues.
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017022.
99.

Counsel for Claimant persevered, reiterating his demand for payment of

additional workers' compensation benefits to which he believed his client was entitled. In a
February 22, 2012 response, counsel for Employer/Surety reiterated her disinclination to make
any of these payments:
It is my understanding that the multiple issues to be resolved at the May
17, 2012 hearing include whether and to what extent Mr. Vawter is entitled to PPI
benefits and whether there has been an unreasonable denial or delay of benefits. I
look forward to prompt resolution of these issues and maintain there continues to
be a legal dispute regarding payment obligations, particularly with regard to
benefits beyond those granted by the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011
decision, for which payment has already been issued.
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017029.

100.

Finally, in a letter dated April 5, 2012, counsel for Employer/Surety affirmed that

no payment of additional benefits would be made until those matters were litigated in connection
with the May 17, 2012 hearing:
I have also taken another look at the order dismissing my permissive
appeal and do not find anything to indicate that PPI benefits are due and payable.
Rather, I see instructions to litigate the remaining issues without further delay.

Nothing has changed since your previous requests for payment and I refer
you to my responses as previously stated in my letters identified above, as well as
the documents filed with the Industrial Commission and Idaho Supreme Court on
the issue of payment obligations. It is abundantly clear that we disagree as to
what payments are reasonably due. As you know, issues regarding entitlement to
additional benefits, including attorney fees for unreasonable denial or delay of
benefits, are scheduled to be addressed at the hearing of May 17, 2012.
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017034.

101.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the position of Employer/Surety was that since
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it had paid the benefits that were specifically addressed in the Commission's order of May 17,
2011, it had no obligation to pay benefits that were not addressed in that order.

What

Employer/Surety has failed to understand, however, is that the Commission's finding that the
subject accident is compensable carries with it an obligation on the part of Employer/Surety to
pay to Claimant those workers' compensation benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the
accident. We find nothing in the correspondence going back and forth between Claimant's
counsel and Defense counsel which suggests that Employer/Surety at any time disputed the
claims for additional benefits to which Claimant believed he was entitled. The only basis for
denial was the aforementioned belief that Employer/Surety had no obligation under the May 17,
2011 order to pay anything except those benefits which were specifically addressed in that order.
102.

As explained in more detail in our December 8, 2011 order denying Employer's

motion for stay, it is the expectation of the Industrial Commission that its final order on
compensability binds the parties to act accordingly during the pendency of this bifurcated matter.
It is no defense to Claimant's manifold requests to simply say that Claimant's entitlement to the

benefits at issue will be decided in connection with the May 17, 2012 hearing. Absent a good
faith dispute over Claimant's entitlement to a particular benefit, Employer/Surety had an
obligation to timely pay the same once this claim had been found to be compensable under the
workers' compensation laws of this state. (See Idaho Code§ 72-304).
I 03.

The res judicata defense is only raised by Employer/Surety to medical and related

expenses incurred by Claimant prior to the September 28, 20 I 0 hearing. Although we have
found that doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the additional bills for which claim is made,
we do not believe that it was unreasonable for Employer/Surety to essay this defense. However,
with respect to the claims for medical and attendant expenses incurred subsequent to September
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28, 2010, and the PPI award made by Dr. Frizzell in November 2010, the only defense that has
been raised by Employer/Surety is that the finding of compensability is not "final" and that, in
any event, the May 17, 2011 order only required Employer/Surety to pay certain specific bills.
As developed above, we find Employer/Surety's reliance on these defenses to payment to be
unreasonable. The Commission's May 17, 2011 order is final and conclusive as to all matters
adjudicated therein. (See Idaho Code§ 72-718). As developed in the Commission's December
8, 2011 order denying the request for stay, the Commission expects parties to abide by final and
conclusive orders during the pendency of any bifurcated proceeding. Again, to do otherwise
would rob bifurcation of its purpose. Idaho Code § 72-804 provides for an award of attorney
fees against any Employer/Surety who contests a claim for compensation \Vithout reasonable
grounds. Here, we find that subsequent to January 30, 2012, Employer/Surety contested without
reasonable grounds Claimant's repeated demands for payment of the following benefits:
a)

Medical expenses incurred subsequent to September 28, 2010;

b)

Mileage, per diem, and lodging expenses incurred by Claimant subsequent to
September 28, 2010;
The PPI award given by Dr. Frizzell follmving Claimant's date of medical

c)

stability in November 2010.
Claimant is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804 for
the failure of Employer/Surety to timely pay these benefits.

Whether Medical Bills Should be Paid at 100% of the Invoiced Amount

104.

Though raised as an issue by Claimant, a challenge to the Supreme Court's

decision in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), was not
addressed by Employer/Surety in post-hearing briefing. In the original May 17, 2011 order,
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Claimant presented medical bills in the total invoiced amount of $149,033.68. The Commission
ordered the payment of the same at 100% of the invoiced amount per Neel, supra. As explained
by the Industrial Commission in the recent case of Aspiazu v. Homedale Tire Service, LC. No.
1984-477235 (filed February 18, 2012), we believe that the Court was fully aware that certain
contractual adjustments made by third party payors may well leave an injured worker responsible
for less than 100% of the invoiced amount of a medical bill. Nevertheless, the Court's ruling
specifically applies to all medical bills incurred during a period of denial regardless of whether
the bills were incurred by an uninsured individual, or an individual with non-occupational group
insurance. We are bound to apply the Supreme Court's unambiguous direction set forth in Neel,
supra, and therefore, order the payment of all medical bills incurred by Claimant in connection

with treatment of his compensable injury to be paid at 100% of the invoiced amount up to the
date of the Commission's order of May 17, 2011 in which the claim was found to be
compensable.

Thereafter, all medical bills incurred by Claimant in connection with his

compensable injury shall be paid per the applicable fee schedule.
Ill
Ill
Ill
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

Claimarit is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine;

2.

Claimant has preexisting physical impairments as follows:

9% whole person, right

thumb; 7% whole person, low back; 7% whole person, left shoulder; 10% whole person, right
shoulder;
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3.

Claimant has accident produced impairment of 12% of the whole person;

4.

Only Claimant's 7% low back impairment meets all elements ofISIF liability, and would

otherwise result in Carey apportionment as follows: Employer's liability: ((12119) x 81 %) =
51.19 + 12 = 63.19%. ISIF liability: ((7/19) x 81%)=29.8 + 7% = 36.8%.
a)

However, Employer/Surety is estopped from asserting any position on Claimant's

preexisting physical impairment inconsistent with the 0% PPI rating assessed by Dr. Knoebel in
1991;
b)

Therefore, the ISIF is not liable for any portion of Claimant's total and permanent

disability, leaving Employer/Surety wholly liable for the payment of total and permanent
disability benefits to which Claimant is entitled subsequent to his November 2010 date of
medical stability;
5.

Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all medical

bills referenced herein which were incurred by Claimant in connection with the subject accident
prior to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, with credit for amounts previously paid;
6.

Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of medical bills referenced herein which were

incurred by Claimant subsequent to the May 17, 2011 decision per the applicable fee schedule,
with credit for amounts paid to date;
7.

Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of mileage, per diem, and lodging expenses

identified at C. 5.17 .12 Ex.16;
8.

Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804 for

Employer/Surety's unreasonable denial of benefits subsequent to January 30, 2012. Claimant
shall file within (20) twenty days, an affidavit and/or brief in support of his request for attorney
fees, with appropriate elaboration on Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13 (1984);
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l( l/ {

9.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.
DATED this _ t h _ day of _ _ _ _ _ , 2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner

ATTEST:

Assistant Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of
, 2012 a true and correct copy of
the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER was served by regular United
States mail upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 E PARK BLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
1703 W HILL RD
BOISE ID 83702
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,

IC 2010-000114

v.
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

On or about October 17, 2012, Defendant Employer, United Parcel Service, Inc., and its
Surety, filed a timely motion for reconsideration under Idaho Code § 72-718 from the
Commission's September 28, 2012 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. Generally,
Employer argues that in its September 28, 2012 Decision, the Commission erred as follows:
1.

The Commission erroneously applied the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to estop Employer

from asserting that Claimant suffered permanent physical impairment (PPI) as a consequence of
the 1990 low back injury;
2.

The Commission erred in failing to apply the doctrine of res judicata to prevent Claimant

from relitigating entitlement to medical bills incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing;
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3.

The Commission erred in making an award of attorney fees to Claimant under Idaho

Code § 72-804.
Under Idaho Code § 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall
be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, within twenty (20) days from the
date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision.
J.R.P. 3(f) states that a motion to reconsider "shall be supported by a brief filed with the
motion." Generally, greater leniency is afforded to pro se claimants. However, "it is axiomatic
that a claimant must present to the Commission new reasons factually and legally to support a
hearing on her Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evidence previously
presented."

Curtis v. MH King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 388, 128 P.3d 920 (2005).

On

reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and determine whether
the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is not compelled to
make findings on the facts of the case during a reconsideration. Davison v. HH Keim Co., Ltd,
110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may reverse its decision upon a motion for
reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the arguments presented, or
upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame established in Idaho Code § 72718. See Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 PJd 329 (2000) (citing Kindred v.
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)).
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue.

However, the

Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply
because the case was not resolved in a party's favor.

ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION - 2

LJ L/ L(

I. Application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel.

In this case, the evidence establishes that on or about October 22, 1990, Claimant
suffered a work related injury to his low back while employed by Employer. In April 1991,
Claimant was evaluated by Richard Knoebel, M.D., an evaluating physician retained by
Employer and its then Surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance. On or about April 2, 1991, and
following his examination of Claimant, Dr. Knoebel opined that Claimant was capable of
returning to work without restriction, and without any PPI referable to the 1990 accident.
Contemporaneous with these findings, Employer's surety issued a "notice" of "Change of
Benefit or Status" in which it advised Claimant of a change in the status of his claim as follows:
"Per Dr. Knoebel' s report, you were released to return to work effective April 2, 1991. You
were determined to be medically stationery without any impairment." (See D. Ex. 10, p. 32).
The records of the Industrial Commission reflect that Employer did not pay any impairment to
Claimant as a consequence of the 1990 accident.
In connection with the prosecution of his claim, Claimant has argued that Dr. Knoebel
got it right in 1991, and that no part of Claimant's current low back impairment is referable to
the 1990 accident.

Proving that all of his low back impairment is referable to the subject

December 18, 2009 accident is more important to Claimant in a less than total case, than it is in
the event the Commission finds Claimant to be totally and permanently disabled. In the former
case, Claimant will receive no compensation for a pre-existing impairment, while in the latter
case the ISIF may bear some responsibility based on Claimant's pre-existing condition. Of
course, the Commission has found Claimant to be totally and permanently disabled, but Claimant
had no assurance of this finding at the time of the hearing and therefore made it a central point of
his prosecution of the case to discredit Employer's current position that Dr. Knoebel got it wrong
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back in 1991, and that Dr. Frizzell correctly opined that, as a consequence of the 1990 accident,
Claimant should have been given a 7% PPI rating.
In this, as in all cases, it is Claimant who bears the burden to prove the extent of his
disability referable to the subject accident. In connection with the instant matter, this burden
necessarily requires of Claimant that he put on proof, as part of his prima facie case, that the
December 18, 2009 accident is, by itself, responsible for causing Claimant's current disability.
Claimant has attempted to do this by arguing that the April 1991 opinion of Dr. Knoebel
establishes that Claimant's current condition is caused by the subject accident alone, and is not
the result of the combined effects of a pre-existing condition and the subject accident.
Employer, in pursuit of Idaho Code § 72-406 or§ 72-332 apportionment, has argued that
the opinion of Dr. Frizzell should carry more weight, thus affording Employer the opportunity to
assign some portion of the blame for Claimant's disability to a preexisting condition.
Finally, the ISIF, whose liability only exists if it can be demonstrated that Claimant
suffered from a preexisting permanent physical impairment, has sided with Claimant in arguing
that Dr. Knoebel got it exactly right back in 1991 when he found that Claimant was not entitled
to an impairment rating from the 1990 accident.

Absent identification of a preexisting

permanent physical impairment, the ISIF cannot be held liable under Idaho Code§ 72-332.
The point of synopsizing the positions of the parties is to illustrate that the fight over
whether the opinion of Dr. Frizzell should prevail over the opinion of Dr. Knoebel is a dispute of
central importance to the outcome of this matter. One need only review the deposition of Dr.
Frizzell, or the many letters between Dr. Frizzell and counsel for Claimant and Employer to
understand that the parties grasp the importance of obtaining a favorable opinion on the issue of
apportionment.
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In connection with pursuing their respective positions, both Claimant and the ISIF were
struck by the irony of Employer's current insistence that some part of Claimant's impairment
should be assigned to the 1990 accident, while it was content, back in 1991, to accept the benefit
of Dr. Knoebel' s finding that Claimant suffered no PPI as a consequence of the 1990 accident.
Both parties argued that Employer should not be heard to now assert a position inconsistent with
the position it took in 1990. Claimant has articulated this position by arguing that the doctrine of
quasi-estoppel should apply to prevent Employer from taking an inconsistent position. Although
the ISIF did not argue the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, it did argue that Employer should not be
heard to now assert a position in this matter that is inconsistent with its former treatment of the
1990 claim and its adoption of Dr. Knoebel's opinion at that time. (See ISIF Post-Hearing Brief,
p. 3).
In support of its argument that the Commission erred in applying the doctrine of quasiestoppel to the facts of this case, Employer first alleges that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is an
affirmative defense, and since it was not raised as an issue by either Claimant or the ISIF, it is
not appropriately before the Commission at this time. Employer asserts that under Idaho Code §
72-713, it was entitled to at least ten days' notice of the quasi-estoppel issue, and without such
prior notice, the issue is not properly before the Commission.
Although quasi-estoppel is typically viewed as an affirmative defense (See Thomas v.

Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (2002)), it is less clear that it should be so
treated in the context of the instant matter, at least as respects Claimant's assertion of the
doctrine.

Remember, it is Claimant who bears the burden of proving that his disability is

referable to the subject accident. In so doing, he has argued, as part of his case in chief, that
Employer should not now be heard to take a position inconsistent with that which it took back in
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1991. One of the noticed issues is whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to PPI
benefits, and it was in connection with his pursuit of PPI benefits that Claimant articulated his
position that Employer should not be allowed to have it both ways. Viewed in the context of
Claimant's burden of proof, his reliance on the doctrine of quasi-estoppel seems to be less an
affirmative defense, and more an argument made in support of proving his prima facie case.
Although it is true that Claimant did not raise quasi-estoppel except in his post-hearing brief, we
do not believe that this articulation of one of the arguments that he relies upon to prove his prima
facie case cannot be considered by the Commission in the absence of it having been noticed as a
specific issue.
Moreover, although both Claimant and the ISIF argued in their post-hearing briefs that
Employer should not be allowed to take a different position in this action concerning Claimant's
preexisting impairment than it did in connection with the 1990 accident, Employer's

post-

hearing brief devotes not one sentence to treatment of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, or to the
ISIF's challenge to Employer's inconsistent position. From the Employer's failure to protest, the
Commission concluded that Employer gave its implied consent to the Commissions'
consideration of these arguments. To the extent necessary, the Commission will treat these
arguments as though they were raised in the issues noticed for hearing (See IRCP 15(b); Murphy
v. Browning Freight, 1986 IIC 0664 (1986)).

Finally, we find it difficult to believe that Employer could be surprised or prejudiced by
the arguments of the opposition concerning the allegation that Employer is currently taking a
position on Claimant's preexisting PPI inconsistent with one it benefitted from in 1991. Again,
the extent and degree of Claimant's PPI has long been recognized by the parties as one of the
central issues in this case; Claimant argues that his current 19% permanent physical impairment
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is entirely referable to the subject accident, while Employer argues that Claimant's current
impairment must be apportioned between the subject accident and a preexisting condition. The
arguments of Claimant and the ISIF that Employer should be estopped from asserting a position
inconsistent with one it previously took is well within the parameters of this central dispute.
The Commission rejects the argument that it was inappropriate for it to consider quasiestoppel in connection with determining whether some portion of Claimant's current physical
impairment should be deemed to have predated the subject accident.
Employer also argues that its actions in connection with the 1990 work accident do not
amount to its having taken a "previous position" on the issue of Claimant's permanent physical
impairment following the 1990 work accident. The argument is that in keeping with established
practices, Employer ordered a closing exam with Dr. Knoebel, who expressed his views on
Claimant's limitations and impairment. Dr. Knoebel's opinion was not challenged by Claimant,
and with nothing to controvert that opinion, Employer simply acceded to it. From this, we are
urged to conclude that there was no "position" taken by Employer in connection with the 1990
accident.

We continue to reject this assertion for reasons set forth in our original opinion.

Dr. Knoebel was the physician chosen by Employer to render an opinion on Claimant's
limitations and PPI following the 1990 work accident.

Dr. Knoebel rendered an opinion

favorable to the interests of Employer when he proposed that Claimant had not suffered any PPI
as a consequence of the 1990 accident, and could be released to return to work without
limitation. Employer adopted Dr. Knoebel's opinion and issued the April 2, 1991 "notice" of
"Change of Benefit or Status", a document whose very title establishes that Surety adopted Dr.
Knoebel's opinion, and notified Claimant that it was changing Claimant's benefit status based on
that opinion.

As noted in our previous decision, records of the Industrial Commission reflect
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that Employer did not pay to Claimant any permanent physical impairment referable to the 1990
accident. We believe that the foregoing non-disputed facts establish that Employer did take a
position on Claimant's permanent physical impairment when it made the judgment to adopt the
opinion of Dr. Knoebel in support of its determination that Claimant was not entitled to an
impairment rating for the effects of the 1990 low back injury.
Further, it is clear that the current position advocated by Employer is inconsistent with
the opinion it took in 1991 in connection with the 1990 accident. Employer appears to argue
that the position it took in 1991 in connection with Dr. Knoebel's opinion on Claimant's PPI
rating is not inconsistent with the position it currently asserts, because the 7% PPI rating given
by Dr. Frizzell for Claimant's preexisting condition, was intended by Dr. Frizzell to address
conditions that developed after Dr. Knoebel's 1991 rating, but before the subject accident. (See
Brief in Support of Defendants' (Employer) Motion for Reconsideration, at p. 3). In other
words, even though Dr. Knoebel did not find it appropriate to give Claimant an impairment
rating in 1991, Claimant's low back could have continued to deteriorate between the date of Dr.
Knoebel's rating and the date of the subject accident, such that as of the date of the subject
accident, Claimant did have a preexisting condition which warranted the imposition of an
impairment rating, Dr. Knoebel' s much earlier opinion notwithstanding. However, the record
does not support such a conclusion, however plausible. The record unambiguously establishes
that it is Dr. Frizzell's opinion that the 7% impairment rating he would award to Claimant for a
preexisting condition is for the 1990 low back injury. The record makes it abundantly clear that
while Dr. Knoebel would not give Claimant an impairment rating for the effects of the 1990
accident, Dr. Frizzell would give Claimant a 7% PPI rating for that same accident. In turn,
Employer's position in 1991 that Claimant suffered no impairment referable to the 1990 accident
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is inconsistent with its reliance on Dr. Frizzell's current opinion that Claimant suffered a 7%
impairment rating referable to the 1990 accident.
It was in Employer's interest to minimize its exposure for the payment of PPI/PPD in

connection with the 1990 accident. It obtained a favorable opinion on this issue after it retained
the services of Dr. Knoebel in 1991. In reliance on Dr. Knoebel' s opinion, Employer took the
position that it was not liable for the payment of further benefits, including PPI/PPD.
Eventually, the period of limitation ran, and there the matter sat for many years until the
occurrence of the subject accident made it beneficial to Employer to argue that the 1990 accident
had, in fact, produced a significant PPL We believe this is exactly the type of inconsistent
position that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is intended to address.
Employer's final argument against the application of the doctrine to these facts is that
although Claimant was employed by Employer at the time of both the 1990 and 2009 accidents,
different sureties were on the risk for the payment of workers' compensation benefits at the time
of those accidents. We fail to see why this fact should affect the application of the doctrine visa-vis Claimant and Employer.
Under Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) "Employer" is defined as follows:
"Employer" means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted
the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes the
owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or
operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an
independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the
workers there employed. If the employer is secured, it means his surety so far as
applicable. (Emphasis added).
Idaho Code§ 72-307 provides:
Knowledge of employer to affect surety. Every such policy, contract or bond shall
contain a provision that, as between the employee and the surety, the notice to or
knowledge of the occurrence of accident causing an injury or manifestation of an
occupational disease on the part of the employer shall be deemed notice or
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knowledge, as the case may be, on the part of the surety, that the jurisdiction of
the employer shall, for the purpose of this law, be the jurisdiction of the surety,
and that the surety shall in all things be bound by and subject to the orders,
findings, decisions, or awards of the commission rendered against the emplover
for the payment of compensation. (Emphasis added).
From these statutory provisions, we conclude that an order which binds the Employer necessarily
binds Surety, notwithstanding that the surety at the time of 2009 accident was a different surety
than the one with whom Employer insured its workers' compensation risk in 1990. The statutes
referenced above do not express any support for the proposition that Employer's current surety
should not be impacted by the strategies employed by Employer in connection with the 1990
accident. Employer should not be allowed to avoid the consequences of the inconsistent position
it has taken simply because it has changed sureties.
The Commission continues to abide, in all respects, by its treatment of the application of
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to the facts of this case.
IL Is the Commission's Decision of September 28, 2010, res judicata of Claimant's claim for
additional medical bills incurred between the date of injury and the September 28, 2010 hearing?
The March 7, 2012 Notice of Hearing specifies that the following issue, among others,
would be heard by the Industrial Commission:
Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the
issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of
res judicata;
Generally speaking, the term of "res judicata" is broad enough to incorporate two separate
concepts; issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion (true res judicata).
Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001); Wernecke v. St.
Maries Joint School Dist. #401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). From this, it is clear that

by raising the issue of res judicata, Employer said enough to put Claimant on notice that
Employer intended to defend the claim for additional medical benefits either under the doctrine
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION - 10

of issue preclusion, claim preclusion, or both.

However, from its post-hearing brief, the

Commission concluded, perhaps erroneously, that Employer only relied on the doctrine of claim
preclusion in urging the Commission to reject Claimant's claim for additional benefits incurred
between the date of accident and the date of the first hearing:
In Idaho, the doctrine of res judicata means that in an action between the same
parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes the
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim, but also every matter which might and should have been litigated
in the first suit.
Employer's Post-Hearing Brief, p. 25.
Although this is a correct statement of the doctrine of claim preclusion in the civil arena,
it incorrectly states the doctrine of claim preclusion as it applies to decisions of the Industrial
Commission. Per Idaho Code § 72-718, a decision of the Industrial Commission is res judicata
only as to matters actually adjudicated. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682
P.2d 1263 (1984); Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995). The Commission treated
Employer's argument concerning res judicata as though claim preclusion was the only res
judicata theory advanced. We find no reason to depart from our treatment of the issue of claim
preclusion on reconsideration.
However, Employer urges the Commission to consider the application of issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel) to the facts of this case, and we deem it appropriate to do so in view of our
belief that by raising the doctrine of res judicata, Employer raised the issue of collateral estoppel
as well.
In order for collateral estoppel to apply m this matter, Employer must satisfy five
elements:
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1)

The party against whom the earlier decision as asserted had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case;
2)

The issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the

present action;
3)

The issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation;

4)

There was a final judgment on merits in the prior litigation;

5)

The party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party

to the litigation.
(See Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, supra; Ticor Title Company v. Stanion, 144 Idaho

119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007)).
To determine whether Employer has met each of these five elements, it is first necessary
to understand the precise issue which was before the Commission at the time of the September
28, 2010 hearing. In the July 20, 2010 Notice of Hearing issued preparatory to the September
28, 2010 hearing, the relevant issue is defined as follows:
Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof.
The stated issue actually encompasses two questions: Is Claimant entitled to reasonable and
necessary medical care, and if so, what particular medical care is he entitled to?
At hearing, Claimant put on proof of medical bills incurred to the date of hearing in the
amount of $149,033.68. However, in his post-hearing brief, he cautioned that this figure might
not include all of the medical bills actually incurred by Claimant through the September 28, 2010
date of hearing.

Evidently, Claimant had some concern that there were medical bills

unaccounted for in his tally as of the date of hearing:

ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION - 12

The $149,033.68 in denied past medical expenses incurred by the Claimant and
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing may not represent 100% of all past medical
expenses incurred by the Claimant from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial
accident to the date when the Industrial Commission enters its final and
appealable order finding this claim compensable. However, the Claimant is
entitled to an Order from the Industrial Commission which sets forth the sum
certain of $149,033.68 in past medical expense that were presented to the
Industrial Commission as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 and adjudicated at the
9.28.10 Hearing so that the Claimant can obtain an enforceable judgment pursuant
to Idaho Code § 72-735 upon which interest may be calculated pursuant to Idaho
Code § 72-734.
Claimant's Nov. 19, 2010 Opening Brief, p. 25.
Even so, Claimant's specific prayer for relief was that the Commission enter an order
holding Employer liable for the full invoiced amount of the medical bills he had incurred, in the
sum of $149,033.68. In its May 17, 2011 decision, the Commission made the following findings
concerning Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits:
Idaho Code § 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured employee
reasonable medical care as may be required by his or her physician immediately
following an injury and for a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to
provide the same, the injured worker may do so at the expense of employer.
Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See Claimant's
Exhibit 7. Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), is
premised on the assumption that an injured worker who contracts for medical care
outside the workers' compensation system has, of may have, exposure to pay the
full invoiced amount of medical bills incurred in connection with his treatment.
Here, there is no evidence that Claimant is obligated to pay anything other than
the full invoiced amount. Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is entitled to
payment of the full invoiced amount of $149,033.68.

Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68.
Vawter May 17, 2011 Decision, pp. 19-20, 21.
As noted by Employer, in pursuing his claim for medical benefits Claimant could have
simply requested that the Commission enter an order holding Employer responsible for all of the
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accident-related medical bills incurred by Claimant to the date of hearing. Instead, Claimant
asked the Commission to make an award in a specific dollar amount, even though Claimant
evidently had some concern that his tally might not have captured every medical bill. Therefore,
on the issue of the extent of Claimant's entitlement to payment of medical bills, the Commission
did as Claimant asked and issued an order for a sum certain of $149,033.68.
It is clear that Claimant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the

extent of his entitlement to medical benefits as of the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing.
Claimant could have been more diligent in satisfying himself that his tally had captured all of the
bills in question, or he could have couched his demand differently such as to obviate the current
predicament. That he chose to proceed as he did does nothing to denigrate the Commission's
conclusion that he was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his entitlement to medical
benefits at the time of the original hearing.
It is also clear that the issue decided in connection with the September 28, 2010 hearing

is identical to the issue which Claimant asks the Commission to entertain in the instant matter.
Here, as in the initial proceeding, Claimant asks the Commission to order the payment of
medical bills incurred by Claimant between the date of injury and the date of the September 28,
2010 hearing.
Likewise, it is clear that the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior
litigation. In the prior hearing, the Industrial Commission actually did decide the issue of the
extent of Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits. It is true that Claimant has since discovered
additional medical bills, but is equally clear that the issue which the Commission decided was
not limited only to those medical bills of which Claimant was aware as of the date of hearing; the
issue was the extent of Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits.
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We believe it equally clear that the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision on this matter
constitutes a "final judgment" for purposes of the application of the rule. Under Idaho Code §
72-718, a decision of the Commission is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the
Commission, upon the filing of the decision in the office of the Commission. Notwithstanding
that the Idaho Supreme Court does not treat the May 27, 2011 decision as "final" for purposes of
appeal, it is clear that from the workers' compensation statutory scheme, the May 17, 2011
decision became final when it was filed with the Industrial Commission.

Neither the

Commission nor the parties are empowered to ignore or amend such a final decision, absent
special circumstances. (See Idaho Code§ 72-719).
Finally, it is clear that the party against whom the doctrine of issue preclusion is sought to
be applied in the instant proceeding is the same party involved in connection with the September
28, 2010 hearing.
Accordingly, though we continue to adhere to our decision that the doctrine of claim
preclusion (pure res judicata) would not prohibit Claimant from advancing claims for additional
medical bills incurred between the date of accident and the date of September 28, 2010 hearing,
we believe that the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) does bar relitigation of the
issue of extent of Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits under the peculiar facts of this case.
In addressing the extent of his entitlement to medical benefits, Claimant couched his demand in a
specific dollar amount and the Commission resolved the issue of the extent of Claimant's
entitlement to medical benefits by ordering the payment of the amount he requested. As respects
the additional medical bills Claimant has since discovered, and which were incurred between the
date of injury and to the date of September 28, 2010 hearing, Claimant's demand for payment of
the same addresses the identical issue that was the subject of the original hearing. The doctrine
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of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) applies to bar relitigation of that issue.

Therefore,

Claimant is barred from raising the issue of his entitlement to additional medical, travel, per
diem and related Idaho Code§ 72-432 expenses incurred between the date of injury and the date
of the September 28, 2010 hearing.
The Commission specifically concludes that as respects additional Idaho Code § 72-432
expenses incurred subsequent to the September 28, 2010 hearing, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not apply to bar litigation of the issue of Claimant's entitlement to recover those
expenses. The extent of the medical benefits to which Claimant is entitled for care rendered
subsequent to September 28, 2010, could not have been determined at the September 28, 2010
hearing. The issue of the extent of Claimant's entitlement to those benefits is a different issue
than the one litigated at the time of the September 28, 2010 hearing.
III. Is Claimant entitled to an award of attorney fees?
Employer takes issue with the Commission's decision to award attorney fees to Claimant
as a result of Employer's refusal to pay to Claimant certain workers' compensation benefits for
which demand was made subsequent to the January 30, 2012 denial of the motion for appeal by
permission by the Idaho Supreme Court. We have considered Employer's arguments, and find
reason to modify our decision to award attorney's fees to Claimant. The Commission's analysis
of Claimant's request for attorney's fees was in part premised on its understanding that Employer
contended that the doctrine of res judicata only applied to bar Claimant's request for additional
medical benefits incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing. However, careful review of
Employer's post-hearing brief demonstrates that Employer actually argued that the doctrine of
res judicata barred Claimant from making claim for additional past and future medical benefits.
(See Employer's post-hearing brief at 24-25). This argument is developed in considerably more
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detail in Employer's brief in support of its motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, it is clear
that with respect to Idaho Code § 72-432 expenses incurred subsequent to September 28, 2010,
Employer did dispute Claimant's entitlement to the same based on its res judicata defense.
Although we have ruled that Claimant's entitlement to Idaho Code § 72-432 benefits incurred
subsequent to September 28, 2010 is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we cannot
say that Employer pursued this defense unreasonably such as to entitle Claimant to an award of
Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees.
However, for Employer's post January 30, 2012 refusal to pay the 12% PPI award made
by Dr. Frizzell, the Commission continues to abide by its decision that Claimant is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission amends Paragraphs 5, 7, and 8 of the September
28, 2012 Conclusions of Law and Order to read as follows:
5.

Except as qualified herein, Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of 100% of

the invoiced amount of all medical bills referenced herein which were incurred by Claimant in
connection with the subject accident prior to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, with
credit for amounts previously paid. With respect to those bills totaling $24,627.80, and itemized
at C.5.17.12 Ex. 14, Claimant is not entitled to recover payment for those services rendered from
the date of the accident through September 27, 2010.
7.

Except as qualified herein, Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of mileage,

per diem and lodging expenses identified at C.5.17.12 Ex. 16. Claimant is not entitled to the
payment of mileage, per diem and lodging expenses incurred from the date of the subject
accident, through September 27, 2010;
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8.

Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 72-

804 for Employer's/Surety's unreasonable denial of PPI benefits subsequent to January 30, 2012.
Claimant shall file within twenty (20) days an affidavit and/or brief in support of his request for
attorney's fees, with appropriate elaboration on Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13
(1984);

In all other respects, the Commission continues to abide by its original decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this I Oday of

De.cf UJ lxv, 2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
~

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of \)F ['(2, fvlbev~ 2012 a true and correct copy of
the ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION was served by regular United States mail upon each
of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
1703 W HILL RD
BOISE ID 83702
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83 712
Telephone:
(208) 3 36-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF 12.10.12
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW, Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, by and through his attorney of Record, Rick D. Kallas,

and, pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718 and the Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration,
hereby moves this honorable Commission for an Order On Reconsideration which reconsiders its 12.10.12

Vawter I Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10. 12 Order on Reconsideration

Pagel

order to the extent that it applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the facts of this case on the grounds and
for the reasons that:

1.

The Commission did not list collateral estoppel as a disputed issue in its 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing;

2.

The parties did not even mention collateral estoppel when they framed the disputed issues at the
commencement of the 5 .17 .12 Hearing and explicitly agreed that res judicata was the only
affirmative defense being raised by Employer;

3.

The parties focused exclusively on res judicata and did not even mention collateral estoppel in
their post-hearing briefs after the 5 .1 7 .12 Hearing;

4.

The Commission focused exclusively on res judicata in its 9.28.12 decision;

5.

The Claimant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate all of his past denied medical
benefit claims at the 9.28.12 expedited I bifurcated hearing;

6.

The past medical benefit issue actually decided at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing was

not identical to the past medical benefit issues actually decided at the 5 .17 .12 Hearing;
7.

The issue of Employer's liability for the past medical benefit claims adjudicated at the 5.17.12
Hearing was not actually decided by the Commission's 5 .17 .11 order which, according to its plain
terms, was limited to a determination of Employer's liability for the past medical benefit claims in
Exhibit No. 7; and,

8.

The Idaho Supreme Court has already established the law of this case and ruled that the
Commission's 5.17.11 order is not a final order that can be given preclusive effect under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

This Motion For Reconsideration is based on the pleadings, papers, documents and orders on file with
and I or entered by Industrial Commission and the pleadings, papers, documents and orders on file with and I or
entered by the Idaho Supreme Court in the above referenced claim, together with the Claimant's Brief in
Support of Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration filed contemporaneously herewith.
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Respectfully submitted this 19th day of December, 2012.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

By:

_i_))~--=-SJ_'JS~{~/)\.

,-;f--,)J- -

RICK'n. KALLAS
Attorney for Claimant

'-g

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of December, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:

Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
1004 W. Fort St.
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Susan Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Danika Kramer
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P .L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
12.10.12 ORDER ON
RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW, Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, by and through his attorney of Record, Rick D. Kallas,
and, pursuant to Idaho Code §72- 718 and the Industrial Commission's 12.10 .12 Order On Reconsideration,
hereby submits the Claimant's Briefln Support of Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration.
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I.

BACKGROUND

Since the Idaho Supreme Court entered its landmark decision in Neel v. Western Construction, 147
Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), all Idaho Employers have understood that when they denied a claim that is
later deemed compensable by the Industrial Commission, they would be held liable for paying 100% of the
invoiced amount of ALL medical benefits incurred by the Claimant from the date of injury to the date when the
Commission deemed the claim compensable:
Any medical bills incurred during the time from when the accident occurred to the time when
the claim was deemed compensable fall outside the workers' compensation regulatory
scheme and may not be reviewed for reasonableness and must be paid in full by the surety.
Accordingly, Surety is obligated to pay Mr. Neel the full invoiced amount for all medical
bills he incurred for his industrial accident prior to June 8, 2007, the date that his claim was
deemed compensable by the Commission. Surety is permitted to review for reasonableness
and reduce payment in accordance with the workers' compensation regulations for all of Mr.
Neel's medical bills that were incurred on June 8, 2007 and later. Neel v. Western
Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206 P.3d 852, 855 (2009).

***
Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), has been generally
cited for the proposition that where a surety has denied responsibility for medical treatment,
surety is responsible for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of the bills in question
upon the Industrial Commission's subsequent determination that surety is responsible for that
care. The underlying premise of Neel is that where the workers' compensation surety has
denied responsibility for the payment of medical benefits, claimant is in the wilderness: The
claimant must go out and strike his/her own bargain with providers, and is potentially liable
for 100% of the invoiced amount of bills for services. For this reason, once the Industrial
Commission determines that the denied care is the responsibility of surety, surety is obligated
to pay claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of the bills in question, this sum representing
the injured worker's exposure on the bills he incurred outside the Workers' Compensation
system. Morris v. U.S. Bank and Old Republic Insurance Company, LC. 2008-027719
(Filed: 5.24.12) (See iJ71 on p. 27).

When the Industrial Commission entered its original decision in this case on 5.17 .11, it explicitly
recognized the Court's holding in Neel and awarded the Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of all past
medical benefits incurred by Claimant that were adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Hearing
Exhibit No. 7:
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Idaho Code § 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured employee reasonable medical
care as may be required by his or her physician immediately following an injury and for a
reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured worker may do so
at the expense of employer.
Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See, Claimant's Exhibit 7. Neel v.
Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), is premised on the assumption that an
injured worker who contracts for medical care outside the workers' compensation system has, or
may have, exposure to pay the full invoiced amount of medical bills incurred in connection with
his treatment. Here, there is no evidence that Claimant is obligated to pay anything other than the
full invoiced amount. Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is entitled to payment of the full
invoiced amount of $149,033.68. (See ifif33-34 on pp. 19-20 of the Industrial Commission's
5.17.11 decision).
After the Industrial Commission entered its 5.17.11 decision finding this claim compensable, the
Claimant presented new and distinct medical benefit claims to Employer that were not previously adjudicated at
the 9.28.10 Hearing as part of Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 and asked Employer to pay 100% of the
invoiced amount of these new and distinct medical benefit claims pursuant to the Court's holding in Neel

1
•

Employer refused to pay these new and distinct past denied medical bills and argued that the doctrine of

res judicata allowed Employer to circumvent the Court's holding in Neel and receive a windfall credit for the
full payment of all past denied bills set forth in Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibits No.'s 14 and 16 that were
never adjudicated at the original 9.28.10 Hearing or paid by Employer.
This case went to Hearing the second time on 5.17.12 and the Industrial Commission rejected
Employer's res judicata arguments and again cited Neel for the proposition that Employer is required to pay
Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefits:
Here, every medical bill that was submitted by Claimant to Surety for payment represents a
distinct claim for a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws. Every bill that was
submitted could have been the subject of any number of defenses to payment raised by
Employer/Surety. Employer/Surety could have argued that one or more of the bills were incurred
outside the chain of referral Employer/Surety could have argued that the care was not required by
Claimant's physician. Employer/Surety could have argued to the Commission that it should have
found the care represented by a particular bill to be unreasonable. The point is that every bill for
medical services represents a discrete claim for workers' compensation benefits. Accordingly,
since it is clear that the bills totaling $24,627.80 are new bills, Claimant's entitlement to that which
'See Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibits No. 14, No. 15, No. 16 and No. 17.
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was not adjudicated at the prior hearing, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar Claimant's
litigation of those bills at this time, notwithstanding that most of those bills are for services
rendered prior to the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing. Aside from the res judicata defense,
no other defenses to these bills have been raised by Employer/Surety. Accordingly, and per Neel v.
Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), Claimant is entitled to 100% of
the invoiced amount of the bills set forth at Claimant's 5.17.12Exhibit 14. (See ~85 on p. 37 of
12.5.12 amended decision).
Finally, Claimant has claimed entitlement to the sum of $1,684.71, representing travel expenses
incurred in connection with the medical care, $264. 75 representing per diem expenses associated
with medical care, and $200.01 representing lodging expenses incurred in connection with medical
treatment. (See C. 5 .17 .12 Ex. 16). Some of these expenses were incurred prior to the September
28, 2010 hearing, and some were incurred subsequent thereto. Claimant contends, and
Employer/Surety does not dispute, that these expenses are otherwise compensable as medical and
related expenses under Idaho Code § 72-432. However, Employer/Surety asserts that those
expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. As with the claim for additional medical bills, the claims for travel, lodging, and per
diem expenses were not adjudicated at the time of the initial hearing. Therefore, these claims are
not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and since they are not otherwise contested by
Employer/Surety, Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for these expenses as well. (See ,87 on p.
38of12.5.12 decision).
The Industrial Commission rejected Employer's res judicata arguments based on a long line of Idaho
Supreme Court cases which have held that the legislature modified true res judicata when it changed the
language of Idaho Code § 72-718:
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same
parties; (2) same claim; and (3) a valid final judgment. Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. Claim
preclusion generally bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the
claim, but also as to matters relating to the claim which might have been litigated in the first suit.
Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620. However, Idaho Code§ 72-718 varies the doctrine of res judicata as
applied to worker's compensation cases. See Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333
(1995). Decisions by the Commission are conclusive only as to matters actually adjudicated, not
as to all matters which could have been adjudicated. Id.; see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy,
Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 720-21, 682 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 (1984). Because we have determined that
the Agreement and ensuing order were void, there is no " valid final judgment," and res judicata
does not bar the present claim. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,
288, 207 P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009) (emphasis supplied).
I.C. § 72-718 codifies a variation of the doctrine ofresjudicata; decisions by the Commission are
conclusive only as to matters actually adjudicated, rather than as to all matters which could have
been adjudicated. Sund v. Gambrel. 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995) (emphasis supplied).
A comparison of the statute existing prior to 1971, and the statute enacted in 1971, discloses that
the two are practically identical except for the addition of the phrase "as to all matters adjudicated"
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in the current statute. When the legislature changes the language of a statute, it is presumed that
they intended to change the application or meaning of that statute. Hawkins v. Chandler, 88 Idaho
20, 396 P.2d 123 (1964); see also Lincoln County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102
Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 678 (1981). We conclude that the legislature, by adding the phrase "as to
all matters adjudicated," intended that decisions of the Commission be final and conclusive
only as to those matters actually adjudicated. This is a departure from the concept of "pure res
judicata," applied prior to 1971, which accorded decisions by the Commission finality and
conclusiveness as to all matters which were, or could have been, adjudicated. Therefore, the third
compensation agreement is only final and conclusive as to those matters actually considered by the
Commission. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 720-21, 682 P.2d 1263, 1267-68
(1984) (emphasis supplied).
Even though the affirmative defense of res judicata was the only issue listed in the Industrial
Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing, the only affirmative defense addressed by the parties at the 5.17.12
Hearing, the only affirmative defense addressed by the Claimant in his 7.27.12 post-hearing Opening Brief, the
only affirmative defense addressed by Employer in its 8.15.12 post-hearing Reply Brief and the only affirmative
defense discussed by the Industrial Commission in its 9.28.12 decision, Employer filed a Motion For
Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 decision on 10.17.12 and for the very first time asked
the Industrial Commission to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the Claimant from collecting 100%
of all past denied medical benefits in accordance with Neel.
The Industrial Commission entered its Order On Reconsideration on 12.10.12 and denied Employer's
Motion For Reconsideration of the resjudicata issue:
The Commission treated Employer's argument concerning res judicata as though claim preclusion
was the only res judicata theory advanced. We find no reason to depart from our treatment of the
issue of claim preclusion on reconsideration (See p. 11, LL 15-18 of 12.10.12 Order on
Reconsideration).
After denying Employer's Motion on the res judicata issue, the Industrial Commission then granted
Employer's Motion For Reconsideration and applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the Claimant
from collecting all past denied medical bills that were not adjudicated at the 9 .28 .10 Hearing as part of
Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7. For the reasons set forth below, the Claimant respectfully requests that the
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Industrial Commission reconsider its 12.10.12 collateral estoppel ruling because the record before the Industrial
Commission does not support application of that doctrine to the facts of this case.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON RECONSIDERATION

vVhen ruling on a Motion For Reconsideration, the Industrial Commission applies the following
standards to determine whether any of its findings of fact and conclusions of law should be changed:
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all
matters adjudicated, provided that within twenty days from the date of filing the decision, any
party may move for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. A motion for reconsideration must
"present to the Commission new reasons factually and legally to support [reconsideration] rather
than rehashing evidence previously presented." Curtis v. MH King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 128 P.3d
920 (2005). The Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments simply because
the case was not resolved in the party's favor.
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual findings or
legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. On reconsideration, the Commission
will examine the evidence in the case, and determine whether the evidence presented supports the
legal conclusions in the decision. However, the Commission is not compelled to make findings of
fact during reconsideration. Davidson v. H.H Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986).
See pp. 1-2, McCrorev v. Boise Paving and Asphalt Co. and Explorer Insurance Co. and State of
Idaho. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, I.C. 2000-025583, Order Denying Reconsideration
(Filed: 6.23.11).
III.
1.

ARGUMENT

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT LIST COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AS A
DISPUTED ISSUE IN ITS 3.7.12 NOTICE OF HEARING
The Industrial Commission is required by Idaho Code §72-713 to list all disputed issues that will be

heard and decided at hearing in a Notice of Hearing:
72-713. Notice of hearings -- Service. The commission shall give at least ten (10) days' written
notice of the time and place of hearing and of the issues to be heard, either by personal service or
by registered or certified mail. Service by mail shall be deemed complete when a copy of such
notice is deposited in the United States post office, with postage prepaid, addressed to a party at
his last known address, as shown in the records and files of the commission. Evidence of service
by certificate or affidavit of the person making the same shall be filed with the commission.
The Industrial Commission did not list collateral estoppel I issue preclusion as an issue to be heard and
decided at the 5.17.12 hearing in its 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing as required by Idaho Code §72-713.

Vawter I Claimant's Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration

Page 6

6.
Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the issue of
Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata;
\\lhen the Industrial Commission asked all of the parties at the commencement of the 5 .1 7 .12 Hearing to
confirm their understanding of the res judicata issue set forth as issue number 6 in the Industrial Commission's
3 .17.12 Notice of Hearing, all of the parties explicitly agreed that issue number 6 only addressed the issue of res

judicata:
Commissioner Baskin:
The issues noticed up for today's hearing have been set forth in the Commission's notice of hearing dated
March 7, 2012, numbered one through nine. I won't go through reading all of those issues, but would
ask the parties to review that order, make sure we are all on the same page as to whether that fairly
encapsulates the issues we have talked about. il1rs. Veltman?
MRS. VELTMAN: Yes, it does.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Mr. Augustine?
MR. AUGUSTINE: Yes, it does.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Mr. Kallas?
MR. KALLAS: Yes, Your Honor, it does.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Let me pose a couple of questions about number six, whether claimant
is entitled to past denied medical care benefits or whether the issue of claimant's entitlement to such
benefits is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. Mr. Kallas, are we talking about additional
medical bills that were incurred from the date of accident to the date of the last hearing that you have
subsequently discovered?
MR. KALLAS: Yes, Your Honor. That's Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 14 today. Those are medical
bills that were incurred by the claimant from date of injury on 12118/09 to date of the Industrial
Commission's original decision on 4/1 7/11 [sic] [5.1 7 .11].
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: What is the approximate amount of those bills? Approximately.
MR. KALLAS: I believe it's -- I believe it's around 24,000 dollars.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Okay. And the issue is whether the claimant is precluded from making
a claim for those additional bills under the doctrine of res judicata. Correct, Mrs. Veltman?
MRS. VELTMAN: That is correct. (Tr. 4/16-5/24) (emphasis supplied).
Based on the precise manner in which the Industrial Commission framed the res judicata issue in its
3.7.12 Notice of Hearing and the parties express agreement at the commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing that

res judicata was the only affirmative defense being raised by Employer, the Claimant only addressed the res
judicata issue at pages 24-27 of his 7 .27 .12 Opening Brief. Likewise, Employer focused exclusively on the res
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judicata defense at pages 24-25 of their 8.15 .12 Reply Brief and never once even mentioned the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
With that background, the Industrial Commission correctly ruled in its 9.28.12 decision 2 and again in its
12 .10.12 Order On Reconsideration 3 that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the Claimant from collecting
100% of the invoiced amount of ALL past denied medical bills that were incurred by the Claimant as the result
of his 12.18.09 industrial accident in accordance with Neel. Based on these undisputed facts, there simply is no
substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial Commission's new "belief that by
raising the doctrine of res judicata, Employer raised the issue of collateral estoppel as well" 4 •
"Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269
(2003).
A reasonable mind would not conclude that Employer properly raised the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel when that issue was not stated in the Industrial Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing, not
mentioned once by the parties or the Commission when they framed the res judicata issue at the
commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing, not mentioned once by the Claimant in his 7.27.12 post-hearing
Opening Brief, and most importantly, not mentioned even once by Employer in its 8.15.12 post-hearing Reply
Brief.
Because substantial and competent evidence does not exist to show that Employer I Surety properly
raised the collateral estoppel affirmative defense, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial
Commission enter a second Order on Reconsideration which prevents Employer from raising the affirmative
defense of collateral estoppel for the first time in its 10.17.12 Brief In Support of Defendants' Motion For
Reconsideration of September 28, 2012.

See~, 82-87 at pp. 35-38 of the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 decision.
'Seep. II, LL 15-18of12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration.
4
Seep. 11, LL 21-22of12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration.
2
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2.

THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL CAN ONLY BE APPLIED TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE IF EMPLOYER HAS MET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING EACH ELEMENT IN
THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

The doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied to facts of this case becasue Employer has not
proven each element in the prima facie case based on a preponderance of the evidence in the record:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously determined
when:
( 1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior
litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Rodriguez, 136 Idaho
at 92, 29 P.3d at 403. This Court finds that collateral estoppel does not bar Royal's claim seeking
apportionment of liability to ISIF for Stoddard's total and permanent disability because the issues are not
identical in the two cases. Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009).
Element No.1:

The Claimant did not have a full & fair opportunity to litigate all past denied
medical benefit claims at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated hearing

When the Industrial Commission considers the facts in the record which prove that the Claimant did not
have a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate all of the past denied medial bills that he incurred from the date of
his 12.18.09 accident until the date when his pre-hearing Exhibits were due 10 days before the 9.28.10 Hearing
pursuant to J.R.P. lO(C)(l), the Industrial Commission should view those facts in light most favorable to the
Claimant based on the "sure and certain relief' that is guaranteed to the Claimant by the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act:
When interpreting the Act, we must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the employee in order to
serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115
P.3d 721, 724 (2005); Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994).
The Act is designed to provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families and
dependents. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296; I.C. § 72-201. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint
School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 1008, 1013 (2009).

***
"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission proceedings
have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of these proceedings being
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the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho
596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial Commission proceedings should be simple,
accommodating to claimants, and above all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically
been imbued with certain powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance
the likelihood of equitable and just results." Id.
When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the amount of
compensation to which he is entitled, and there is no question but that he is entitled to
compensation, then it is the duty of the Board to call attention to such failure and see to it that
whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is presented, and then make the necessary
findings of fact. Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61 Idaho 720, 722, 107 P.2d 155, 157 (1940) (quoting
Feuling v. Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 334, 31 P.2d 683, 686 (1934).
Hartman v. Double L Mfg. 141Idaho456, 458, 111P.3d141, 143 (2005).
When considering whether the Claimant had afull and fair opportunity to litigate all past denied medical
benefits at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing, the Industrial Commission should bear in mind that it was
Employer's 5.12.10 Motion To Bifurcate that forced the Claimant to complete and serve his J.R.P. lO(C)(l)
Hearing Exhibits on or before 9.18.10 - a mere 59 days after he underwent his complicated anterior I posterior

540 degree L4-5 lumbar fusion surgery on 7.21.10.
This case was bifurcated at Defendants' request. See Response to Request for Hearing Motion to
Bifurcate, filed May 12, 2010. Claimant preferred to address all the issues in one hearing, though
Claimant ultimately agreed to bifurcation. See Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion to
Bifurcate, filed May 13, 2010. We agree with Defendants that bifurcation is often desirable and
beneficial to the parties. It promotes efficiency, in that a negative decision on the issue of
compensability spares the parties from having to unnecessarily litigate the other issues.
Bifurcation also allows the issue of a claimant's entitlement to medical care to be addressed while
a claimant is still in the period of recovery and other issues, such as permanent impairment and
permanent disability, are not yet ripe. Forcing the parties to wait until all issues are ripe before
hearing the case would essentially force claimants to pay for their own medical care. Many
claimants are not in financial position to do this, and their conditions could deteriorate as they go
untreated. Thus, as Defendants argue, there is a rationale to support the decision to bifurcate.
However, and as this case aptly demonstrates, there is a potential downside to the decision to
bifurcate as well. Should Defendants lose on a threshold compensability issue, they will be
obliged to pay benefits, and must even bring the case to its full conclusion, before they can appeal
the Commission's determination on the threshold issue. With any decision to request bifurcation
comes a need to recognize this potential outcome, and parties ignore this potentiality at their peril.
Indeed, if parties were not expected to abide by a Commission order on a bifurcated case, there
would be no reason to bifurcate. Why would the parties ask for such an order, and why would the
Commission issue one, if the order is to have no effect? It would be more economical to try the
case on all the issues at once. When parties request bifurcation, they are requesting an expedited
determination of certain issues, and they should expect to be held accountable for their
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responsibilities under such a determination once it is made. The policy of the workers'
compensation law is to provide injured workers with sure and certain relief. Claimant is correct
that an important aspect of sure and certain relief is prompt payment of benefits. (See Vawier,
12.8.11 Order Denying Stay, pp. 7-8).
Employer should have anticipated that one of the risks associated with their 5.12.10 Motion To
Bifurcate would be that the Claimant would not be able to gather every single medical bill to account for his
$173,661.48 in past denied medical benefits within the short time frame of 59 days after his 7.21.10 lumbar
fusion surgery in order to satisfy the J.R.P. lO(C)(l) pre-hearing Exhibit deadline (i.e., Cl. 9.28.10 H.E. No. 7
past medical benefits= $149,033.68 +Cl. 5.17.12 H.E. No. 14 past medical benefits= $24,627.80 and the
combined total

$173,661.48).

When the Industrial Commission balances the equities in order to determine whether the Claimant truly
had a fi1ll and fair opportunity to adjudicate ALL of his $1 73 ,661.48 in past denied medical benefits at the
expedited I bifurcated 9.28.10 Hearing, the Industrial Commission must remember that it was Employer's
1 . 8 .10 denial of this compensable claim that forced the Claimant to go outside the Idaho workers' compensation
system and process all of his accident-related medical expenses through his health insurance plan with the
Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue Cross - Blue Shield of Oregon in order to obtain the essential medical care that
he needed to address his L4-5 disc herniation and resulting cauda equina syndrome.
When Employer's Third Party Administrator (TPA), Gallagher Bassett Claims Services, denied the
Claimant's 12.18.09 worker's compensation claim on 1.8.10, the Claimant called his UPS Supervisor, Dax
Wilkinson. Mr. Wilkinson told the Claimant to process all of his denied accident-related medical benefits
through his Health Insurance Plan with the Oregon Teamsters Trust (Tr. 92/25 - 9319; 93124 -94/4).

The

Claimant complied with his Supervisor's instructions and processed all of his accident-related medical bills
through his Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue Cross

Blue Shield health insurance plan, but that proved to be a

complicated, sometimes adversarial and time consuming process.
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The Claimant explained at the 5.17.12 Hearing that his Oregon Teamsters Trust insurance policy had a
contract provision that placed a $10,000.00 cap on the medical benefits that the Claimant could receive if he
was pursuing a denied worker's compensation claim. After the Claimant exceeded the $10,000.00 cap, the
Oregon Teamsters Trust terminated his medical benefits and rejected claims from his medical providers. The
Claimant then had to appeal to the Board of Directors of the Oregon Teamsters Trust and obtain a hardship
waiver of the $10,000.00 cap in order to reverse the Board's termination of benefits and restore his eligibility to
receive continuing medical benefits (Tr. 90/15 - 91/5; 106/9-107/10).
The Claimant testified that he did not submit his medical bills to the Oregon Teamsters Trust for
processing and payment. The Claimant never saw his medical bills and just assumed that his medical providers
were sending his medical bills directly to the Oregon Teamsters Trust (Tr. 91/20 - 92/3). When Employer's
attorney asked the Claimant why he did not request that his 5.17.12 Exhibit No. 14 medical bills be paid at the
9 .28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing, the Claimant testified that he did not have his most recent bills support a
request for payment and did not know what the total amount of his bills was at the time of the 9.28.12 expedited
I bifurcated Hearing (Tr. 103/10-14).

The Claimant explained that he did not know about the $24,627.80 in past medical bills listed in
Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibit No. 14 at the time of the expedited bifurcated Hearing on 9.28.10 because
the statement I subrogation ledger that he received from the Oregon Teamsters I Blue Cross

Blue Shield only

listed the $149,033.68 in medical bills that were adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Hearing
Exhibit No. 7 (Tr. 103/25

104/4; 104117-20).

The Claimant explained that he could not adjudicate the past denied medical bills listed in Claimant's
5.17.12 Hearing Exhibit No. 14 at the time of the 9.28.10 Hearing because the Oregon Teamsters I Blue CrossBlue Shield had not received the bills from his medical providers from his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery or if
the Oregon Teamsters had received the bills they had not yet processed them for payment (Tr. 104/ 4-6). The
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Claimant also explained that he did not understand the process of how his medical providers generated their
bills and submitted them to the Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue-Cross-Blue Shield for processing and payment.
The Claimant testified that for all he knew, his medical providers may not have sent his bills to the Oregon
Teamsters for payment in a timely manner or, if they did, the Oregon Teamsters may have found some kind of
discrepancy or problem with the bill and sent it back to the provider for clarification before the bill could be
paid (Tr. 104/ 4-9).
The Claimant testified that he did not really understand the day-to-day mechanics of how the medical
provider bill submission, bill processing and bill payment procedure between his Idaho medical providers and
Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue Cross - Blue Shield really worked. (Tr. 104/ 6-9). However, the Claimant did
know that after his Idaho medical providers submitted their bills to Idaho Blue Cross-Blue Shield, those bills
would have to be processed in Idaho first before they were sent to the Oregon Blue Cross-Blue Shield for final
processing and payment (Tr. 104/10

17).

The Claimant's testimony at the 5 .17.12 Hearing proves that he did not have a full and fair opportunity
to adjudicate all of his past denied bills from his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery at the 9.28.10 expedited I
bifurcated hearing because he did not know the amount of those bills at the time when his Hearing Exhibits
were due on 9.18.10 - a mere 59 days after his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery.

The record before the

Commission shows that each of the Claimant's medical bills from each of his medical providers had to go
through 3 separate billing I processing cycles before the Claimant would be notified of the amount of his bills
by Oregon Teamsters: (1) The medical provider would first have to create the bill between date of service and
date of submission to Idaho Blue Cross-Blue Shield

estimated 30 day time frame; (2) Idaho Blue Cross-Blue

Shield would then process the bill in Idaho - estimated 30 day time frame; and finally, (3) Idaho Blue Cross
Blue Shield would send the bill to Oregon Teamsters I Oregon Blue Cross-Blue Shield for final processing and
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payment

estimated 30 day time frame. Being conservative, this entire billing and payment process could

easily take 90

180 days.

By denying the Claimant's 12.18.09 worker's compensation claim, Employer forced the Claimant out
of the "sure and certain relief' promised to him by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act and into the
sometimes adversarial and complicated 3-stage billing cycle required by the Oregon Teamsters Trust I Idaho
Blue Cross

Blue Shield I Oregon Blue Cross

Blue Shield. By filing its Motion To Bifurcate, Employer

forced the Claimant into the 9 .28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing before he had received perfect information
about his past denied medical bills. The record in this case clearly establishes that Employer I Surety's actions
deprived the Claimant of a full and fair opportunity to fully adjudicate ALL of his past denied medical bills at
the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing.
The Claimant gave unrefuted testimony at the 5.17.12 Hearing which explained why the 3-stage billing
I payment cycle that he was forced to deal with outside of the worker's compensation system made it highly

impractical (if not impossible) for him to be fully prepared to adjudicate all of his past denied medical benefits
at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated hearing just 59 days after his 7 .21.10 lumbar fusion surgery. Based on that
record, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission reconsider its 12.10.12 conclusion that
the Claimant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the extent of his entitlement to
medical benefits as of the date of the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing (Seep. 14of12.10.12 Order On
Reconsideration).
When considering whether to grant the Claimant's Motion For Reconsider, the Claimant respectfully
requests that the Industrial Commission apply the equitable principles laid down by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Hartman:
"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission proceedings
have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of these proceedings being
the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho
596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial Commission proceedings should be simple,

Vawter I Claimant's Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration

Page 14

L(I~

accommodating to claimants, and above all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically
been imbued with certain powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance
the likelihood of equitable and just results." Id.
When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the amount of
compensation to which he is entitled, and there is no question but that he is entitled to
compensation, then it is the duty of the Board to call attention to such failure and see to it that
whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is presented, and then make the necessary
findings of fact. Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61 Idaho 720, 722, 107 P.2d 155, 157 (1940) (quoting
Feuling v. Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 334, 31 P.2d 683, 686 (1934).
Hartman v. Double L Mfg. 141 Idaho 456, 458, 111 P.3d 141, 143 (2005).
The process and procedure before the Industrial Commission is supposed to be as accommodating to the
Claimant as possible. As stated by the Court in Hartman, it is the responsibility of the Commission to make
certain that the Claimant receives the full amount of all of the compensation to which he is entitled under the
Act. In those cases where the Claimant has failed to present evidence which is required to prove the full
amount of the compensation to which he is entitled, the Commission has a duty to take whatever action is
necessary to ensure that the Claimant's right to benefits are fully adjudicated and he receives an equitable and
just result.

If the Commission remams convinced that the Claimant had a full and fair opportunity to fully
adjudicate ALL of his past denied medical benefit claims at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated hearing in spite
of his unrefuted testimony at the 5.17.12 Hearing, then the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial
Commission exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Idaho Code §72-719 to rewrite its 5.17.11 medical benefits
award so that the language of the award is broad enough to include 100% of the invoiced amount of ALL past
medical benefits incurred by Claimant from the date of his industrial accident on 12.18.09 to the date when the
Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5.17.11 including, but not limited to, the $149,033.68 in past
denied medical benefit claims that were adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No.
7, the $24,627.80 in past denied medical benefit claims that were adjudicated at the 5.17.12 Hearing as
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Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 14 and the $2,149.47 in past medical benefit claims that were adjudicated at the
5. 1 7.12 Hearing as Exhibit No. 16.
The Commission may review any order to correct a manifest injustice. LC. § 72-719(3). The fact
that I.C. § 72-719(3) becomes operative on the Commission's own motion "does not preclude the
Commission from exercising its powers when notice of a purported manifest injustice is brought
to its attention either by a party or a third party." Banzhaf v. Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700, 703,
662 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1983). Manifest injustice as a ground for review of an order "must be
construed broadly." Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 13, 644 P.2d 331, 335 (1982). Page v. McCain
Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 306, 179 P.3d 265, 269 (2008).
A manifest injustice will occur if the Claimant is prevented from collecting all of the worker's
compensation benefits that he is entitled to under the Workers' Compensation Act and Employer is able to
avoid paying the Claimant $26,777.27 in past denied benefits that is clearly liable for under Idaho Code §72432 and Neel. The Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission rectify this manifest injustice

and prevent Employer from realizing this unearned credit I windfall by exercising its equitable powers under
Idaho Code §72-719 to clarify its 5 .17.11 decision to clearly state that Employer I Surety are liable for 100% of
the invoiced amount of ALL past medical benefit incurred by Claimant from date of injury on 12.18.09 to date
when this claim was deemed compensable on 5.17.11 including, but not limited to, the past medical benefit
claims adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit No. 7 and the past medical benefit claims adjudicated at
the 5.17.12 Hearing as Exhibit No. 14 and Exhibit No. 16, with credit for the Exhibit 7 claims already paid.
Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all medical bills
referenced herein which were incurred by Claimant in connection with the subject accident prior
to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, with credit for amounts previously paid (See
Conclusion of Law and Order No. 5 in 9.28.12 decision and 12.5.12 amended decision).
Element 2:

The past medical benefit issues adjudicated at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing
were not identical to the past medical benefit issues decided at the 5.17.12 Hearing.

The Industrial Commission stated in its 12.10.10 Order On Reconsideration that the past medical benefit
issue actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing and the past medical benefit issue adjudicated at the 5 .17 .12
Hearings were identical:
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It is also clear that the issue decided in connection with the September 28, 2010 hearing is
identical to the issue which Claimant asks the Commission to entertain in the instant matter. Here,
as in the initial proceeding, Claimant asks the Commission to order the payment of medical bills
incurred by Claimant between the date of injury and the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing
(Seep. 14of12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration).

The Claimant asks the Commission to reconsider this finding because the issues that were framed in the
7.20.10 Notice of Hearing and the issues that were framed in the 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing were completely
different and the past medical benefit issues that were actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated
Hearing were not identical with the past medical benefit issues that were actually adjudicated at the 5 .1 7 .12
Hearing.
The precise medical benefits issue that was actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated
Hearing was whether Employer was liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of each of the past denied medical
benefit claims that were adjudicated as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 at the 9.28.10 Hearing based on the
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206 P.3d 852, 855
(2009).
The precise medical benefits issue that was actually adjudicated at the 5.17.12 Hearing was whether
Employer was liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of each of the past denied medical benefit claims that
were listed in Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibit No. 14 and Exhibit No. 16 and adjudicated at the 5.17.12
Hearing based on the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206
P.3d 852, 855 (2009).
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, albeit including
several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. Berisha v. The Grove
Hotel and Insurance Company of the West, LC. 2002-003038 (Filed: 5.30.12)( See ifl3 on p.
13).
If there is any confusion over the precise nature of the past medical benefit issue in this case, that

confusion should be construed in favor of the Claimant so that he receives sure and certain relief promised to
him by the Workers' Compensation Act and against Employer because it drafted the exact language of issue
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number 3 in its 5 .12.10 Motion To Bifurcate and convinced the Industrial Commission to adopt it verbatim in
its 7.2010 Notice of Hearing.
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by Idaho Code
§ 72-432, and the extent thereof?

(See page 2 of Employer's 5 .12.10 Motion To Bifurcate and the Industrial Commission's 7.20.10 Notice
of Hearing).
The statement of issue number 3 drafted by Employer and adopted verbatim by the Industrial
Commission is ambiguous. The first part of the issue only makes reference to the "medical care" that the
Claimant may be entitled to receive pursuant to Idaho Code §72-432. Idaho Code §72-432 (1) describes the
medical benefits that a Claimant may be entitled to receive by referring specifically to medical care, surgical
care or treatment, nursing care, hospital services, medicines, crutches and other apparatus as may be required
by the injured worker's attending physician or needed immediately after an industrial accident and for a
reasonable time thereafter (See LC. §72-432(1)).
The second part of issue number 3 drafted by Employer and adopted verbatim by the Industrial
Commission only refers to "the extent" of the "medical care" that the Claimant may be entitled to receive
under Idaho Code §72-432(1); i.e., what is "the extent" of the medical care, surgical care or treatment, nursing
care, hospital services, medicines, crutches and other apparatus that has been required by the injured worker's
attending physician(s) or needed immediately after an industrial accident and for a reasonable time thereafter?
When Employer framed the disputed issues in its 12.17.10 post-hearing Response Brief, it is clear that
they understood that issue number 3 only addressed the issue of the medical care that the Claimant was entitled
to:
This matter is before the Commission to determine 1) whether Mr. Vawter sustained a personal
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, 2) whether his injury was the result of
an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and 3) whether he is entitled to
medical care, temporary total disability (TID), temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits, and
attorney fees. (Seep. 1 of Employer I Surety's 12.17.10 Response Brief)(emphasis supplied).

Vawter I Claimant's Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration

Page 18

Although issue number 3 says nothing about "the extent or total amount of Employer I Surety's
liability" for the medical care that the Claimant was entitled to receive, the Commission has added the concept
of liability and the concept of the total amount of that liability to the language of issue number 3 in order to
broadly apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel:
"What is Employer I Surety's liability" for the medical care that the Claimant is entitled to receive
under Idaho Code §72-432, and "the extent I total amount thereof'?
The language of issue number 3 in the 7.20.10 Notice of Hearing did not inform the Claimant that he
was expected to come to the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing with every single medical bill from every
single medical provider who had examined and I or treated him from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial
accident to the date of the 9 .28.10 expedited I bifurcated hearing or he would be forever barred from
recovering those past denied medical benefits from Employer based on the harsh application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. As already pointed out in the full and fair opportunity discussion above, it was impractical
(if not impossible) for the Claimant to identify the total amount of all of his medical bills prior to the 9.28.10
expedited I bifurcated Hearing just 59 days after his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery.
The Claimant obviously disagrees with the liberal manner in which the Industrial Commission is
now interpreting issue number 3 in order to grant Employer an unearned credit I windfall for benefits
never paid in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel. The process and procedure before the
Industrial Commission is supposed to be as simple and accommodating to the Claimant as possible so that
the injured worker is in the best position to achieve substantial justice, fairness and equity:
"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission proceedings
have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of these proceedings being
the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho
596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial Commission proceedings should be simple,
accommodating to claimants, and above all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically
been imbued with certain powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance
the likelihood of equitable and just results." Id.
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When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the amount of
compensation to which he is entitled, and there is no question but that he is entitled to
compensation, then it is the duty of the Board to call attention to such failure and see to it that
whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is presented, and then make the necessary
findings of fact.
Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61 Idaho 720, 722, 107 P.2d 155, 157 (1940) (quoting Feuling v. Farmers'
Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 334, 31P.2d683, 686 (1934)). Moreover, I.C. § 72-714(3)
provides: "The commission, or member thereof, or a hearing officer, referee or examiner, to whom
the matter has been assigned, shall make such inquires and investigations as may be deemed
necessary." As stated in Hagler, "none of our opinions in recent years have had occasion to remind
the Commission of the inherent powers it possesses." 118 Idaho at 599, 798 P.2d at 58. Although,
in this case, it is not the Industrial Commission we have to remind, but instead the parties
practicing before it. Hartman v. Double L Mfg. 141Idaho456, 458, 111P.3d141, 143 (2005).

Employer and the Industrial Commission are now treating the Claimant's request for the payment of a
sum certain of medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68 as a complete waiver of the Claimant's rights
under Neel to collect 100% of the invoiced amount ALL past denied medical benefits that the Claimant was
forced to incur outside of the worker's compensation system based on Employer's denial of his claim:
"Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage." Brand S Corp.
v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981). "It is a voluntary act and implies election
by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or advantage which he
might at his option have demanded and insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 368, 304
P.2d 646, 649 (1956). " A party asserting waiver must have acted in reliance upon the waiver and
altered the party's position." Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782,
839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167
(2009).
The Claimant has never expressed the intent to waive any of his past medical benefit claims. On the
contrary, the Claimant has consistently maintained throughout these proceedings that Employer is liable for

100% of ALL of his past denied medical benefit claims based on the Court's holding in Neel. On page 25 of
his 11.19.10 post-hearing Brief, the Claimant requested that the Industrial Commission apply the Supreme
Court's holding in Neel and award him 100% of ALL past denied medical benefits:
Based on the Supreme Court's hold [sic][holding] in Neel, the Defendants are liable for
100% of the invoiced amount of the medical expenses incurred by the Claimant from the
date of his 12.18.09 low back injury to the date when the Industrial Commission enters its
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final and appealable order finding this claim compensable. At the time of the September 28,
2010 Hearing, the Claimant presented undisputed evidence proving that he has incurred at
least $149,033.68 in past denied medical bills in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial
accident I low back injury (Cl. Ex. 7) (Tr., p. 42, L. 18 -p. 45, L. 1).
The $149,033.68 in denied past medical expenses incurred by the Claimant and adjudicated
at the 9.28.10 Hearing may not represent 100% of all past medical expenses incurred by the
Claimant from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial accident to the date when the Industrial
Commission enters its final and appealable order finding this claim compensable. However,
the Claimant is entitled to an Order from the Industrial Commission which sets forth the sum
certain of $149,033.68 in past medical expenses that were presented to the Industrial
Commission as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 and adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing so
that the Claimant can obtain an enforceable judgment pursuant to Idaho Code §72-735 upon
which interest may be calculated pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734. (See p. 25 of Claimant's
11.19 .10 post-hearing Brief) (emphasis supplied).
The Claimant repeated his Neel request for the payment of 100% of ALL past denied medical benefits in
the Conclusion section on page 29 of his 11.19.10 post-hearing Opening Brief. The Claimant also repeated his
Neel request for the payment of 100% of ALL past denied medical benefits in his 12.28.10 Reply Brief:
The Industrial Commission should Order the Defendants to pay 100% of the invoiced amount of
all past medical expenses incurred by Claimant from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial injury to
the date when the Industrial Commission enters a final and appealable order finding this claim
compensable in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western
Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009) (Seep. 29 of the Claimant's 12.28.10 Reply
Brief).
Employer's 12.10.10 post-hearing Response Brief was 22 pages long. At no time in that 22 page Brief
did Employer ever object to the Claimant's Neel requests that the Industrial Commission enter an order
holding Employer I Surety liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of ALL past medical benefits that the
Claimant incurred from the date of his 12.18.09 injury to the date when the Commission deemed this claim
compensable. Employer did not even address its liability for past medical benefits.
When the Claimant requested a sum certain of past medical benefits in his 11.19.10 post-hearing Brief,
the Claimant made it clear to Employer and the Industrial Commission that the Claimant had incurred at least
$149,033.68 in past medical benefits which may not represent 100% of all past medical benefits that the
Claimant had incurred since the date of his 12.18.09 accident. The Claimant clearly explained that he was only
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requesting a sum certain of the specific past medical benefit claims that had been adjudicated at the 9.28.10
Hearing as Exhibit No. 7 so that he could obtain an enforceable judgment pursuant to Idaho Code §72-735 upon
which interest could accrue pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734.
Employer has succeeded in convincing the Industrial Co:inmission that all the Claimant had to do in
order to avoid the collateral estoppel predicament that he now finds himself in is to request a vague and openended order from the Commission which stated that Employer was liable for I 00% of all bills without
specifying an amount:
As noted by Employer, in pursuing his claim for medical benefits Claimant could have simply
requested that the Commission enter an order holding Employer responsible for all of the
accident-related medical bills incurred by Claimant to the date of hearing. (See p. 13-14 of
12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration).
This is a misstatement of the law. The Claimant was required by law to ask for a specific dollar amount
of the past medical benefit claims that were actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Hearing
Exhibit No. 7. Otherwise, it would have been legally impossible for him to convert an open-ended and vague
order generically establishing liability a final and enforceable judgment:
"This Court has held that a decision or order that does not 'finally dispose of all of the claimant's
claims would not be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(d) .... ' " ,Matter of
Nagle, 126 Idaho 139, 140, 879 P.2d 602, 603 (1994) (quoting Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990) ). A determination of liability without the
determination of the amount of compensation is not a final order. Lines v. Idaho Forest
Industries, 125 Idaho 462, 464, 872 P.2d 725, 727 (1994). Hartman, supra, at 141 Idaho 457-458,
111P.3d142-143 (emphasis supplied).

***
Nor has Frank made a showing as to the amount his insurance company paid for him to receive
such medical care. Absent evidence in the record to support a specific award the Commission
could not grant Frank his requested relief. Frank v. The Bunker Hill Co., 150 Idaho 76, 80, 244
P .3d 220, 224 (2010) (emphasis supplied).
Employer never objected to the Claimant's request that the Industrial Commission award the Claimant
a sum certain of $149,033.68 based on 100% of the invoiced amount of the specified past denied medical
benefit claims that were actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing as Claimant's
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Hearing Exhibit No. 7. Apparently, Employer was so confident that the Industrial Commission was going to
rule in its favor on the threshold "arise out of employment" compensability question, that it did not even
bother to address its liability under Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel for the Claimant's past denied medical
benefits.
When the Industrial Commission awarded the Claimant the sum certain of $149,033.68 in past denied
medical benefits in its 5.17.11 decision, it started by making specific reference to the medical benefit claims
that were actually adjudicated at the 9 .28 .10 Hearing as Claimant's Exhibit No. 7.
Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See Claimant's Exhibit 7.
(See if 34 on p. 19 of 5.17.11 decision).
The Commission then cited Neel and ordered Employer I Surety to pay Claimant the sum certain of
100% of the invoiced amount of the medical bills that were actually adjudicated in Claimant's Hearing Exhibit
No. 7; i.e., $149,033.68.
Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is entitled to payment of the full invoiced amount of
$149 ,033 .68. (See if 34 on p. 20 of 5 .17 .11 decision).
Based on the express language of its 5.17.11 decision, it is obvious that the Commission only the
decided the past medical benefit issue of Employer's liability for I 00% of the invoiced amount of the past
denied medical benefit claims that had been actually adjudicated as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 at the
9.28.10 Hearing.

The Commission never admonished the Claimant that he would later be found to have

completely waived his rights under Neel by requesting a sum certain for those past medical benefit claims that
had actually been adjudicated.
After the Industrial Commission entered its 5 .1 7.11 decision which required Employer to pay the
Claimant $149,033.68 in past denied medical benefits based on 100% of the invoiced amount of the medical
benefit claims that were actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Exhibit No. 7, Employer
steadfastly refused to recognize the validity of the Commission's order and pay the benefits that were ordered.

Vawter I Claimant's Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration

Page 23

When Employer finally tendered payment (after several months of litigation and 2 failed attempts to take
interlocutory appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court) in February of 2012, Employer did not make its tender
conditional on the Claimant agreeing to a complete waiver his right to seek 100% of the invoiced amount of
ALL past denied medical benefits in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel:
Upon learning that the Court dismissed my interlocutory appeal by order of January 30, 2012, my
client issued prompt payment to you on February 2, 2012, for the sum of $184,172.38. This
amount includes all benefits ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 order
($149,033.68 in medical benefits and $28,352.70 in temporary disability benefits), as well as
interest from the date of the decision through the date of payment ($6,786.00). Thus, all benefits
ordered have been paid. (See Cl. 5.17.12 H.E. 017022) (emphasis supplier).
Employer did not state in its 2.14.12 letter that its 2.2.12 payment included 100% of ALL past medical
benefits that the Claimant incurred from the date of his 12.18.09 injury to the date when the Commission
deemed this claim compensable on 5.17 .12 or that said payment would completely and fully satisfy ALL of
Employer's 100% payment obligations under Neel.

Employer stated unequivocally that its $184,172.38

payment only covered the benefits that were ordered to be paid by the Industrial Commission in its 5.17.11
order - and nothing more. When that payment was made in February of 2012, Employer knew that the
Industrial Commission had based its $149,033.68 award of past medical benefits only upon the past medical
benefit claims that had been adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit 7. Employer knew that it would only
receive credit for paying the Exhibit 7 bills by making that payment. If Employer expected to receive full credit
for paying all past medical bills, it should have said so when it tendered payment.
Since making this payment in February of 2012, Employer has now concocted the very disingenuous
legal argument that the payment that it made in February of 2012 was not only intended to satisfy the past
denied medical benefit claims that were actually adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit 7 and ordered to
by paid by the Commission, Employer's payment was really intended to fully extinguish ALL of Employer's
liability for 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefit claims and completely satisfy
Employer's obligations under Neel.
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Employer's disingenuous legal position that it deserves a full credit for making a partial payment is
directly contradicted by the statements made in its 2.14.12 letter which plainly and unequivocally limited the
scope of Employer's payment to satisfaction of the past denied medical benefits of $149,033.68 that were
adjudicated at the 9.18.10 Hearing as Exhibit No. 7. If Employer had been candid with the Claimant and
honestly informed him that it intended to wrongfully convert its partial payment into a complete and final
satisfaction of ALL of its liability under Neel for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all past
medical benefits incurred by Claimant as the result of their denial of his 12.18.09 claim, the Claimant obviously
would have rejected Employer's partial payment and would have insisted on the full payment of all past denied
medical bills in accordance with Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel. This type of chicanery and gamesmanship
should not be rewarded in a system designed to accomplish substantial justice for the Claimant:
"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission proceedings
have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of these proceedings being
the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. 1\;ficron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho
596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial Commission proceedings should be simple,
accommodating to claimants, and above all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically
been imbued with certain powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance
the likelihood of equitable and just results." Id.
When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the amount of
compensation to which he is entitled, and there is no question but that he is entitled to
compensation, then it is the duty of the Board to call attention to such failure and see to it that
whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is presented, and then make the necessary
findings of fact.
Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61 Idaho 720, 722, 107 P.2d 155, 157 (1940) (quoting Feuling v. Farmers'
Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 334, 31 P.2d 683, 686 (1934)). Moreover, I.C. § 72-714(3)
provides: "The commission, or member thereof, or a hearing officer, referee or examiner, to whom
the matter has been assigned, shall make such inquires and investigations as may be deemed
necessary." As stated in Hagler, "none of our opinions in recent years have had occasion to remind
the Commission of the inherent powers it possesses." 118 Idaho at 599, 798 P.2d at 58. Although,
in this case, it is not the Industrial Commission we have to remind, but instead the parties
practicing before it. Hartman v. Double L Mfg. 141Idaho456, 458, 111 P.3d 141, 143 (2005).
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The Claimant respectfully requests that the Commission reconsider its decision to apply collateral

estoppel to the facts of this case because issue number 3 in the Commission's 7.20.10 Notice of Hearing is not
identical to the past medical benefit issue that was actually litigated at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated
Hearing (i.e., Employer's Neel liability for 100% of the invoiced amount of the past medical benefit claims
adjudicated in Exhibit No. 7) and not identical to the past medical benefit issue that was actually litigated at the
5.17.12 Hearing (i.e., Employer's Neel liability for 100% of the invoiced amount of the different past medical
benefit claims adjudicated in Exhibits 14, 15 and 16)/

Element No. 3.

Employer should not be allowed to use collateral estoppel to preclude the Industrial
Commission from determining Employer's actual liability for ALL past medical
benefits under Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel

Employer seeks to utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude the Claimant from recovering
the different past denied medical benefits that were adjudicated as Exhibits No. 14, 15 and 16 at the 5 .17 .12
Hearing. However, Employer's liability for those past medical benefits was not actually adjudicated at the
9 .28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing. The Industrial Commission only adjudicated the issue of Employer's
liability for the specific past medical benefit claims that were listed in Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 at the
9 .2 8 .10 Hearing:
Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See Claimant's Exhibit 7.
(See~ 34 on p. 19 of 5.17.11 decision).
Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is entitled to payment of the full invoiced amount of
$149,033.68. (See~ 34 on p. 20 of 5.17.11 decision).
The Claimant should not be punished for failing to present each and every past medical bill at the
9 .2 8 .10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing when it was Employer's denial of this claim that forced him into the
byzantine triple billing I reimbursement cycle of the Oregon Teamsters Trust I Oregon Blue Cross- Blue Shield
I Idaho Blue Cross - Blue Shield health care system and it was Employer's 5.12.10 Motion To Bifurcate which
forced him to serve his 9.28.10 Hearing Exhibits just 59 days after his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery.
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Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, albeit including
several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. Berisha v. The Grove
Hotel and Insurance Companv of the West, LC. 2002-003038 (Filed: 5.30.12)( See ,13 on p.
13).
Element No. 4:

Collateral estoppel cannot be applied to the facts of this case because the Idaho
Supreme Court has ruled that the 5.17.11 decision is not final

After the Industrial Commission entered its 5.17 .11 decision, Employer filed a Notice of Appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court on 6.20.11 and tried to take an interlocutory appeal of the Industrial Commission's
5 .17.11 decision. The Claimant filed a Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal with the Supreme Court on
6.27.11 on the grounds that the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order was not a final Order that fully and finally disposed of all of the Claimant's claims against the Defendants.
On 7.27.11, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Claimant's Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal and entered
its Order Dismissing Appeal.
Employer then filed a Motion For Clarification with the Idaho Supreme Court on 8.1.11. The Idaho
Supreme Court denied Employer's Motion For Clarification on 8.15.11 and specifically referred Employer's
counsel to the Court's holding in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992) and the
Industrial Commission's retention of jurisdiction as evidenced by its 7.7.11 Amended Notice of Telephone
Conference and Notice of Hearing.
This Court held recently that, "a decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all
of the claimant's claims would not be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to I.A.R. l l(d) .... "
Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co, 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990). Additionally,
in Reynolds v. Browning Ferris Indus., 113 Idaho 965, 969, 751P.2d113, 117 (1988), we held
that "whenever the Commission explicitly retains jurisdiction over a matter, that act by its very
nature infers that there is neither a final determination of the case nor a final permanent award to
claimant." Jensen, supra.

***
"This Court has held that a decision or order that does not 'finally dispose of all of the claimant's
claims would not be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(d) .... ' " Matter of
Nagle, 126 Idaho 139, 140, 879 P.2d 602, 603 (1994) (quoting Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990). Hartman, supra, 141 Idaho 457, 111 P.3d 142
(2005).
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By granting the Claimant's Motion For Involuntary Dismissal and denying Employer's Motion For
Clarification with specific reference to its holding in Jensen, the Idaho Supreme Court has established the law of
this case to be that the Commission's 5.17 .11 decision was not a final order.
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,
515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000) Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 816, 153
P.3d 1158, 1162 (2007).
The Idaho Supreme Court's ruling that the 5.17 .11 order was not a final and appealable order must be
adhered to by the Industrial Commission throughout these proceedings because it is the law of this case.
Collateral estoppel can only be used in those cases where the prior order sought to be given preclusive effect is

a final and appealable order. Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009).
Employer has even admitted that the 5.17.11 order is not a final order that would support application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel:
Ironically, Defendants sought to have the Commission's May 17, 2011, award modified to reflect
the lack of finality of the award, consistent with the Supreme Court's determination that the
award was not final for purposes of an appeal. Defendants specifically pointed out that such
modification, based on the theory of manifest injustice, would allow Claimant to present
additional evidence regarding medical benefits not awarded by the initial decision (See p. 25 of
Employer's 8.15.12 Reply Brief) (emphasis supplied).
Since the doctrine of collateral estoppel can only be applied against a final order which disposes of all
of the disputed issues on the merits, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Commission reconsider its
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and confirm that Employer remains liable for 100% of the
invoiced amount of all medical bills incurred by Claimant from the date of his injury on 12.18.09 to the date of
the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 order in accordance with Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel (See order no. 5 in
9.28.12 decision and 12.5.12 amended decision).
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Conclusion

The Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission reconsider its 12.l 0 .12 Order On
Reconsideration and not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the Claimant from collecting 100% of
the invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by Claimant from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial
accident to the date of the Commission's 5.17.11 order for the following reasons:
1.

The Commission did not list collateral estoppel as a disputed issue in its 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing;

2.

The parties did not even mention collateral estoppel when they framed the disputed issues at the
commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing and explicitly agreed that res judicata was the only
affirmative defense being raised by Employer;

3.

The parties focused exclusively on res judicata and did not even mention collateral estoppel in
their post-hearing briefs after the 5.17.12 Hearing;

4.

The Commission focused exclusively on res judicata in its 9.28.12 decision;

5.

The Claimant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate all of his past denied medical
benefit claims at the 9.28.12 expedited I bifurcated hearing;

6.

The past medical benefit issue actually decided at the 9.28.10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing was
not identical to the past medical benefit issues actually decided at the 5.17.12 Hearing;

7.

The issue of Employer's liability for the past medical benefit claims adjudicated at the 5.17 .12
Hearing was not actually decided by the Commission's 5.17.11 order which, according to its plain
terms, was limited to a determination of Employer's liability for the past medical benefit claims in
Exhibit No. 7; and,

8.

The Idaho Supreme Court has already established the law of this case and ruled that the
Commission's 5.17.11 order is not a final order that can be given preclusive effect under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial

Commission reconsider its decision to apply collateral estoppel to the facts of this case and enter a new
order consistent with order number 5 from its 9.28.12 decision and 12.5.12 amended decision which
makes it clear that Employer is liable for 100% of the invoice amount of ALL past medical benefits
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incurred by Claimant from date of injury on 12.18.09 to date of the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11
order, minus credit for the Exhibit 7 past medical benefits previously paid.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of December, 2012.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRA.NCO, PLLC
/'""'"-,~

By:

-RI-~-!-1-'l-~-K-=-AL-~-~-s-n-I-~-£-~_,_\~.

,,,__J_ _ __

Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of December, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
Claimant's Briefln Support of Motion For Reconsideration by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:

Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
1004 W. Fort St.
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Susan Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, Idaho 83702

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Danika Kramer
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIB ERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AWARD
OF ATTOR.N"EY' S FEES BASED ON
12.10.12 ORDER ON
RECONSIDER.A.TI ON

COMES NOW, Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, by and through his attorney of record,
Rick D. Kallas, and pursuant to the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 Order, 12.5.10 Amended
Order, 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration and the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in

Hogaboom v. Economy Afattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984), hereby submits the
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following Supplemental Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees based on the
Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration.
Rick D. Kallas, being first duly sworn on oath, hereby deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho and make the following
statements based on my own personal knowledge;

2.

I hereby incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein each and every
statement made in Claimant's 10.15.12 Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees
and 10.30.12 Addendum to 10.15.12 Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees.

3.

Since I have already addressed the Hogaboom attorney's fee factors in my 10.15.12
Affidavit, those factors will not be re-addressed in this Affidavit.

4.

The Industrial Commission revised its 9.28.12 I 12.5.12 order on attorney's fees in its
12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration and limited the Claimant's award of attorney's fees
to the undisputed 12% whole person PPI rating that Dr. Frizzell issued.

5.

The amount of the Claimant's attorney's fees that should be collected from Employer
based on that 12% undisputed PPI award can be calculated as follows:
12% X 500 weeks = 60 weeks X 2009 PPI rate of $349.80 = $20,988.00 X 30% fee =
$6,296.40. Further your affiant sayeth not

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of December, 2012.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO,
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF ADA )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.i'.J TO Before me this 19th day of December, 2012.

Notarv Public for the State ofidaho
Residing at
&Jig:_,
, Idaho
My Commission Expires: J'/liV,P,mf)ty 1 1 JDIS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of December, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
Claimant's Supplemental Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees based on 12.10.12 Order by the
method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
1004 W. Fort St
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Susan Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, Idaho 83702

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB NO. 7850)
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, PLLC
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, ID 83702
PH (208) 387-2667
FAX (208) 387-2677
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com
Attorney for Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc. and Liberty Insurance Corp.

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
V.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No.: 2010-000114

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

_!

!

·•
..

·~

~

.

·-·'
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COME NOW Defendants United Parcel Service, Inc., and Liberty Insurance Corporation,
pursuant to J.R.P. 3(E)(2), and file this objection in response to Claimant's December 19,
2012, motion for reconsideration.
Defendants object to Claimant's motion for reconsideration because such a motion is
not provided for under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 1

718, a decision of the Commission is final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or the filing
of the decision on rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may be appealed to the
Supreme Court as set forth in Idaho Code § 72-724.
In this case, the Commission filed its order on reconsideration on December 10, 2012.
Accordingly, the Commission's order is a final decision appealable to the Supreme Court.
Claimant's motion for reconsideration is simply a restatement of arguments set forth in his
brief in response to Defendants' motion for reconsideration, and the Commission no longer
has jurisdiction over the issues he requests to have revisited. For these reasons, his motion
should be denied.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 2012.

Susan R. Veltman
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON
Attorney for Defendants

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of December, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
RICK KALLAS
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, & DEFRANCO, PLLC
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE, ID 83712
PAUL AUGUSTINE
P.O. BOX 1521
BOISE, ID 83701
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the abovenamed, the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAL'J

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 3

!}Z C

Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Attorney for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VA WIER,
Claimant,
vs.
'UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S 12.24.12 RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S 12.21.12 OBJECTION
TO CLAIMANT'S 12.19.12 MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 12. l 0.12
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

)

COMES NOvV, Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, by and through his attorney of Record, Rick D. Kallas,

and, pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718 and the Defendants' 12.21.12 Objection to Claimant's Motion For
Reconsideration, hereby responds to said Objection as follows:
1.

The Defendants have only cited Idaho Code §72-718 in support of their Objection to the Claimant's
Motion For Reconsideration. That Code provision provides that the Industrial Commission's 9.28.10
decision would become final upon the filing of the Commission's 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration
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only with respect to those matters that were actually adjudicated by the Industrial Commission at the
5.17.12 Hearing.
2.

The Claimant filed his 12.19.12 Motion For Reconsideration because the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was not a matter that was actually adjudicated by the Industrial Commission at the 5.17 .12 Hearing.
a.

Collateral estoppel was not listed as a disputed issue to be heard and decided at the 5.17.12
Hearing in the Industrial Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing;
Collateral estoppel was not discussed or mentioned by any of the parties at the
commencement of the 5 .17 .12 Hearing when they explicitly agreed that the only affirmative
defense raised by Employer was the doctrine of res judicata;
Collateral estoppel was not raised or discussed by the Claimant in his 7.27.12 post-hearing
Opening Brief;
Collateral estoppel was not raised or discussed by Employer in its 8.15.12 post-hearing
Reply Brief;
Collateral estoppel was not raised or discussed by Claimant in his 8.27.12 post-hearing
Reply Brief; and
Collateral estoppel was not raised or discussed by the Industrial Commission in its 9.28.12
decision.

b.

c.
d.
e.
f.

3.

The Industrial Commission did not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel against the Claimant until it

entered its 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration. Because collateral estoppel is now being applied against the
Claimant in order to deprive him of substantial medical benefits that he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code
§72-432 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206 P.3d
852, 855 (2009), the Commission's recent decision to apply that doctrine has now become the proper subject of
a Motion For Reconsideration.
"[A ]n administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected party
with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the issue." White v.
Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977). Notice informing the
parties of a hearing on "all issues considered by the Appeals Examiner" satisfies due
process requirements. McGee v. JD. Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 328, 333, 17 P.3d 272, 277
(2000).
4.

Idaho Code §72-718 states that the Commission may reconsider any of its decisions upon its own
initiative.
Based on the above and foregoing reasons, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial

Commission deny Employer's Objection and consider the Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration on the
merits.
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Respectfully submitted this 24th day of December, 2012.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of December, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
Claimant's Response to Employer's Objection to Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration by the method
indicated below and addressed to the following:

Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
1004 W. Fort St.
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Susan Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, Idaho 83702

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Fl

E

MICHAELP. VAWTER,
Claimant,

IC 2010-000114

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer,

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMANT'S
SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE
DECEMBER 10, 2012 ORDER

and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

On or about December 10, 2012, the Commission entered its Order on Employer's
-Motion for Reconsideration of the Commission's September 28, 2012 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. In essence, Claimant's motion constitutes a second motion for
reconsideration of the Commission's September 28, 2012 decision, the first having been filed by
Employer/Surety on October 17, 2012.
For the reasons set forth below, we decline to consider Claimant's motion for
reconsideration.
Idaho Code § 72-718 provides:

FINALITY OF COMMISSION'S DECISION. A decision of the commission,
in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 1

by the commission upon filing the decision in the office of the commission;
provided, within twenty (20) days from the date of filing the decision any party
may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision, or the commission
may rehear or reconsider its decision on its own initiative, and in any such events
the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration
or the filing of the decision on rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may
be appealed to the Supreme Court as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code.
Emphasis added.
Idaho Code§ 72-718 clearly anticipates that only one motion for reconsideration may be
filed on a decision of the Industrial Commission. The statute specifies that on the filing of a
timely motion for reconsideration the Commission may either (1) deny the motion or (2) file a
In either case, the order on reconsideration is

decision modifying the original decision.

immediately final and appealable to the Idaho Supreme Court.
Had the legislature intended to allow multiple motions for reconsideration the statute
would have been drafted differently than it was.

The Commission declines to entertain

Claimant's motion for reconsideration and denies the same.
DATED thisJ!u/ day of

:Jwu,{1A1

, 2013.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

~~

Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman

0• *
@®

ATTEST:

/

0

~

®

•

~~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the .if!!!_ day of TM~ , 2013 a true and correct copy of the
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND MOTION FOR
CONSIDERATION was served by
facsimile processing machine upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
208-345-8945
SUSAN R VELTMAN
208-387-2677
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
208-947-0014
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, PLLC
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, ID 83702
PH (208) 387-2667
FAX (208) 387-2677
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com
Attorney for Appellants United Parcel Service, Inc. and Liberty Insurance Corp.

IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL VAWTER,
Respondent,
V.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Appellants,
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Co-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No.: 2010-000114

NOTICE OF APPEAL

~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, MICHAEL VAWTER AND HIS ATTORNEY,
RICK KALLAS, 1031 E. PARK BLVD., BOISE, IDAHO 83712, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF) AND ITS ATTORNEY, PAUL AUGUSTINE, P.O. BOX 1521,
BOISE, IDAHO 83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. I

1.

The above named Appellants, United Parcel Service, Inc. and Liberty Insurance
Corp., appeal against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered in the above-entitled proceeding on
May 17, 2011, September 28, 2012, and December 10, 2012, by Chairman Thomas E.
Limbaugh, Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin, and Commissioner R.D. Maynard.

2.

Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1l(d)
I.A.R.

3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
a. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining Claimant suffered an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment causing an injury on
December 18, 2009, inclusive of:
L The award to Claimant of TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through
December 6, 2010.
IL The award to Claimant of medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68.
iii. The finding that Claimant has accident produced impairment of 12% of the
whole person.
b. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining Appellants are
estopped from asserting any position on Claimant's pre-existing physical impairment
inconsistent with the 0% PPI rating assessed by Richard Knoebel, M.D., in 1991,
inclusive of the finding that:
i. ISIF is not liable for any portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability,
leaving Appellants wholly liable for payments of total and permanent
disability benefits to which Claimant is entitled subsequent to his November
2010 date of medical stability.
c. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining Claimant is entitled
to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 72-804 for Appellants'
unreasonable denial of PPI benefits subsequent to January 30, 2012.

4.

There is no order sealing any portion of the record.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. Transcripts have already been prepared for
the hearings occurring on September 28, 2010, and May 17, 2012. Hearing transcripts are
listed below to be included in the Industrial Commission's record.

6.

Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Industrial
Commission's record regardless of whether such documents are automatically included under
Rule 28 I.A.R.:
a. Respondent's Request for Calendaring dated May 3, 2010.
b. Appellants' Response to Respondent's Request for Calendaring and Motion for
Bifurcation dated May 11, 2010.
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c. The Industrial Commission's Notice of Hearing dated July 20, 2010.
d. Hearing transcript dated September 28, 2010.
e. All exhibits admitted at the September 28, 2010, hearing including:
i. Respondent's exhibits 1-20.
ii. Appellants' exhibits 1-8.
f. All post-hearing briefs filed regarding the September 28, 2010, hearing, including:
i. Respondent's opening brief dated November 19, 2010.
ii. Appellants' responsive brief dated December 17, 2010.
iii. Respondent's reply brief dated December 28, 2010.
g. The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order dated
May 17, 2011.
h. Appellants' Notice of Appeal dated June 20, 2011.
i. The Supreme Court's Certificate of Appeal dated June 21, 2011.
j. Appellants' Response to Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal dated July
8, 2011, including:
i. Appellants' Affidavit in Support of Response dated July 8, 2011.
ii. Appellants' Brief in Support of Response dated July 8, 2011.
k. The Supreme Court's Order Dismissing Appeal dated July 27, 2011.
1. Appellants' Motion for Clarification dated August 1, 2011, including:
i. Appellants' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Clarification dated August 1,
2011.
rn. The Supreme Court's Order Denying Motion for Clarification dated August 15, 2011.
n. The Supreme Court's Rernittitur dated August 19, 2011.
o. Appellants' Notice oflntent to File a Complaint against ISIF dated August 18, 2011.
p. Appellants' Request for Additional Issues at Hearing dated August 19, 2011.
q. Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Motion dated August 31, 2011.
r. Appellants' Memorandum Regarding Payment Obligations dated September 16,
2011, including:
i. Appellants' Affidavit in Support of Memorandum dated September 16, 2011.
ii. All exhibits to the memorandum.
s. Co-Respondent ISIF's Acknowledgement of Notice of Claim dated September 26,
2011.
t. Respondent's Response to Appellants' Motion for Stay dated September 27, 2011.
u. Co-Respondent ISIF's Denial of Claim dated October 6, 2011.
v. Appellants' Complaint against ISIF dated October 19, 2011.
w. Co-Respondent ISIF's Answer to Complaint dated November 8, 2011.
x. Respondent's Request for Calendaring dated November 29, 2011.
y. The Industrial Commission's Order Denying Stay dated December 8, 2011.
z. Appellants' Motion for Permission to Appeal Order Denying Stay and Request for
Expedited Hearing dated December 12, 2011.
aa. Appellants' Motion Requesting Expedited Ruling for Stay upon Permissive Appeal
dated December 12, 2011.
bb. The Industrial Commission's Order to Shorten Time dated December 13, 2011.
cc. The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Permission to Appeal dated December
19, 2011.

NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. 3

dd. Appellants' Motion for Permissive Appeal and Stay dated December 30, 2011,
including:
i. Appellants' Affidavit in Support of Motion dated December 30, 2011.
ii. Appellants' Brief in Support of Motion dated December 30, 2011.
ee. The Supreme Court's Notice of Filing dated December 30, 2011.
ff. The Supreme Court's Order Denying Motion for Permissive Appeal dated January
30, 2012.
gg. Respondent's Request to Include Supplemental Issues for Resolution at May 17,
2012, Hearing dated February 13, 2012.
hh. The Industrial Commission's Notice of Hearing dated March 7, 2012.
11. Hearing transcript dated May 17, 2012.
jj. All exhibits admitted at the May 17, 2012, hearing, including:
i. Respondent's exhibits 1-24.
ii. Appellants' exhibits 9-22.
iii. Co-Respondent ISIF's exhibits A-K.
kk. The post-hearing deposition transcript of:
i. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., dated June 4, 2012.
11. All post-hearing briefs filed regarding the May 17, 2012, hearing, including:
1. Respondent's opening brief dated July 27, 2012.
11. Co-Respondent ISIF' s responsive brief dated August 15, 2012.
m. Appellants' responsive brief dated August 15, 2012.
iv. Respondent's reply brief dated August 28, 2012.
mm.Appellants' Notice of Substitution of Counsel dated August 31, 2012.
nn. The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated
September 28, 2012.
oo. Respondent's Motion for Correction of Errata dated October 15, 2012.
pp. Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration dated October 17, 2012, including:
i. Appellants' Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration dated October
17, 2012.
qq. Co-Respondent ISIF's Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration dated October 29,
2012.
rr. Respondent's Brief in Response to Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 30, 2012.
ss. Appellants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration dated November
7, 2012.
tt. The Industrial Commission's Errata dated December 5, 2012.
uu. The Industrial Commission's Order of Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012.
vv. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's December
10, 2012, Order dated December 19, 2012, including:
i. Respondent's Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 19, 2012.
ww. Appellants' Objection to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration dated December
21, 2012.
xx. Respondent's Response to Appellants' Objection to Claimant's Motion dated
December 24, 2012.

NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. 4
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yy. The Industrial Commission's Order Dismissing Respondent's Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 2, 2013.

7.

I certify:
a. That there are no transcript fees because the Industrial Commission provides copies
of the transcripts upon written request, without a fee, to all parties and the transcripts
have already been prepared;
b. That the estimated fee for preparation of the Industrial Commission's record has been
paid;
c. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20
I.A.R.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2013.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, PLLC
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, ID 83702
PH (208) 387-2667
FAX (208) 387-2677
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com
Attorney for Appellants United Parcel
Service, Inc. and Liberty Insurance Corp.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
RICK KALLAS
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, & DEFRANCO, PLLC
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE, ID 83712
PAUL AUGUSTINE
P.O. BOX 1521
BOISE, ID 83701
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN
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MICHA EL VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent,
TE OF
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STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Respondent-Respondent on
and
U1"11TED PARCEL
RVICE, 11\C.,
Employer, and LIDERTY INSURANCE
CORPORA Tl
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CERTIFICATION

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order; Errata and
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order; Order on Reconsideration; Order
Dismissing Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the December 10, 2012 Order and the
whole thereof, in IC case number 2010-000114 for Michael Vawter v. United Parcel Services, Inc.,
Employer, Liberty Insurance Corp., Surety, and State ofldaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of said
Commission

this~ day of January, 2013.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAELP. VAWTER,
Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Defendants I Appellants I Cross-Respondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Co-Respondent

CLAIMANT'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I. C. No. 2010- 000114
Supreme Court No. 40660-2013

NOTICE OF
CROSS-APPEAL

Filing Fee: $94.00
[Rule 23(a)(4), I.AR.]
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS I APPELLANTS I CROSS-RESPONDENTS,
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, AND LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
AND THEIR ATTORNEY, SUSAN R. VELTJVIAN, AND TO THE STATE OF
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, AND THEIR ATTORNEY,
PAUL AUGUSTINE, AND TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TRA.T:
1.

The above named Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant, Michael P. Vawter, crossappeals against the above named Defendants I Appellants I Cross-Respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order; from the Industrial Commission's December 8, 2011 Order
Denying Stay and from the Industrial Commission's September 28, 2012 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order (as amended by Errata Order of 12.5.10) and December 10,
2012 Order On Reconsideration.

2.

The Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court because the orders described above in paragraph 1 are final and appealable
orders pursuant to Rule 11 (d) I.AR.

3.

Preliminary statement of the issues on cross-appeal:

(a)

Are Defendants I Appellants I Cross-Respondents estopped I barred from raising the
"course of employment" issue for the first time on appeal since they conceded before the
Industrial Commission that the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident I injury occurred during the
course of his employment?

CLAIMANT'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
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(b)

Did the Industrial Commission err by concluding in its 5 .17 .11 decision that the
Defendants presented sufficient evidence to rebut I overcome the "premises presumption"
that the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident I injury arose out of his employment?

(c)

Did the Industrial Commission err by concluding in its 5 .17 .11 decision that the Claimant
was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 based on
employer I surety's unreasonable denial of this claim?

(d)

When employer I surety file a motion to bifurcate the hearings before the Industrial
Commission, do they have an obligation to comply with the Industrial Commission's
bifurcated order even though it does not resolve all disputed issues in the case?

(e)

Did the Industrial Commission err by concluding in its 12.8.11 Order Denying Stay that
the Defendants did not unreasonably delay the payment of benefits to Claimant as
ordered by the Commission in its 5 .1 7.11 decision and by concluding that Claimant was
not entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804?

(f)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision I
12. l 0.12 Order on Reconsideration by retroactively assigning a 7% PPI rating that was
not issued until 2011 to the Claimant's 10.22.90 industrial accident?

(g)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9 .28.12 decision I 12.5 .12 amended decision I
12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration by finding that the Claimant's 7% PPI rating issued in
2011 was "manifest" prior to the Claimant's 12.18. 09 accident I injury?

(h)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision I
12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration by finding that the Claimant's 7% PPI rating issued in
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2011 was a "subjective hindrance" to obtaining employment or reemployment prior to the
Claimant's 12.18.09 accident I injury?
(i)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision I
12 .10 .12 Order on Reconsideration by finding that the Claimant's 7% PPI rating issued in
2011 "combined with" the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident I injury to cause the Claimant to
become totally and permanently disabled?

U)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision I
12. l 0.12 Order on Reconsideration by giving retroactive application to permanent
physical restrictions that were not issued until 2011 to the Claimant's 10.22.90 industrial
accident?

(k)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9.28.12 decision/ 12.5.12 amended decision I
12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration by applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
prevent the Claimant from collecting 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied
medical benefits that Claimant incurred outside the workers' compensation system in
direct violation of the Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146,
149, 206 P.3d 852, 855 (2009)?

(1)

Did the Industrial Commission err by dismissing the Claimant's 12.19.12 Motion To
Reconsider the collateral estoppel issue even though the Industrial Commission did not
discuss the collateral estoppel issue until it issued its 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration?

(m)

Did the Industrial Commission err in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision I
12. l 0.12 Order on Reconsideration by not exercising its jurisdiction under Idaho Code
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§72-719 to prevent the manifest injustice of giving Defendants I Appellants I CrossRespondents an unearned credit for the payment of past denied medical bills that they
never actually paid in direct violation of the Court's holding in Neel v. Western
Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206 P.3d 852, 855 (2009).
(n)

Whether Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney's
fees at every stage of this case from date of injury on 12.18.09 to the date of final
decision by the Supreme Court on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804?

4.

No portion of the record has been sealed by order of the Commission or a Court.

5.

The Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant requests the preparation of the entire
reporter's standard transcript for both the 9 .28 .10 Hearing and the 5.1 7.12 Hearing as
defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R. to be delivered to the Supreme Court. The Industrial
Commission has already provided the reporter's transcripts of the 9.28.10 Hearing and
5 .17 .12 Hearing to the parties.

6.

The Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant requests the following documents to be
included in the Industrial Commission's I agency's record in addition to those automatically
included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and in addition to those listed in the Defendants I Appellants
I Cross-Respondents Notice of Appeal:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring;
Defendants' 5.12.10 Response To Claimant's Request For Calendaring and Motion
to Bifurcate;
Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate;
6.10.10 Pre-Hearing Deposition Transcript of Claimant;
Industrial Commission's 07.20.2010 Notice of 09.28.2010 Hearing;
9.16.10 Pre-Hearing Deposition Transcript of Mike McGuire;
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(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(3 5)

Claimant's 9.28.10 Hearing Exhibits 1-20;
Defendants' 9.28.10 Hearing Exhibits 1-8;
Claimant's 11.19.10 Opening Brief;
Defendants' 12.17.10 Responsive Brief;
Claimant's 12.28.10 Reply Brief;
Referee Michael Powers' 4.20.11 Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Recommendation;
Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order;
Claimant's 5.19.11 Request For Calendaring;
Defendants' 5.31.11 Response To Request For Calendaring;
Industrial Commission's 6.3.11 Order Denying Request For Calendaring;
Claimant's 6.3.11 Reply to Defendants' Response to Claimant's Request For
Calendaring;
Industrial Commission's Amended Notice of 9.7.11 Telephone Conference and
Notice of 10.25.11 Hearing;
Defendant I Appellant's 6.20.11 Notice of Appeal;
Idaho Supreme Court's 7.27.11 Order Dismissing Appeal;
Defendants I Appellants' 8.1.11 Motion For Clarification;
8.1.11 Affidavit of Susan R. Veltman in Support of Defendants I Appellants'
Motion For Clarification;
Idaho Supreme Court's 8.15.11 Order Denying Defendant I Appellant's Motion
For Clarification;
Defendants' 8.18.11 Notice oflntent to File WC Complaint against the Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund;
Idaho Supreme Court's 8.19.11 Remittitur;
Defendants' 8.19.11 Request For Additional Issues at 10.25.11 Hearing;
Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection To Defendants' Motion to Add Issues at 10.25.11
Hearing;
Industrial Commission's 9.7.11 Order Vacating 10.25.11 Hearing and
Establishing Briefing Schedule;
Defendants' 9.16.11 Memorandum Regarding the Issue of Payment Obligations;
Affidavit of Susan R. Veltman In Support of Defendants' Memorandum
Regarding The Issue of Payment Obligations;
Claimant's 9.27.11 Response to Defendants' Motion For Stay of 5.17.11 Order to
Pay Compensation Benefits;
Claimant's 11.29.11 Request For Calendaring;
Claimant's 11.29.11 Request For Status Conference;
Industrial Commission's 12.8.11 Order Denying Stay;
Defendants' 12.12.11 Motion For Permission to Appeal Order and Request For
Expedited Hearing;
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(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)

(46)

(47)

(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(60)

Defendants' 12.12.11 Motion Requesting Expedited Ruling For Stay Upon
Permissive Appeal;
Industrial Commission's 12.13.11 Order To Shorten Time;
ISIF's 12.15.11 Response to Motions Filed by Liberty Insurance Corp. and United
Parcel Service;
Claimant's 12.15 .11 Request For Scheduling of Hearing Based on Claimant's
11.29.11 Request For Calendaring;
Claimant's 12.15 .11 Response in Opposition To Defendant UPS' s Motion For
Permission to Appeal;
Industrial Commission's 12.19.11 Order Granting Permission To Appeal;
Defendant UPS's 12.19.11 Response to Claimant's Request For Calendaring;
Defendant ISIF's 12.20.11 Response to Claimant's Request For Calendaring;
Defendant I Appellant UPS's 12.30.11 Motion To Idaho Supreme Court For
Permissive Appeal and to Stay the Industrial Commission's 12.8.11 Order;
Defendant I Appellant UPS's 12.30.11 Brief to the Idaho Supreme Court In
Support of Their Motion For Permission to Appeal And To Stay the Industrial
Commission's 12.8.11 Order;
12.30.11 Affidavit of Susan R. Veltman in Support of Defendant I Appellant
UPS's 12.30.11 Motion to the Idaho Supreme Court For Permission to Appeal
and to Stay the Industrial Commission's 12.8.11 Order;
Claimant I Respondent's 1.13.12 Brief in Response to Defendant I Appellant's
Motion For Permissive Appeal and to Stay the Industrial Commission's 12.8.11
Interlocutory Order;
Claimant I Respondent's 1.13 .12 Motion To Modify Industrial Commission's
12.19.11 Stay;
Claimant I Respondent's 1.13.12 Briefln Support of Motion To Modify Industrial
Commission's 12.19.00 Stay;
1.13.12 Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas in Support of Claimant I Respondent's
Motion To Modify Industrial Commission's 12.19.11 Stay;
1.13.12 Affidavit of Claimant I Respondent in Support of Motion To Modify
Industrial Commission's 12.19.11 Stay;
Idaho Supreme Court's 1.30.12 Order Denying Motion For Permissive Appeal;
Claimant's 1.30.12 Second Request For Scheduling of Final Hearing Based on
Claimant's 11.29.11 Request For Calendaring;
Claimant's 2.13.12 Request To Include Supplemental Issue at 5.17.12 Hearing;
Industrial Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of 5.17.12 Hearing;
5.8.12 Pre-Hearing Deposition Transcript of Preston (Dax) Wilkinson;
Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibits 1-24;
Defendant UPS's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibits 9-22;
Defendant ISIF's Hearing Exhibits A- K;
6.4.12 Post-Hearing Deposition Transcript of R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D.;
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(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73)
(74)
(75)
(76)
(77)
(78)
(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)

7.

Claimant's 7.27.12 Opening Brief;
Defendant UPS's 8.15.12 Post-Hearing Brief;
Defendant ISIF's 8.15.12 Post-Hearing Brief;
Claimant's 8.27.12 Post-Hearing Reply Brief;
Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order;
Claimant's 10.15.12 Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees;
Claimant's 10 .15 .12 Motion For Correction of Errata;
Defendant UPS' s 10 .1 7 .12 Motion For Reconsideration;
Defendant UPS's 10.17.12 Briefin Support of Motion For Reconsideration;
Defendant ISIF's 10.29.12 Brief in Opposition to Motion For Reconsideration;
Claimant's 10.30.12 Brief In Response to UPS's 10.17.12 Motion For
Reconsideration;
Claimant's 10.30.12 Addendum to 10.15.12 Affidavit in Support of Award of
Attorney's Fees;
Defendant UPS's 11.7.12 Reply Brief;
Industrial Commission's 12.5.12 Errata;
Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration;
Claimant's 12.19.12 Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10.12 Order on
Reconsideration;
Claimant's 12.19.12 Brief in Support of Motion For Reconsideration of 12.10.12
Order on Reconsideration;
Claimant's 12.19.12 Supplemental Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's
Fees based on 12 .10 .12 Order on Reconsideration;
Defendant UPS's 12.21.12 Objection to Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration;
Claimant's 12.24.12 Response to Defendant UPS's Objection to Claimant's
Motion For Reconsideration;
Industrial Commission's 1.2.13 Order Dismissing Claimant's Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the 12. l 0.12 Order; and,
Defendant I Appellant UPS 's 1.18.13 Notice of Appeal.

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been served on the reporter of the
9.28.10 Hearing and 5.17.12 Hearing, M. Dean Willis, CSR No. 95, C!O M.D Willis
Certified Shorthand Reporters, P.O. Box 1241, Eagle, Idaho 83616.
(b) (1) [X]

The original transcripts of the 9.28.10 Hearing and 5.17.12 Hearing have

CLAIMANT'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
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been filed by the reporter with the Industrial Commission and copies of the transcripts
have already been provided to the parties.
(2) [ ] That the cross-appellant is exempt from paymg the estimated transcript fee
because:
(c)(l) [X]

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the agency's record (if any)

has been paid to the clerk of the Industrial Commission.
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of
the record because:
(d) ( 1) [ X]

That the cross-appeal appellate filing fee has been paid.

(2) [] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because:
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20.

DATED this 1st day of February, 2013.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DeFRANCO, P.L.L.C

Attorney's For Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of February, 2013, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following:

Susan R. Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson, PLLC
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, Idaho 83 702

M.D. Willis
Certified Shorthand Reporters
P.O. Box 1241
Eagle, ID 83616

Michael P. Vawter
P.O. Box 168
Donnelly, Idaho 83615

Paul Augustine
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, Idaho 83701

Attorney For Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent/Cross Appellant,
V.

)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 40660

)

CERTIFICATE OF CROSS APPEAL

)

)

STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRlAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND

)
)
)

Respondent-Respondent on Appeal,

)
)

)

~~

)
)
)
)
)
)

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer, and LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Respondents-Appellants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

)

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
Thomas Limbaugh, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2010-000114

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed September 28, 2012; Errata and Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed December 5, 2012; Order on Reconsideration,
filed December 10, 2012; Order Dismissing
Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration of
the December 10, 2012 Order.

Attorney for Appellant:

Susan R. Veltman
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, ID 83702

CERTIFICATE OF CROSS APPEAL (40660 -1\UCHAEL VA'WTER) - 1

Attorney for Claimant-Respondent I
Cross Appellant:

Rick Kallas
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

Attorney for Respondent ISIF:

Paul Augustine
PO Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

Appealed By:

United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance

Appealed Against:

Michael Vawter and State of Idaho Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund

Notice of Appeal Filed:

January 18, 2013

Cross Appeal By:

Michael Vawter

Appealed Against:

United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance and
State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

Notice of Cross Appeal Filed:

February 1, 2013

Cross Appellate Fee Paid:

$94.00 to Supreme Court

Name of Reporter:

Dean Willis

Transcript Requested:

Yes

Dated:

February 4, 2013

Assistant Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF CROSS APPEAL (40660 - MICHAEL VAWTER) - 2

CERTIFICATION

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Cross-Appeal and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2010-000114 for
Michael Vawter v. United Parcel Services, Inc., Employer, Liberty Insurance Corp., Surety, and .
State ofldaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of said
Commission

this~ day of February, 2013.
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NAL

PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTI1'1'E LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014

l~\1FEB-1.1 p j:Ub

Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant,
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
IC No. 2010-000114
Claimant/Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,

v.

Docket No. 40660-2013

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Defendants/
Appellants/Cross
Respondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Co-Respondent/
Cross Appellant.

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 1

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS, UNITED
PARCEL SERVICES, INC. AND LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP. AND THEIR ATTORNEY,
SUSAN VELTMAN, 1703 W. HILL ROAD, BOISE, IDAHO 83702, THE CLERK OF THE
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND MICHAEL VAWTERM'D HIS ATTORNEY, RICK
KALLAS, 1031, E. PARK BLVD., BOISE, IDAHO 83712.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Cross-Appellant/Respondent, State of Idaho, Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund appeals against the above named Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders entered in the
above entitled proceeding on September 28, 2012 and December 5, 2012 and the Order on
Reconsideration December 19, 2012 by Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner Thomas P.
Baskin, and Commission R.D. Maynard.
2. That the Respondent/Cross-Appellant has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court, and the Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rule 1 l(d) I. A. R.
3.

Preliminary statement at issues on cross-appeal:
a. Did the Industrial Commission err in its September 28, 2012 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, its December 5, 2012 Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and its December 10, 2012 Order on
Reconsideration by retroactively assigning 7% PPI to Claimant's 1990 low back
lllJUry.
b. Did the Industrial Commission err in its September 28, 2012 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, its December 5, 2012 Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and its December 10, 2012 Order on
Reconsideration by finding that the Claimant's 1990 low back injury constituted
a subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to his 2009 industrial accident.
c. Did the Industrial Commission err in its September 28, 2012 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, its December 5, 2012 Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and its December 10, 2012 Order on
Reconsideration by finding that Claimant's pre-existing low back condition
combined with his injury of December 18, 2009 to cause Claimant's total and
permanent disability.

4. No additional reports or transcripts are requested.
5. Respondent/Cross-Appellant does not request the inclusion of any additional documents
in the agency's record.
6. I certify:

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2

a. That there are no transcript fees or document fees due because no additional
documents have been requested;
b. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and
c. That Service has been made on all parties required to be served.
DATED this

11\f'

day of February, 2013.
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By

w~

Paul J. Augdtlne - Of the Firm
Attorneys for~ross-Appellant

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \.i\ ~ day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, by the method indicated below, and addressed
to each of the following:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, PLLC
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

...';f:-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__Hand Delivered
__Overnight Mail
__Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant
Susan Veltman
Breen, Veltman & Wilson, PLLC
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, ID 83702

¥-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__Hand Delivered
__Overnight Mail
__Telecopy

Attorneys for Employer/Surety

I

.

Paul J. Augustin'f

'\J

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent/Cross Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
lJ\TD EMNITY FUND
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal/Cross Appellant,
and,
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Employer, and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety,
Respondents-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 40660
CERTIFICATE OF
CROSS APPEAL(ISIF)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
Thomas Limbaugh, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2010-000114

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed September 28, 2012; Errata and Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed December 5, 2012; Order on Reconsideration,
filed December 10, 2012; Order Dismissing
Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration of
the December 10, 2012 Order.

Attorney for Appellants:

Susan R. Veltman
1703 W. Hill Road
Boise, ID 83702

CERTIFICATE OF CROSS APPEAL (ISIF) (40660 - MICHAEL VAWTER) - 1

Attorney for Claimant-Respondent I
Cross Appellant:

Rick Kallas
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

Attorney for Respondent ISIF/
Cross Appellant:

Paul Augustine
PO Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

Appealed By:

United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance

Appealed Against:

Michael Vawter and State ofidaho Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund

Notice of Appeal Filed:

January 18, 2013

Cross Appeal By:

Michael Vawter

Appealed Against:

United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance and
State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

Notice of Cross Appeal Filed:

February 1, 2013

Cross Appeal By:

State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

Appealed Against:

Michael Vawter and United Parcel Service and
Liberty Insurance

Notice of Cross Appeal (ISIF) Filed:

February 4, 2013

Cross Appellant (ISIF) Fee Paid:

$94.00 to Supreme Court

Name of Reporter:

Dean Willis

Transcript Requested:

Yes

Dated:

February 5, 2013

Assistant Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF CROSS APPEAL (ISIF) (40660 - MICHAEL VAWTER) - 2

CERTIFICATION

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Cross-Appeal (ISIF) and the whole thereof, in IC case number
2010-000114 for Michael Vawter v. United Parcel Services, Inc., Employer, Liberty Insurance
Corp., Surety, and State ofldaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of said
Commission this

Sth day of February, 2013.

/uma

~

Assistant Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 40660, Michael Vawter, on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the
Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein.
DATED this J,{jh. day

ofd~1:)

, 2013.
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As~istant

Commission Secretary
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent/Cross Appellant,

v.

)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 40660
NOTICE OF COMPLETION

)

STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal/Cross Appellant,
and
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Employer, and LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Respondents-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~--~~~~~-~~)

TO:

STEPHEN KENYON, Clerk of the Courts;
Rick D. Kallas, for the Claimant-Respondent/Cross Appellant;
Paul J. Augustine, for the Respondent-Respondent on Appeal/Cross Appellant;
Susan R. Veltman, for the Claimant-Appellant.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served
by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Rick D. Kallas
PO Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

Paul J. Augustine
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
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Susan R. Veltman
1703 W. Hill Rd.
Boise, ID 83702

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Agency's Record,
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the Agency's
Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record
shall be deemed settled.
DATED

thi~day of c5jilfl,rz,~

, 2013.

* 0 ~ssistant

NOTICE OF

COMPLETIO~
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